关于「说真话与短名单:提议方的诚实与接受方的赌注」,《稳定匹配与无私奔配对》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第四章说明提议方说真话不吃亏,接受方中有 0.233 能靠谎报得益,但缩短名单是一场可能落空的赌注。

数据口径:书中的人物、档期与偏好均为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,只使用当事人明示提供的偏好,不做未经同意的画像,配对结果只是建议,双方都可以拒绝。 第一章在示意扫描中发现口味越一致,先到先得越糟,平均私奔对从 4.14 个升到 14.12 个;评分优先只在所有买手看法完全一致时才稳定;罗斯对英国八个地区的比较单看计数,单侧费希尔检验 p 值为 0.2143,须与定理和实验复现一起才站得住。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.233

markets 500 of 4x4, every agent tries all 65 reported lists
creators (proposers) who can gain by lying0 of 2000
brands (receivers) who can gain by lying465 of 2000 (0.233)
markets where at least one brand can gain188 of 500 (0.376)
mean gain of a gaining brand1.64 places
brands whose best lie beats their brand-optimal stable partner0
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. p41: who can gain by misstating a ranking? Exhaustive check.
# Model: 4 creators propose to 4 brands, uniformly random true rankings,
# fixed seed, 500 illustrative markets. For every agent we try every
# possible reported list (each ordered subset of the other side: 65
# lists, truncations included) with everyone else truthful, and ask
# whether the outcome under the TRUE ranking beats truth-telling.
# Theory: proposers can never gain (Dubins and Freedman 1981; Roth
# 1982); receivers sometimes can (Roth 1982).
import itertools
import math
import random

N, MARKETS = 4, 500
rng = random.Random(20261113)
LISTS = [list(p) for k in range(N + 1)
         for p in itertools.permutations(range(N), k)]


def deferred(pp, rp):
    rank = [{p: i for i, p in enumerate(v)} for v in rp]
    nxt, held, free = [0] * N, [None] * N, list(range(N))
    while free:
        p = free.pop()
        while nxt[p] < len(pp[p]) and p not in rank[pp[p][nxt[p]]]:
            nxt[p] += 1
        if nxt[p] >= len(pp[p]):
            continue
        r = pp[p][nxt[p]]
        nxt[p] += 1
        cur = held[r]
        if cur is None:
            held[r] = p
        elif rank[r][p] < rank[r][cur]:
            held[r] = p
            free.append(cur)
        else:
            free.append(p)
    return held


def value(true, partner):
    return N - true.index(partner) if partner is not None else 0


prop_gain = rec_gain = rec_any = beyond = 0
rec_size = []
for _ in range(MARKETS):
    kp = [rng.sample(range(N), N) for _ in range(N)]
    bp = [rng.sample(range(N), N) for _ in range(N)]
    held = deferred(kp, bp)
    part_k = {k: b for b, k in enumerate(held) if k is not None}
    for k in range(N):
        base = value(kp[k], part_k.get(k))
        for lst in LISTS:
            h = deferred(kp[:k] + [lst] + kp[k + 1:], bp)
            got = {kk: b for b, kk in enumerate(h) if kk is not None}
            if value(kp[k], got.get(k)) > base:
                prop_gain += 1
                break
    bh = deferred(bp, kp)                # 品牌提议:品牌最优稳定配对
    bopt = [None] * N
    for k, b in enumerate(bh):
        if b is not None:
            bopt[b] = k
    any_here = False
    for b in range(N):
        base = value(bp[b], held[b])
        best = base
        for lst in LISTS:
            h = deferred(kp, bp[:b] + [lst] + bp[b + 1:])
            best = max(best, value(bp[b], h[b]))
        if best > base:
            rec_gain += 1
            any_here = True
            rec_size.append(best - base)
        if best > value(bp[b], bopt[b]):
            beyond += 1
    if any_here:
        rec_any += 1
print("markets %d of %dx%d, every agent tries all %d reported lists"
      % (MARKETS, N, N, len(LISTS)))
print("creators (proposers) who can gain by lying: %d of %d"
      % (prop_gain, MARKETS * N))
print("brands (receivers) who can gain by lying:   %d of %d (%.3f)"
      % (rec_gain, MARKETS * N, rec_gain / (MARKETS * N)))
print("markets where at least one brand can gain:  %d of %d (%.3f)"
      % (rec_any, MARKETS, rec_any / MARKETS))
print("mean gain of a gaining brand: %.2f places"
      % (math.fsum(rec_size) / len(rec_size)))
print("brands whose best lie beats their brand-optimal stable partner: %d"
      % beyond)

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《稳定匹配盖尔沙普利算法、买手客户达人品牌摄影师档期的无私奔配对母典》第 4 章「说真话与短名单:提议方的诚实与接受方的赌注」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-299 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026299,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Gale-Shapley Stable Matching: Pairings without Blocking Pairs for Buyers and Clients, Creators and Brands, Photographers and Slots},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论