What does Four-Player Imperfect Information conclude, in numbers, about “Classics Read Side by Side: The Substantial and the Empty, the Orthodox and the Unorthodox, and the Fog of War”?
Answer: "Victory according to the enemy" and "no constant disposition" land on best response rather than equilibrium in this book's framework, which is the same side as Chapter 6's conclusion that multiplayer games have no value guarantee, so the useful question is a best response to the opponents present. "The direct joins battle, the indirect secures victory" corresponds to mixed strategies, and program p12 supplies the precise content: both deterministic policies are worse than the mix, the loss curve has a kink at the equilibrium, and the correct proportion (0.1667 here) is determined uniquely by the payoff matrix. But the value of mixing is conditional on the opponent's volume of observation, and reading a proportion takes thousands of observations, so when that volume is small the orthodox-to-unorthodox proportion hardly matters — a qualification the formalisation yields and reading the classics alone does not. Clausewitz's fog divides the labour differently from Sunzi's solid and void: it concerns the unreliability of one's own information, which in this book is "everything beyond one's own tiles is in the fog", and Chapter 4's calibration warning is its quantified version. The comparison extends only to structure, because the treatises have no fixed rules, determinate payoffs or repeated play, and every theorem here depends on all three.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; apart from cited literature data, all data in the book are synthetic.
Data table
| Text | What it says | Where it lands in this book's framework |
|---|---|---|
| "Weak Points and Strong": victory according to the enemy; no constant disposition | The right course depends on the opponent and is not fixed | Best response rather than equilibrium (Chapter 6, part one) |
| "Energy": the direct joins battle, the indirect secures victory | The proportions of a mix | Mixed equilibrium of a \(2\times2\) zero-sum game; the proportion is set by the payoff matrix (program p12) |
| "Energy": inexhaustible as heaven and earth | Unpredictability is a resource | The value of mixing, conditional on the opponent's volume of observation (program p11) |
| Clausewitz's fog and friction | One's own information is unreliable and plans deform | The first class of quantity is exact and the second dominates the conclusion (Chapters 1 and 4) |
Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Imperfect-Information Stochastic Games, Bayesian Hand-Reading and Counterfactual Regret Minimisation in Four-Player Tile Dynamics (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classics Read Side by Side: The Substantial and the Empty, the Orthodox and the Unorthodox, and the Fog of War. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24020464
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24020464 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-055 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026055,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Imperfect-Information Stochastic Games, Bayesian Hand-Reading and Counterfactual Regret Minimisation in Four-Player Tile Dynamics},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24020464},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24020464}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Scale: Why the Information Sets Cannot Be Listed
- Chapter 2 · The Tile Pool: Hypergeometric Inference and a Result That Runs Backwards
- Chapter 3 · Hand Reading: Suji Is a Deduction, Not a Regularity
- Chapter 4 · Shanten, Acceptance and the Race: Ignoring Three Players Overstates the Win
- Chapter 5 · Folding: Optimal Stopping, and a Conclusion Stated Backwards
- Chapter 6 · Solving the Game, and the Money
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Test