What does Costly Signals and Hot-Cold Traps conclude, in numbers, about “When Costly Signals Separate: Single Crossing, the Handicap Principle and the Cost Structure of Honest Signals”?

Answer: The left half of the table is the honest equilibrium. A person of quality 0.4 sends 0.0600, one of quality 0.8 sends 0.3000, one of quality 1.0 sends 0.4800, and the receiver's reading equals true quality every time. The right half replaces the cost with a flat s that does not depend on quality: every type now chooses the same strength, 0.4800. Once everyone sends the same signal, nothing can be read from it. The column of 1.000 is only the illusion of a receiver who keeps the old reading, and in equilibrium that reading must be abandoned.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not psychological counselling, claims no effect of any kind, and teaches no technique of manipulation. Chapter 2 enters each interaction in a likelihood-ratio ledger; with illustrative parameters one missed plan weighs as much as 2.52 kept ones, and Wald's sequential test saves 0.459 of the interactions a fixed observation period needs.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.0600, 0.3000, 0.4, 0.4800, 0.8, 1.0

qhonest s(q)best s, cost s/qqhatbest s, flat costqhat
0.20.00000.00000.2000.48001.000
0.40.06000.06000.4000.48001.000
0.60.16000.16000.6000.48001.000
0.80.30000.30000.8000.48001.000
1.00.48000.48001.0000.48001.000
cost falling with quality: signal reveals q exactly
flat cost: all types send 0.4800, the reading is the same
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p12: Grafen's condition for an honest handicap. Quality q
# lies in [0.2, 1]; the receiver reads quality qhat(s) = sqrt(q0^2 + 2s)
# from signal s. With cost s/q (cheaper for higher quality) the best
# reply of every type is s(q) = (q^2 - q0^2)/2, so qhat(s(q)) = q and
# the signal is honest. With a flat cost s, every type chooses the same
# s, so the signal says nothing. Grid search checks the algebra.
# Model after Grafen (1990); the functional forms are illustrative.
import math

Q0 = 0.2
STEP = 0.0001
GRID = [i * STEP for i in range(int(1.0 / STEP) + 1)]


def qhat(s):
    return math.sqrt(Q0 * Q0 + 2.0 * s)


def best(cost):
    return max(GRID, key=lambda s: qhat(s) - cost(s))


print("  q   honest s(q)  best s, cost s/q  qhat   best s, flat cost  qhat")
for q in (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0):
    s_h = (q * q - Q0 * Q0) / 2.0
    s_q = best(lambda s: s / q)
    s_f = best(lambda s: s)
    print("{:4.1f}   {:9.4f}   {:13.4f}   {:6.3f}   {:13.4f}   {:6.3f}"
          .format(q, s_h, s_q, qhat(s_q), s_f, qhat(s_f)))
print("cost falling with quality: signal reveals q exactly")
print("flat cost: all types send {:.4f}, the reading is the same"
      .format(best(lambda s: s)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Costly-Signal Screening in Early Intimacy, Intermittent-Reinforcement Dopamine Traps and Reciprocal-Floor Stopping Games (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: When Costly Signals Separate: Single Crossing, the Handicap Principle and the Cost Structure of Honest Signals. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-181 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026181,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Costly-Signal Screening in Early Intimacy, Intermittent-Reinforcement Dopamine Traps and Reciprocal-Floor Stopping Games},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book