What does Disaster Recovery and Threshold Shares conclude, in numbers, about “The Illusion of Three Copies: a Binomial Ledger of Loss and Leak”?

Answer: Three copies in three places are, under independent losses, the practice that best protects against loss: with the illustrative parameters the yearly loss probability is only 0.000125, but the leak probability rises to 0.058808, which is 2.940 times that of a single copy. Two-of-three improves both ledgers against one copy, and against three copies it trades loss for leakage. To beat three copies on both ledgers at once, at least 5 pieces are needed under these parameters, and two-of-five is the smallest such scheme. Shamir's paper supports the mathematics of threshold schemes and the dilemma of key management; it does not support the claim that a threshold scheme dominates under every set of parameters. The next chapter opens a share and looks inside: finite fields, polynomials and interpolation, why \(k-1\) pieces reveal nothing, and whether a share that has been quietly corrupted can be detected.

Scope of the numbers: Chapter 6 computes self-rescue after one share goes missing: losing the fastest holder is like raising the threshold by one, and the illustrative rescue window is 263 hours. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (19 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.000125, 0.058808, 2.940

q0.05 loss, p = 0.02 leak per piece per year
scheme k n P(secret lost) P(secret leaked)
one copy1 1 0.050000 0.020000
two copies1 2 0.002500 0.039600
three copies1 3 0.000125 0.058808
2-of-3 shares2 3 0.007250 0.001184
3-of-5 shares3 5 0.001158 0.000078
4-of-7 shares4 7 0.000194 0.000005
ratios loss leak
three copies / one copy0.0025 2.940
2-of-3 / one copy0.1450 0.0592
2-of-3 / three copies58.0 0.0201

Key formula

\[P_{\text{丢}} = \sum_{j=n-k+1}^{n} \binom{n}{j} q^j (1-q)^{n-j}, \qquad P_{\text{泄}} = \sum_{j=k}^{n} \binom{n}{j} p^j (1-p)^{n-j}.\]
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: whole copies versus (k, n) threshold shares, one year.
# Model: every piece is lost (destroyed, misplaced, holder unreachable)
# with probability q and leaked (read by someone not entitled) with
# probability p, independently. Loss of the secret = fewer than k pieces
# survive; leak of the secret = at least k pieces leak. A whole copy is
# the special case k = 1. q = 0.05 and p = 0.02 per piece per year are
# illustrative; the secret itself is never needed for this arithmetic.
import math

Q, P = 0.05, 0.02


def tail(n, r, x):
    # binomial upper tail: at least x of n pieces fail
    terms = [math.comb(n, j) * r ** j * (1 - r) ** (n - j)
             for j in range(x, n + 1)]
    return math.fsum(terms)


def loss(k, n, q=Q):
    return tail(n, q, n - k + 1)


def leak(k, n, p=P):
    return tail(n, p, k)


SCHEMES = [("one copy", 1, 1), ("two copies", 1, 2),
           ("three copies", 1, 3), ("2-of-3 shares", 2, 3),
           ("3-of-5 shares", 3, 5), ("4-of-7 shares", 4, 7)]
print("q = %.2f loss, p = %.2f leak per piece per year" % (Q, P))
print("scheme          k  n   P(secret lost)  P(secret leaked)")
for name, k, n in SCHEMES:
    print("%-14s %2d %2d   %14.6f  %16.6f"
          % (name, k, n, loss(k, n), leak(k, n)))
base_loss, base_leak = loss(1, 3), leak(1, 3)
print("ratios                    loss    leak")
print("three copies / one copy  %6.4f   %5.3f"
      % (base_loss / loss(1, 1), base_leak / leak(1, 1)))
print("2-of-3 / one copy        %6.4f  %6.4f"
      % (loss(2, 3) / loss(1, 1), leak(2, 3) / leak(1, 1)))
print("2-of-3 / three copies    %6.1f  %6.4f"
      % (loss(2, 3) / base_loss, leak(2, 3) / base_leak))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Disaster Recovery for Digital Assets: Shamir Secret-Sharing Thresholds, Off-Site Incremental Snapshots and Self-Rescue from Single Points of Loss (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Illusion of Three Copies: a Binomial Ledger of Loss and Leak. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-272 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026272,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Disaster Recovery for Digital Assets: Shamir Secret-Sharing Thresholds, Off-Site Incremental Snapshots and Self-Rescue from Single Points of Loss},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book