What does First-Move Probes and Hidden Market Truth conclude, in numbers, about “Commitment Strength Made Operational: Probes per Week, Delay to the First Probe and the Stopping Rule”?
Answer: Chapter 5 derives a stopping rule from the value of information, which halts the probe at 375 visitors; probes per week have a ceiling beyond which perturbation is excessive; and delay before the first probe has a price, with 90-day regret of 773.6 when starting at once and 5,804.9 when never starting.
Scope of the numbers: Parameters are illustrative, calculations come from the book's programs, and all data are synthetic. This is general business analysis, not personalised legal, tax or investment advice; it promises no income.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 5804.9, 773.6, 90
| delay(days) | regret/run | ends right | bits learned |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 773.6 | 0.940 | 0.795 |
| 7 | 1,003.3 | 0.938 | 0.782 |
| 14 | 1,348.5 | 0.920 | 0.751 |
| 30 | 2,494.0 | 0.945 | 0.772 |
| 60 | 3,923.4 | 0.922 | 0.722 |
| 90 | 5,804.9 | 0.700 | 0.222 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p53: what waiting before the first probe costs.
# Illustrative. Default tier A (price 30) versus a new real tier B
# (price 40). True conversions are drawn per run from the priors
# qA ~ Beta(24, 76) and qB ~ Beta(17, 83). 100 visitors a day for 90
# days. Before day d every visitor sees A; from day d each day's share
# shown B equals the posterior chance that B earns more (probability
# matching, normal approximation). Reported over 400 runs: regret
# against the better tier, share of runs that end on the better tier,
# and bits learned about "which tier is better" (entropy drop).
import math
import random
DAYS, PER_DAY, RUNS = 90, 100, 400
def p_b_better(a1, b1, a2, b2):
m1, m2 = 30 * a1 / (a1 + b1), 40 * a2 / (a2 + b2)
v1 = 900 * a1 * b1 / ((a1 + b1) ** 2 * (a1 + b1 + 1))
v2 = 1600 * a2 * b2 / ((a2 + b2) ** 2 * (a2 + b2 + 1))
z = (m2 - m1) / math.sqrt(v1 + v2)
return 0.5 * (1.0 + math.erf(z / math.sqrt(2.0)))
def h2(p):
p = min(max(p, 1e-12), 1 - 1e-12)
return -(p * math.log2(p) + (1 - p) * math.log2(1 - p))
def run(rng, delay):
qa, qb = rng.betavariate(24, 76), rng.betavariate(17, 83)
best = max(30 * qa, 40 * qb)
st = [24.0, 76.0, 17.0, 83.0]
lost = []
h0 = h2(p_b_better(*st))
for day in range(DAYS):
share = p_b_better(*st) if day >= delay else 0.0
for _ in range(PER_DAY):
if rng.random() < share:
buy = rng.random() < qb
st[2 if buy else 3] += 1
lost.append(best - 40 * qb)
else:
buy = rng.random() < qa
st[0 if buy else 1] += 1
lost.append(best - 30 * qa)
pb = p_b_better(*st)
right = (pb > 0.5) == (40 * qb > 30 * qa)
return math.fsum(lost), right, h0 - h2(pb)
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(39553)
print("delay(days) regret/run ends right bits learned")
for d in (0, 7, 14, 30, 60, 90):
regs, rights, bits = [], 0, []
for _ in range(RUNS):
r, ok, b = run(rng, d)
regs.append(r)
rights += 1 if ok else 0
bits.append(b)
print("{:>11} {:>10,.1f} {:>10.3f} {:>12.3f}".format(
d, math.fsum(regs) / RUNS, rights / RUNS,
math.fsum(bits) / RUNS))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). High-Agency Active Inference, Intentional Perturbation Probes and Hidden Market-Truth Exploration (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Commitment Strength Made Operational: Probes per Week, Delay to the First Probe and the Stopping Rule. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-395 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026395,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {High-Agency Active Inference, Intentional Perturbation Probes and Hidden Market-Truth Exploration},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Bias Floor of Confounding: Why a Longer Passive Log Is Wrong with More Confidence
- Chapter 2 · Identifiability: What the Back Door, the Instrument and the Published Threshold Each Require
- Chapter 3 · Expected Information Gain: Put the Probe Where It Teaches the Most
- Chapter 4 · Exploration and Exploitation: The Regret Ledger of Thompson Sampling and Fixed Habits
- Chapter 6 · Bringing Willingness to Pay into View, and a Counterpart's Floor: BDM, Hypothetical Bias and Inference from Public Information
- Chapter 7 · The Classics Examined: Lu You, Wang Yangming, Bacon and Bernard on Doing and on Provoked Observation
- Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: The First-Move Probe Ledger, Pre-Registered Tests and the Plan for Refutation