What does Acquirer Risk Steps and Reserve Survival conclude, in numbers, about “Refunds: The Optimal Interception Threshold Before a Dispute”?
Answer: Chapter 4 derives the threshold for refunding before a dispute, 0.443 with the illustrative parameters, and compares strict, blanket and targeted policies.
Scope of the numbers: Parameters are illustrative; all calculations come from the book's programs. This is general risk analysis, not legal, financing or investment advice, and promises no income.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.443
| A. refund-now threshold q* (all disputes lost) | |
| price STEP | 0 STEP=20 STEP=60 |
| 10 | 0.367 0.220 0.122 |
| 30 | 0.620 0.443 0.282 |
| 100 | 0.842 0.721 0.561 |
| 300 | 0.941 0.885 0.792 |
| B. price 30, STEP 20: q* by dispute win rate W | |
| W | 0.0 q* = 0.443 |
| W | 0.2 q* = 0.517 |
| W | 0.4 q* = 0.620 |
| W | 0.6 q* = 0.775 |
| C. expected cost of one complaint, price 30, STEP 20 | |
| q refund now wait | |
| 0.1 | 31.00 7.00 |
| 0.3 | 31.00 21.00 |
| 0.5 | 31.00 35.00 |
| 0.7 | 31.00 49.00 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: when does a refund before a dispute cost less?
# A buyer complains about a digital order of price PRICE. If we refund
# now we give back PRICE and lose the processing fee FEE that is not
# returned. If we do not, the buyer opens a dispute with probability q;
# a lost dispute costs PRICE + CB_FEE (dispute fee) + OPS (evidence
# work) + STEP (the marginal expected cost of one more dispute on the
# ratio band, from chapter 1). We assume, against ourselves, that every
# dispute is lost; the win rate W enters in part B.
# Refund now is cheaper when q > q* = (PRICE + FEE) /
# (PRICE + CB_FEE + OPS + STEP) for W = 0, and in general when
# q (1 - W) (PRICE + CB_FEE + OPS + STEP) + q W (CB_FEE + OPS) >
# PRICE + FEE.
# Units are illustrative and carry no currency.
FEE, CB_FEE, OPS = 1.0, 15.0, 5.0
def q_star(price, step, win=0.0):
lose = price + CB_FEE + OPS + step
keep = CB_FEE + OPS
per_q = (1.0 - win) * lose + win * keep
return min(1.0, (price + FEE) / per_q)
def main():
print("A. refund-now threshold q* (all disputes lost)")
print(" price STEP=0 STEP=20 STEP=60")
for price in (10.0, 30.0, 100.0, 300.0):
row = [q_star(price, s) for s in (0.0, 20.0, 60.0)]
print(" {:>5.0f} {:.3f} {:.3f} {:.3f}".format(price, *row))
print("B. price 30, STEP 20: q* by dispute win rate W")
for win in (0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6):
print(" W = {:.1f} q* = {:.3f}".format(win, q_star(30.0, 20.0,
win)))
print("C. expected cost of one complaint, price 30, STEP 20")
print(" q refund now wait")
for q in (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7):
wait = q * (30.0 + CB_FEE + OPS + 20.0)
print(" {:.1f} {:>7.2f} {:>7.2f}".format(q, 30.0 + FEE, wait))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Payment-Acquirer Risk Step-Functions, Multi-Gateway Hot Failover and Rolling-Reserve Survival for Digital Fleets (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Refunds: The Optimal Interception Threshold Before a Dispute. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-397 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026397,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Payment-Acquirer Risk Step-Functions, Multi-Gateway Hot Failover and Rolling-Reserve Survival for Digital Fleets},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Steps: Noise in the Chargeback Ratio, the Beta Posterior and Card-Network Definitions
- Chapter 2 · Lag: Cohort Measures, Arrival-Date Measures and Underestimation During Surges
- Chapter 3 · Jumps: Cumulative Sums, Exponentially Weighted Averages and Bayesian Online Change Points
- Chapter 5 · Hot Failover: Common-Cause Failure, Timeout Budgets and Idempotency
- Chapter 6 · Reserves: Rolling Holdbacks, Settlement Freezes and the Minimum Buffer That Keeps Cash Flowing
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: Peace and Peril in the Zuo Zhuan, Forethought in the Doctrine of the Mean, Joseph's Granaries and Bagehot's Reserve
- Chapter 8 · The Empirical Loop: the Acquirer-Risk Ledger, Field Tools and Checker Specifications