What does Differential Privacy for Business Statistics conclude, in numbers, about “"Anonymous" Is Not Anonymous: Quasi-Identifiers, Differencing and Reconstruction”?
Answer: Deleting names does not make data anonymous: in a postcode of ten thousand, about 0.843 of residents are unique on date of birth and sex, and only past forty thousand does that fall to one half; Sweeney and Golle report national shares near 87 % and 63 %, by different methods, with the same verdict of "most". Releasing only aggregates is not safe either: two means that differ by one member subtract to the newcomer's 1680.00 yuan. Small errors do not stop many questions: with twelve members and 48 subset counts carrying errors of one unit either way, the adversary still gets 0.919 of the bits right. Only a Laplace release whose total budget is nailed at 1 pushes him back to the coin-toss level of 0.511. The next chapter answers a direct question: what exactly is this "budget", and what does an epsilon of 1 actually mean?
Scope of the numbers: Chapter 3 deals with sensitivity: revenue clipped per person has a root mean square error of 6545 yuan in the illustrative data, 4.09 % of revenue, and a customer profile spends the budget only once by parallel composition. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (20 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.511, 0.919, 12, 48
| n = 12 secret bits, m = 48 noisy subset counts | |
| noise on each answer | bits recovered |
| exact answers | 1.000 |
| uniform +-1 | 0.919 |
| uniform +-2 | 0.789 |
| uniform +-4 | 0.636 |
| Laplace eps 48 total | 0.925 |
| Laplace eps 4.8 total | 0.614 |
| Laplace eps 1 total | 0.511 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p13: reconstructing secret bits from many subset counts.
# Dinur-Nissim style: n = 12 members each hold one secret bit (bought a
# sensitive category or not). The shop answers m = 48 subset counts
# ("how many of these members bought it"), each with some noise. The
# attacker tries all 2**12 = 4096 candidate tables, keeps the one whose
# subset counts are closest in L1 to the answers. Reported: share of
# bits recovered, mean over 30 fixed-seed trials (0.5 = coin flipping).
# Laplace rows spread a total budget eps over the 48 answers (eps / 48
# each, basic composition). All data are illustrative.
import math
import random
N, M, TRIALS = 12, 48, 30
rng = random.Random(20261113)
POP = [bin(c).count("1") for c in range(1 << N)]
def laplace(r, b):
u = r.random()
while u == 0.0:
u = r.random()
if u < 0.5:
return b * math.log(2.0 * u)
return -b * math.log(2.0 * (1.0 - u))
def attack(noise):
shares = []
for _ in range(TRIALS):
secret = rng.randrange(1 << N)
masks = [rng.randrange(1, 1 << N) for _ in range(M)]
answers = [POP[secret & q] + noise() for q in masks]
best, best_d = 0, None
for cand in range(1 << N):
d = math.fsum(abs(POP[cand & q] - a)
for q, a in zip(masks, answers))
if best_d is None or d < best_d:
best, best_d = cand, d
shares.append((N - POP[best ^ secret]) / N)
return math.fsum(shares) / len(shares)
rows = [("exact answers", lambda: 0),
("uniform +-1", lambda: rng.randint(-1, 1)),
("uniform +-2", lambda: rng.randint(-2, 2)),
("uniform +-4", lambda: rng.randint(-4, 4)),
("Laplace eps 48 total", lambda: laplace(rng, 1.0)),
("Laplace eps 4.8 total", lambda: laplace(rng, 10.0)),
("Laplace eps 1 total", lambda: laplace(rng, 48.0))]
print("n = %d secret bits, m = %d noisy subset counts" % (N, M))
print("%-24s %16s" % ("noise on each answer", "bits recovered"))
for name, fn in rows:
print("%-24s %16.3f" % (name, attack(fn)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Differential Privacy, the Laplace Mechanism and Privacy-Budget Accounting: Publishing Business Statistics without Exposing Any Individual (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: "Anonymous" Is Not Anonymous: Quasi-Identifiers, Differencing and Reconstruction. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-296 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026296,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Differential Privacy, the Laplace Mechanism and Privacy-Budget Accounting: Publishing Business Statistics without Exposing Any Individual},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · The Laplace Mechanism: Epsilon Is a Ceiling on the Likelihood Ratio
- Chapter 3 · Sensitivity: Clip Revenue First, and Spend the Budget Once on a Customer Profile
- Chapter 4 · Composition and Budget Accounting: Basic, Advanced and Optimal Books
- Chapter 5 · Randomized Response and the Local Model: Letting Customers Add the Noise
- Chapter 6 · How Large Should Epsilon Be: the Dispute over the 2020 United States Census and the Price of Small Numbers
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Han Feizi on the Difficulty of Persuasion and Warner's Randomized Response
- Chapter 8 · A Noisy Release Procedure for the Public Statistics of a Pay-per-Use Service, and a Plan for Refutation