What does The Deadweight Loss of Gift-Giving conclude, in numbers, about “The Separating Equilibrium of Costly Signals: Why "Wasteful" Gifts Are Credible”?

Answer: Chapter 3 gives the separating equilibrium of costly signals and shows that for the same 100, cash leaves partners at only 0.462 of those who turn up while a personalised gift reaches 0.774.

Scope of the numbers: Its clients, gifts and parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is general business analysis, not business, legal, tax or financial advice, and statutes must be checked by hand before publication. Chapter 5 derives the break-even yearly gift: for the same lift a loyal client justifies 2.67 times the gift, and an illustrative allocation by value nets 356.63 against 90.98 for an equal split.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.462, 0.774, 100

partners q = 0.3, pretending cost U(0, 200)
costformtakers inpartner share
50cash0.2500.632
50luxury item0.2000.682
50hamper0.1500.741
50personalised0.0620.873
100cash0.5000.462
100luxury item0.4000.517
100hamper0.3000.588
100personalised0.1250.774
200cash1.0000.300
200luxury item0.8000.349
200hamper0.6000.417
200personalised0.2500.632
cost to keep partner share >= 0.6, by form
cashc <= 57.1
luxury itemc <= 71.4
hamperc <= 95.2
personalisedc <= 228.6
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p32: why an impractical gift screens out takers.
# Model: a share q of recipients are partners who engage whatever the
# gift; the rest are takers who engage only to collect the gift. A
# taker engages if the gift's value to him, y c, exceeds his cost of
# pretending, k ~ Uniform(0, KMAX). Forms differ only in y, the value
# to a taker per unit of cost: cash 1.00, a resaleable luxury item
# 0.80, a generic hamper 0.60, a personalised item 0.25. The share
# of partners among those who engage is the screening quality.
# q = 0.3 and KMAX = 200 are illustrative; results are exact.
Q = 0.3
KMAX = 200.0
FORMS = (("cash", 1.00), ("luxury item", 0.80), ("hamper", 0.60),
         ("personalised", 0.25))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("partners q = {:.1f}, pretending cost U(0, {:.0f})".format(
        Q, KMAX))
    print("  cost  form           takers in  partner share")
    for c in (50.0, 100.0, 200.0):
        for name, y in FORMS:
            t = min(1.0, y * c / KMAX)
            share = Q / (Q + (1.0 - Q) * t)
            print("  {:4.0f}  {:<13}  {:.3f}      {:.3f}".format(
                c, name, t, share))
    print("cost to keep partner share >= 0.6, by form")
    for name, y in FORMS:
        # Q / (Q + (1-Q) y c / KMAX) >= 0.6
        cmax = (Q / 0.6 - Q) / (1.0 - Q) * KMAX / y
        print("  {:<13}  c <= {:.1f}".format(name, cmax))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). The Deadweight Loss of Gift-Giving, Reciprocity-Ledger Decay and the Signalling Value of Corporate Gifts (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Separating Equilibrium of Costly Signals: Why "Wasteful" Gifts Are Credible. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-223 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026223,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Deadweight Loss of Gift-Giving, Reciprocity-Ledger Decay and the Signalling Value of Corporate Gifts},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book