What does Disaster Recovery and Threshold Shares conclude, in numbers, about “The Illusion of Three Copies: a Binomial Ledger of Loss and Leak”?
Answer: Three copies in three places are, under independent losses, the practice that best protects against loss: with the illustrative parameters the yearly loss probability is only 0.000125, but the leak probability rises to 0.058808, which is 2.940 times that of a single copy. Two-of-three improves both ledgers against one copy, and against three copies it trades loss for leakage. To beat three copies on both ledgers at once, at least 5 pieces are needed under these parameters, and two-of-five is the smallest such scheme. Shamir's paper supports the mathematics of threshold schemes and the dilemma of key management; it does not support the claim that a threshold scheme dominates under every set of parameters. The next chapter opens a share and looks inside: finite fields, polynomials and interpolation, why \(k-1\) pieces reveal nothing, and whether a share that has been quietly corrupted can be detected.
Scope of the numbers: Chapter 6 computes self-rescue after one share goes missing: losing the fastest holder is like raising the threshold by one, and the illustrative rescue window is 263 hours. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.000125, 0.058808, 2.940
| q | 0.05 loss, p = 0.02 leak per piece per year |
| scheme k n P(secret lost) P(secret leaked) | |
| one copy | 1 1 0.050000 0.020000 |
| two copies | 1 2 0.002500 0.039600 |
| three copies | 1 3 0.000125 0.058808 |
| 2-of-3 shares | 2 3 0.007250 0.001184 |
| 3-of-5 shares | 3 5 0.001158 0.000078 |
| 4-of-7 shares | 4 7 0.000194 0.000005 |
| ratios loss leak | |
| three copies / one copy | 0.0025 2.940 |
| 2-of-3 / one copy | 0.1450 0.0592 |
| 2-of-3 / three copies | 58.0 0.0201 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: whole copies versus (k, n) threshold shares, one year.
# Model: every piece is lost (destroyed, misplaced, holder unreachable)
# with probability q and leaked (read by someone not entitled) with
# probability p, independently. Loss of the secret = fewer than k pieces
# survive; leak of the secret = at least k pieces leak. A whole copy is
# the special case k = 1. q = 0.05 and p = 0.02 per piece per year are
# illustrative; the secret itself is never needed for this arithmetic.
import math
Q, P = 0.05, 0.02
def tail(n, r, x):
# binomial upper tail: at least x of n pieces fail
terms = [math.comb(n, j) * r ** j * (1 - r) ** (n - j)
for j in range(x, n + 1)]
return math.fsum(terms)
def loss(k, n, q=Q):
return tail(n, q, n - k + 1)
def leak(k, n, p=P):
return tail(n, p, k)
SCHEMES = [("one copy", 1, 1), ("two copies", 1, 2),
("three copies", 1, 3), ("2-of-3 shares", 2, 3),
("3-of-5 shares", 3, 5), ("4-of-7 shares", 4, 7)]
print("q = %.2f loss, p = %.2f leak per piece per year" % (Q, P))
print("scheme k n P(secret lost) P(secret leaked)")
for name, k, n in SCHEMES:
print("%-14s %2d %2d %14.6f %16.6f"
% (name, k, n, loss(k, n), leak(k, n)))
base_loss, base_leak = loss(1, 3), leak(1, 3)
print("ratios loss leak")
print("three copies / one copy %6.4f %5.3f"
% (base_loss / loss(1, 1), base_leak / leak(1, 1)))
print("2-of-3 / one copy %6.4f %6.4f"
% (loss(2, 3) / loss(1, 1), leak(2, 3) / leak(1, 1)))
print("2-of-3 / three copies %6.1f %6.4f"
% (loss(2, 3) / base_loss, leak(2, 3) / base_leak))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Disaster Recovery for Digital Assets: Shamir Secret-Sharing Thresholds, Off-Site Incremental Snapshots and Self-Rescue from Single Points of Loss (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Illusion of Three Copies: a Binomial Ledger of Loss and Leak. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-272 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026272,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Disaster Recovery for Digital Assets: Shamir Secret-Sharing Thresholds, Off-Site Incremental Snapshots and Self-Rescue from Single Points of Loss},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Lagrange Interpolation over a Finite Field: Making, Rebuilding and Checking Shares
- Chapter 3 · Loss and Collusion: Unequal Holders, Shared Buildings and Acquaintance Graphs
- Chapter 4 · Off-Site Incremental Snapshots: Recovery Point, Recovery Time and Mean Time to Data Loss
- Chapter 5 · Leaks Accumulate: Proactive Share Refresh
- Chapter 6 · Self-Rescue after a Single Point of Loss: Time to Quorum and the Exposed Window
- Chapter 7 · Classics East and West: the Tiger Tally of Shiji 77 and the Split Tally of the Exchequer
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Threshold Drills, the Risk Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test