What does Funnels, Mastery Gates and Licensing conclude, in numbers, about “Two-Sided Networks, Grading Noise and Teaching to the Test”?

Answer: Once the client side is treated as a finite pool, the best mark in the two-sided equilibrium is 18, and 16 is less than one per cent short. AI grading noise mainly hurts strong candidates, and borderline review repairs it. Teaching to the test empties the pass mark of its filtering power; unseen transfer questions bring it back.

Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate evidence, 16 runnable Python programs, classical sources and hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 16, 18

T certified active sessions two-sided one-sided
10909.4 687.1 59060 919613 1326784
11868.0 697.9 61374 964040 1291977
12815.2 708.0 64183 1018617 1243348
13750.5 715.9 67508 1084272 1178226
14674.0 674.0 69971 1120621 1094334
15586.7 586.7 71314 1127620 990152
16490.7 490.7 72298 1135464 865282
17389.0 389.0 72607 1142861 720647
18285.5 285.5 71715 1144817 558862
19184.5 184.5 68583 1125667 383736
2089.4 89.4 60407 1032295 198401
best T: two-sided 18, one-sided 10
two-sided profit at T16 / at best T: 0.9918
Reading: once clients are a finite pool shared among
licensees, a lax mark certifies people who then find too
few clients to take the licence; the cross-side effect moves
the best mark from 10 to 18, and the curve is flat enough
that 16/20 gives up less than one per cent.
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. [p11] Two sides: certified practitioners and their clients.
# For each pass mark T the certified pool of p09 has size N_c(T) and mean
# mastery Q(T). Clients book S = 50,000 exp(4 (Q - 0.75)) (N / 500)^0.3
# sessions a year: they want quality and some choice. Price per session
# 80 exp(4 (Q - 0.75)); the practitioner keeps 90%. A certified person
# takes up the licence (fee 600) if income S p 0.9 / N - 600 exceeds an
# outside option drawn uniform on 0..8,000, so the active number N
# solves N = N_c F(S p 0.9 / N - 600), found by bisection. Firm profit
# = 600 N + 0.1 S p. The one-sided benchmark (p09) assumes 100 sessions
# per licensee whatever their number.
import math

K = 6.0

def total_pmf(m):
    a, b = K * m, K * (1 - m)
    lb = lambda x, y: math.lgamma(x) + math.lgamma(y) - math.lgamma(x + y)
    one = [math.exp(math.lgamma(5) - math.lgamma(j + 1) - math.lgamma(5 - j)
                    + lb(j + a, 4 - j + b) - lb(a, b)) for j in range(5)]
    tot = [1.0]
    for _ in range(5):
        nxt = [0.0] * (len(tot) + 4)
        for i, x in enumerate(tot):
            for j, y in enumerate(one):
                nxt[i + j] += x * y
        tot = nxt
    return tot

def pool(T, grid=400):
    n = q = 0.0
    for i in range(grid):
        th = (i + 0.5) / grid
        w = 168 * th ** 5 * (1 - th) ** 2 / grid
        m = min(0.97, th + 0.08)
        pp = sum(total_pmf(m)[T:])
        n += w * pp
        q += w * pp * m
    return 1000 * n, q / n

def equilibrium(nc, Q):
    price = 80 * math.exp(4 * (Q - 0.75))
    def share(N):
        S = 50000 * math.exp(4 * (Q - 0.75)) * (N / 500) ** 0.3
        inc = S * price * 0.9 / N - 600
        return min(1.0, max(0.0, inc / 8000)), S
    lo, hi = 1e-6, nc
    for _ in range(80):
        mid = (lo + hi) / 2
        if nc * share(mid)[0] > mid:
            lo = mid
        else:
            hi = mid
    S = share(lo)[1]
    return lo, S, price, 600 * lo + 0.1 * S * price

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("    T  certified  active   sessions  two-sided  one-sided")
    best2 = best1 = None
    prof2 = {}
    for T in range(10, 21):
        nc, Q = pool(T)
        N, S, p, prof = equilibrium(nc, Q)
        one = nc * (600 + 10 * p)
        prof2[T] = prof
        best2 = max(best2 or (prof, T), (prof, T))
        best1 = max(best1 or (one, T), (one, T))
        print("   {:2d} {:10.1f} {:7.1f} {:10.0f} {:10.0f} {:10.0f}".format(
            T, nc, N, S, prof, one))
    print("   best T: two-sided {}, one-sided {}".format(best2[1], best1[1]))
    print("   two-sided profit at T = 16 / at best T: {:.4f}".format(
        prof2[16] / best2[0]))
    print("\nReading: once clients are a finite pool shared among")
    print("licensees, a lax mark certifies people who then find too")
    print("few clients to take the licence; the cross-side effect moves")
    print("the best mark from 10 to 18, and the curve is flat enough")
    print("that 16/20 gives up less than one per cent.")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Diagnostic-to-Pedagogy Conversion Funnels, Mastery-Gated Curriculum Architecture and Certification Network Economics (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Two-Sided Networks, Grading Noise and Teaching to the Test. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090197

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090197 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-074 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026074,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Diagnostic-to-Pedagogy Conversion Funnels, Mastery-Gated Curriculum Architecture and Certification Network Economics},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090197},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090197}
}

Other chapter answers in this book