What does Prediction-Market Prices and Arbitrage conclude, in numbers, about “Reading Probabilities from Prices: Calibration Tests, Correlated Resolutions and the Cost of Correction”?
Answer: Chapter 6 shows that the bias is hard to confirm: with 1,000 independent contracts a test has a power of only 0.575, with a within-event correlation of 0.3 1,000 contracts are worth 139, and a flexible correction makes forecasts worse.
Scope of the numbers: It is not investment, trading or betting advice; all data are synthetic, generated by its programs. Chapter 7 reads the Guanzi's "the clever gain tenfold" and the Shiji's Bai Gui, "what others discard I take, what others take I let go", as information rent and the cost of carry, marked as interpretation.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.3, 1000, 139
rho true sd naive se ratio effective n naive false positives 0.0 0.0098 0.0100 0.98 1036 0.044 0.1 0.0170 0.0100 1.70 344 0.243 0.3 0.0267 0.0100 2.68 139 0.470 0.6 0.0401 0.0100 4.02 62 0.628 Reading: the prices are right by construction, yet with an event-level correlation of 0.3 a naive test calls them biased in about half of all samples. 1,000 contracts from 20 events carry the information of far fewer; inference must cluster by event.
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p13: Correlated resolutions shrink the effective sample.
# 1,000 contracts come from 20 events (50 per event: states, margins,
# turnout lines of one election, say). Prices are perfectly calibrated:
# each contract's price equals its true probability, drawn uniform in
# [0.80, 0.97]. Outcomes share an event-level shock through a Gaussian
# copula with correlation rho, which leaves every marginal probability
# unchanged. The calibration estimate is mean(outcome - price); the
# naive standard error treats contracts as independent. 2,000 runs.
import math
import random
from statistics import NormalDist
E, M, RUNS = 20, 50, 2000
PHI = NormalDist()
def one(rng, rho):
total = var = 0.0
for _ in range(E):
z = rng.gauss(0, 1)
for _ in range(M):
p = rng.uniform(0.80, 0.97)
u = PHI.cdf(math.sqrt(rho) * z + math.sqrt(1 - rho)
* rng.gauss(0, 1))
total += (1 if u < p else 0) - p
var += p * (1 - p)
n = E * M
return total / n, math.sqrt(var) / n
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(59013)
print(" rho true sd naive se ratio effective n"
" naive false positives")
for rho in (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
est, ses = [], []
for _ in range(RUNS):
e, s = one(rng, rho)
est.append(e)
ses.append(s)
sd = math.sqrt(sum(x * x for x in est) / RUNS)
se = sum(ses) / RUNS
fp = sum(abs(e) / s > 1.96 for e, s in zip(est, ses)) / RUNS
print(" {:3.1f} {:7.4f} {:7.4f} {:5.2f} {:6.0f}"
" {:6.3f}".format(rho, sd, se, sd / se,
E * M * (se / sd) ** 2, fp))
print("\nReading: the prices are right by construction, yet with an")
print("event-level correlation of 0.3 a naive test calls them biased")
print("in about half of all samples. 1,000 contracts from 20 events")
print("carry the information of far fewer; inference must cluster by")
print("event.")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Reading Probabilities from Prices: Calibration Tests, Correlated Resolutions and the Cost of Correction. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090166
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090166 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-059 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026059,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090166},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090166}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · A Price Is Not a Probability: Belief Dispersion, Risk Attitudes and the Favourite-Longshot Bias
- Chapter 2 · The Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule: Softmax, KL Divergence and the Subsidy Cap
- Chapter 3 · Capital Lock-Up: Why Near-Certain Contracts Sit at 0.92 to 0.96
- Chapter 4 · Books of Exclusive Outcomes: Executable Arbitrage When Prices Do Not Sum to 1
- Chapter 5 · Logically Related Events: Convex Polytopes, Frank-Wolfe Projection and Arbitrage Certificates
- Chapter 7 · "The Wise Gain Tenfold" and "Watching the Turn of the Times": Information Rent and the Cost of Carry
- Chapter 8 · A Four-Step Check and a Pre-Registered Test of the Lock-Up Discount