What does Power Laws, Audits and Buyouts in Creator Management conclude, in numbers, about “Off-Platform Deals as an Inspection Game: Audit Rates, Penalties and the Mixed Equilibrium of Private Gains”?

Answer: Chapter 3 writes off-platform dealing as an inspection game and derives the minimum effective audit rate, 0.4167 for a penalty of 30000 yuan under the reference parameters; when the penalty cannot be collected, raising it reduces audits but not diversion.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not individual legal or financial advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.4167, 30000

gain G 15000, sensitivity 0.8, audit cost 600
F kept by agency F not collected
penalty F p* (audit) q* loss/month q* loss/month
01.0000 0.0500 750 0.0500 750
150000.6250 0.0250 375 0.0500 750
300000.4167 0.0167 250 0.0500 750
600000.2500 0.0100 150 0.0500 750
1200000.1389 0.0056 83 0.0500 750
commitment: audit at p* + 0.01 removes diversion; audit spend
F15000: p 0.6350, spend 381 a month vs exposure 15000
F30000: p 0.4267, spend 256 a month vs exposure 15000
F60000: p 0.2600, spend 156 a month vs exposure 15000
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: the off-platform deal as an inspection game.
# A creator who takes a brand deal privately keeps the agency's
# commission G (deal value 50000 yuan x commission 0.30).  The agency
# audits with probability p; an audit finds a diverted deal with
# sensitivity S and then the creator repays G plus a penalty F.  An
# audit costs K.  Creator indifference gives p* = G / (S (G + F));
# agency indifference gives the diversion rate q* = K / (S (G + F)) if
# F is collected by the agency, and K / (S G) if it is not.  The
# commitment line is the cheapest audit rate that removes diversion.
# Parameters are illustrative, in yuan per creator-month.
G, S, K = 50000 * 0.30, 0.8, 600

print("gain G {:.0f}, sensitivity {}, audit cost {}".format(G, S, K))
print("                        F kept by agency    F not collected")
print("penalty F   p* (audit)   q*      loss/month  q*      loss/month")
for F in (0, 15000, 30000, 60000, 120000):
    p = G / (S * (G + F))
    qk = K / (S * (G + F))
    ql = K / (S * G)
    print("{:9d} {:11.4f}   {:.4f} {:9.0f}    {:.4f} {:9.0f}".format(
        F, min(p, 1.0), qk, qk * G, ql, ql * G))
print("commitment: audit at p* + 0.01 removes diversion; audit spend")
for F in (15000, 30000, 60000):
    p = G / (S * (G + F)) + 0.01
    print("  F {:6d}: p {:.4f}, spend {:5.0f} a month vs exposure {:.0f}"
          .format(F, p, p * K, G))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Survivor Power Laws in Influencer-Agency Incubation, Sampling-Audit Games against Off-Platform Deals and Option Pricing of Contract Buyouts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: Off-Platform Deals as an Inspection Game: Audit Rates, Penalties and the Mixed Equilibrium of Private Gains. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-172 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026172,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Survivor Power Laws in Influencer-Agency Incubation, Sampling-Audit Games against Off-Platform Deals and Option Pricing of Contract Buyouts},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book