What does Whitelist Licensing, Hooks and Scout Attribution conclude, in numbers, about “Single-Tier Scout Commission by Shapley Value”?

Answer: Chapter 5 settles single-tier scout commission by Shapley value, with a scout share of 0.1458; the advertiser nets 0.2000 under last touch and 0.3561 under Shapley credit, and a null touch earns nothing.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative, all calculations are generated by its programs, and it is general analysis, not business or legal advice. Chapter 6 prices the bypass option on a binomial tree, where a damages clause at the reasonable pre-estimate of 20.82 deters every bypass in the illustrative model.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.2000, 0.3561

rulex1x2Pliftadv. netwelfare
last touch0.0001.0000.40000.10000.20000.3500
shapley0.3770.4530.41220.11220.35610.3841
efficient0.6700.6700.47860.17860.47860.4000
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p52: last touch rewards exposure, Shapley rewards lift.
# Two touch points on one target cohort: x1 = reach of the licensed
# creator ad (upper funnel), x2 = intensity of retargeting (shown
# last). Purchase probability P = p0 + a1 x1 + a2 x2 - a12 x1 x2 with
# p0 = 0.30 (would buy anyway), a1 = 0.20, a2 = 0.10, a12 = 0.05.
# Party i pays k_i x_i^2 / 2 (k1 = 0.25, k2 = 0.10) and earns r = 0.5
# per credited order. Credit rules:
#   last touch: party 2 gets x2 P, party 1 gets x1 (1 - x2) P
#   Shapley on lift: party 1 gets a1 x1 - a12 x1 x2 / 2, party 2
#   gets a2 x2 - a12 x1 x2 / 2; baseline orders go to nobody.
# Nash equilibrium by best-response iteration on a 0.001 grid; the
# advertiser earns margin 1 per order minus credits paid. A stylised
# reading of Berman (2018); parameters illustrative.
P0, A1, A2, A12, K1, K2, R = 0.30, 0.20, 0.10, 0.05, 0.25, 0.10, 0.5
GRID = [j / 1000.0 for j in range(1001)]


def prob(x1, x2):
    return P0 + A1 * x1 + A2 * x2 - A12 * x1 * x2


def credit(rule, x1, x2):
    if rule == "last touch":
        p = prob(x1, x2)
        return x1 * (1.0 - x2) * p, x2 * p
    return (A1 * x1 - A12 * x1 * x2 / 2.0,
            A2 * x2 - A12 * x1 * x2 / 2.0)


def equilibrium(rule):
    x1, x2 = 0.5, 0.5
    for _ in range(200):
        n1 = max(GRID, key=lambda y: R * credit(rule, y, x2)[0]
                 - K1 * y * y / 2.0)
        n2 = max(GRID, key=lambda y: R * credit(rule, n1, y)[1]
                 - K2 * y * y / 2.0)
        if (n1, n2) == (x1, x2):
            break
        x1, x2 = n1, n2
    return x1, x2


def report(name, x1, x2, paid):
    p = prob(x1, x2)
    cost = K1 * x1 * x1 / 2.0 + K2 * x2 * x2 / 2.0
    print("  {:<10}  {:.3f}  {:.3f}  {:.4f}  {:.4f}  {:>9.4f}  {:.4f}"
          .format(name, x1, x2, p, p - P0, p - paid, p - cost))


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("  rule          x1     x2      P     lift   adv. net"
          "  welfare")
    for rule in ("last touch", "shapley"):
        x1, x2 = equilibrium(rule)
        c1, c2 = credit(rule, x1, x2)
        report(rule, x1, x2, R * (c1 + c2))
    best = max(((a, b) for a in GRID[::10] for b in GRID[::10]),
               key=lambda z: prob(*z) - K1 * z[0] ** 2 / 2
               - K2 * z[1] ** 2 / 2)
    report("efficient", best[0], best[1], 0.0)

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dark-Ads Whitelist Licensing Economics, Three-Second Hook Survival Analysis and Single-Tier Scout Attribution Games (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Single-Tier Scout Commission by Shapley Value. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-333 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026333,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dark-Ads Whitelist Licensing Economics, Three-Second Hook Survival Analysis and Single-Tier Scout Attribution Games},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book