What does Falsifiability and the Replication Crisis conclude, in numbers, about “Falsifiability and Research Programmes: What Counts as a Scientific Statement?”?
Answer: The first case resembles the historical example Dorling discussed: a well-tested theory (0.90 beforehand) with a less reliable auxiliary (0.60). After the failure the theory falls only to 0.783, while the auxiliary drops from 0.60 to 0.130: the blame falls mainly on the auxiliary, as it should. The second case is the reverse: a young theory (0.50) paired with a well-tested auxiliary (0.95) falls to 0.048. The third case shows that if "theory true but auxiliary wrong" would itself rarely produce such a failure, even a theory that was very credible (0.90) falls to 0.067. So the Duhem–Quine thesis describes a logical indeterminacy, but evidence can still discriminate between the parts quite sharply.
Scope of the numbers: This book is not medical, psychological or investment advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (14 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.048, 0.067, 0.130, 0.50, 0.60, 0.783
| case | P(T) before -> after | P(A) before -> after |
|---|---|---|
| well-tested theory, shaky auxiliary | 0.90 -> 0.783 | 0.60 -> 0.130 |
| young theory, well-tested auxiliary | 0.50 -> 0.048 | 0.95 -> 0.905 |
| old theory, but failure unlikely if T holds 0.90 -> 0.067 | 0.60 -> 0.560 | |
| patches | degenerating: P(system) | progressive: P(system) |
| 0 | 0.900 | 0.9000 |
| 1 | 0.818 | 0.9783 |
| 2 | 0.692 | 0.9956 |
| 3 | 0.529 | 0.9991 |
| 4 | 0.360 | 0.9998 |
| 5 | 0.220 | 1.0000 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Duhem's problem in Bayesian form (the approach of Dorling 1979; the numbers are
# illustrative). A prediction E follows only from theory T TOGETHER WITH an auxiliary
# assumption A. E fails. Logic says only "not (T and A)"; how the blame is shared depends
# on the priors and on how likely the failure would be in each of the other three cases. T
# and A are independent a priori.
def after_failure(pT, pA, l_TnA, l_nTA, l_nTnA):
# l_xy = P(failure | x, y); P(failure | T, A) = 0 because T and A together entail E
TnA = pT * (1 - pA) * l_TnA
nTA = (1 - pT) * pA * l_nTA
nTnA = (1 - pT) * (1 - pA) * l_nTnA
z = TnA + nTA + nTnA
return TnA / z, nTA / z # P(T | failure), P(A | failure)
cases = [
("well-tested theory, shaky auxiliary", 0.90, 0.60, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50),
("young theory, well-tested auxiliary", 0.50, 0.95, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50),
("old theory, but failure unlikely if T holds", 0.90, 0.60, 0.01, 0.50, 0.50),
]
print("case P(T) before -> after"
" P(A) before -> after")
for label, pT, pA, *l in cases:
T, A = after_failure(pT, pA, *l)
print(f"{label:43s} {pT:.2f} -> {T:.3f} {pA:.2f} -> {A:.3f}")
# Repeated rescue, as odds of the rescued system against a rival (prior odds 9 : 1). Every
# new auxiliary costs a factor 0.5 in prior odds. A DEGENERATING patch only explains the
# failure it was made for (the rival explains it too: likelihood ratio 1). A PROGRESSIVE
# patch also predicts a new fact that is then observed and that the rival gave only a 10 %
# chance (likelihood ratio 10).
print("patches degenerating: P(system) progressive: P(system)")
for k in range(6):
deg, prog = 9 * 0.5 ** k, 9 * (0.5 * 10) ** k
print(f"{k:7d} {deg / (1 + deg):22.3f} {prog / (1 + prog):21.4f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Scientific Methodology, Falsifiability and the Mathematical Statistics of the Replication Crisis (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Falsifiability and Research Programmes: What Counts as a Scientific Statement?. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782104
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23782104 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-033 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026033,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Scientific Methodology, Falsifiability and the Mathematical Statistics of the Replication Crisis},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23782104},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782104}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Why Most Published Findings May Be False: Ioannidis's Derivation
- Chapter 3 · p-Hacking, Researcher Degrees of Freedom and the Garden of Forking Paths
- Chapter 4 · Publication Bias, the File Drawer and the Winner's Curse
- Chapter 5 · Large-Scale Replication: Results and Controversy
- Chapter 6 · The Remedies of Meta-Science: Pre-Registration, Registered Reports and Equivalence Tests
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial