Pareto Whale Auto-Detection, High-Net-Worth Self-Selection Signals and Ten-X VIP Tier Escalation: chapter answers
A popular story among low-price automated shops says that revenue follows a power law, that the top 2 % of super-high-net-worth customers bring in a disproportionate share of profit, that a few implicit probes will detect these whales automatically, and that a private VIP lane will then close orders ten to fifty times the usual size. This book tests the story sentence by sentence. After checking the original literature it corrects its blueprint: a power law must be tested first, and a purely lognormal synthetic book passes the power-law goodness-of-fit test with a p-value of 0.430, while only…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-399 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · Power Law or Lognormal: Test the Tail Before Talking About Whales
Program p12 tries 60 candidate thresholds between the 0.50 and 0.98 quantiles and draws 200 synthetic books for each real book. The result is not what the long-tail chart would lead anyone to expect. For book LN the cho… - Chapter 2 · The Profit Share of the Top 2 %: Closed Forms, the Bootstrap and the Danger of Extrapolation
The share of the top 2 % is decided by the shape of the tail, and the 80/20 rule is the special case of a Pareto index of 1.161. The profit share always exceeds the revenue share, by an amount that depends on the per-he… - Chapter 3 · Who Will Be Next Year's Whale: BG/NBD and the Prediction of High Value
BG/NBD models the purchase rate and silent attrition separately and estimates its parameters from three summaries: the number of repeat purchases, the time of the last purchase and the length of observation. On the synt… - Chapter 4 · Menu Screening: Three Mussa-Rosen Tiers and the No-Degradation Constraint on the Base Tier
Chapter 4 uses the menu screening of Mussa and Rosen to generate tier price gaps of about 9.57 and 51.66 times, shows that the unconstrained menu leaves 0.575 of buyers worse off, and finds that locking the base tier ke… - Chapter 5 · Opt-in Entries: High-Value Signals on a Public Menu and Their Expected Profit
Once the "implicit probe" is rewritten as a public entry, the signal comes from the buyer's voluntary choice rather than from covert observation. The entry's worth depends on the ratio of its true and false positive rat… - Chapter 6 · Displaying the Tiers and Sizing the VIP Layer: Decoys, Compromise and Queues
Chapter 6 shows with a multinomial logit that the direction of decoy and compromise effects depends on a parameter to be estimated, sizes a VIP consultant desk with Erlang C, one consultant serving 23 members and four s… - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: the Han Feizi, the Shiji, Dupuit and Pareto
When the poor make up 0.5 of travellers, removing the roof raises profit from 3.825 to 3.950, a gain of 0.125. At 0.6 the gain is 0.030; at 0.7 removing the roof loses 0.065; at 0.8 it loses 0.160. The last line gives t… - Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: the Whale Ledger, the Four Kits and a Pre-registered Refutation
Chapter 8 gives the distilled Whale Tail Test and VIP Opt-in Menu Calculator, checker specifications grouped by the four kits, a weekly whale ledger and pre-registered tests, the most expensive needing 14,579 customers.…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote