What does Five-Adversary Business Wargaming conclude, in numbers, about “The Imitating Competitor and the Compliance Auditor: Capacity Commitment, Entry Delay and Random Checks against a Clause List”?
Answer: Chapter 4 shows that under capacity commitment the former monopolist keeps 0.4444 of its profit, and that resolving violations lowers ruin to 0.0920.
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classical sources and hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.4444
| monopoly | q 17.00 price 230.00 profit 2,890.0 | |||
| Cournot | q 11.33 each, price 173.33, profit 1,284.4 each | |||
| Bertrand | price 60.00, profit 0.0 | |||
| incumbent keeps 0.4444 of monopoly profit under Cournot | ||||
| entry delay | ruin(all five) | 95% interval | t_med | cash |
| 2 | 0.2495 | [0.2310, 0.2689] | 41.0 | 3,075 |
| 4 | 0.2450 | [0.2267, 0.2643] | 42.0 | 3,174 |
| 8 | 0.2165 | [0.1990, 0.2351] | 40.0 | 3,358 |
| 13 | 0.2070 | [0.1898, 0.2253] | 40.0 | 3,620 |
| 26 | 0.1770 | [0.1609, 0.1943] | 39.0 | 4,170 |
| never | 0.1635 | [0.1479, 0.1804] | 38.0 | 4,483 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: the imitating competitor, capacity and entry delay
# Part 1, after Kreps and Scheinkman (1983): with linear demand
# P = a - b Q and unit cost c, a rival that first commits capacity and
# then competes on price lands on the Cournot outcome, not on the
# Bertrand price c. Part 2: the p13 engine, unchanged, with the
# imitator's entry delay varied. Parameters are illustrative.
import math
import random
import statistics
ND = statistics.NormalDist()
AGENTS = ("buyer", "arbitrage", "auditor", "imitator", "liquidity")
PLAN = {"price": 199.0, "cost": 60.0, "fixed": 600.0, "fee": 0.12,
"cash0": 6000.0, "arrivals": 14.0, "med": 210.0, "sig": 0.35,
"window": 14.0, "loopholes": 3.0, "violations": 1.0,
"delay": 8.0, "runrate": 0.02, "freeze": 0.04, "lam": 2.25,
"disc": 0.15, "rate": 0.4, "exploit": 80.0, "audit": 0.06,
"fine": 600.0, "spiral": 0.85, "channels": 1.0,
"hold": 4.0, "rr0": 0.02}
def p_buy(price, ref, lam, eta, med, sig):
if ref >= price:
gl = eta * (ref - price)
else:
gl = -eta * lam * (price - ref)
need = price - gl
if need <= 1.0:
return 1.0
z = (math.log(need) - math.log(med)) / sig
return 1.0 - ND.cdf(z)
def poisson(rng, mu):
if mu <= 0.0:
return 0
lim = math.exp(-mu)
k, p = 0, rng.random()
while p > lim:
k += 1
p *= rng.random()
return k
def run_path(rng, pl, on, horizon=52):
"""One path; returns (ruin_round or 0, max_drawdown, final_cash)."""
cash = pl["cash0"]
peak, mdd = cash, 0.0
ref = pl["price"]
cum, seen, delist = 0.0, 0, 0
due = 0.0
held = {}
hist = []
for t in range(1, horizon + 1):
entered = on["imitator"] and seen and t >= seen + pl["delay"]
price = pl["price"] * (0.9 if entered else 1.0)
arr = pl["arrivals"] * (0.6 if entered else 1.0)
if on["liquidity"] and cash < 0.25 * pl["cash0"]:
price *= pl["spiral"]
if on["buyer"]:
mkt = price * 0.75 if rng.random() < pl["disc"] else price
ref += 0.3 * (mkt - ref)
pb = p_buy(price, ref, pl["lam"], 0.5, pl["med"], pl["sig"])
rr = pl["rr0"] + 0.0015 * pl["window"] + \
0.25 * max(0.0, (price - ref) / price)
else:
pb = p_buy(price, price, 1.0, 0.0, pl["med"], pl["sig"])
rr = pl["rr0"] + 0.0015 * pl["window"]
n = 0
if delist > 0:
delist -= 1
else:
n = poisson(rng, arr * pb)
gross = n * price
net = gross * (1.0 - pl["fee"]) - n * pl["cost"]
refund_now = due
due = poisson(rng, rr * n) * price
inflow = net
if on["liquidity"]:
ch = int(pl["channels"])
parts = [inflow / ch for _ in range(ch)
if rng.random() < pl["freeze"]]
stuck = math.fsum(parts)
back = t + int(pl["hold"])
held[back] = held.get(back, 0.0) + stuck
inflow -= stuck
inflow += held.pop(t, 0.0)
loss = 0.0
if on["arbitrage"]:
loss += pl["exploit"] * poisson(rng, pl["rate"] * pl["loopholes"])
if on["auditor"] and rng.random() < pl["audit"]:
found = 0
for _ in range(int(pl["violations"])):
if rng.random() < 0.7:
found += 1
loss += pl["fine"] * found
if found:
delist = 1
hist.append(gross)
if on["liquidity"] and rng.random() < pl["runrate"]:
phi = rng.uniform(0.10, 0.30)
loss += phi * math.fsum(hist[-8:])
flow = math.fsum([inflow, -pl["fixed"], -refund_now, -loss])
cash += flow
cum += flow
if on["imitator"] and not seen and cum > 3000.0:
seen = t
peak = max(peak, cash)
mdd = max(mdd, peak - cash)
if cash < 0.0:
return t, mdd, cash
return 0, mdd, cash
def wilson(k, n, z=1.959964):
p = k / n
d = 1.0 + z * z / n
c = (p + z * z / (2 * n)) / d
h = z * math.sqrt(p * (1 - p) / n + z * z / (4 * n * n)) / d
return max(0.0, c - h), min(1.0, c + h)
def scenario(pl, on, n=2000):
rng = random.Random(40613)
res = [run_path(rng, pl, on) for _ in range(n)]
ruins = sorted(r[0] for r in res if r[0])
mdds = sorted(r[1] for r in res)
fin = [r[2] for r in res]
lo, hi = wilson(len(ruins), n)
return {"ruin": len(ruins) / n, "lo": lo, "hi": hi,
"t_med": float(statistics.median(ruins)) if ruins else 0.0,
"mdd50": mdds[n // 2], "mdd95": mdds[int(0.95 * n)],
"cash": math.fsum(fin) / n}
A, B, C = 400.0, 10.0, 60.0
qm = (A - C) / (2 * B)
qc = (A - C) / (3 * B)
pm, pc = A - B * qm, A - B * 2 * qc
print("monopoly q {:.2f} price {:.2f} profit {:,.1f}".format(
qm, pm, (pm - C) * qm))
print("Cournot q {:.2f} each, price {:.2f}, profit {:,.1f} each".format(
qc, pc, (pc - C) * qc))
print("Bertrand price {:.2f}, profit 0.0".format(C))
print("incumbent keeps {:.4f} of monopoly profit under Cournot".format(
(pc - C) * qc / ((pm - C) * qm)))
ALL = dict.fromkeys(AGENTS, True)
NOIMI = {a: a != "imitator" for a in AGENTS}
print("entry delay ruin(all five) 95% interval t_med cash")
for d in (2, 4, 8, 13, 26):
r = scenario(dict(PLAN, delay=float(d)), ALL)
print("{:>11} {:>14.4f} [{:.4f}, {:.4f}] {:>5.1f} {:>6,.0f}".format(
d, r["ruin"], r["lo"], r["hi"], r["t_med"], r["cash"]))
r = scenario(PLAN, NOIMI)
print("{:>11} {:>14.4f} [{:.4f}, {:.4f}] {:>5.1f} {:>6,.0f}".format(
"never", r["ruin"], r["lo"], r["hi"], r["t_med"], r["cash"]))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Axiom-Driven Business Wargaming, Multi-Agent Adversarial Stress-Testing and Pre-Launch Zero-Tuition Sandboxes (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Imitating Competitor and the Compliance Auditor: Capacity Commitment, Entry Delay and Random Checks against a Clause List. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-406 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026406,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Axiom-Driven Business Wargaming, Multi-Agent Adversarial Stress-Testing and Pre-Launch Zero-Tuition Sandboxes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Axiom Table and the Round-Based Engine: Nineteen Conclusions, Zero-Intelligence Agents and a Sandbox That Can Go Bankrupt
- Chapter 2 · The Price-Sensitive Buyer: Reference Points, Loss Aversion and the Hangover after a Promotion
- Chapter 3 · The Arbitrage Speculator: a Red Team That Reads Only Our Own Rule Book, a Breach List and the Order of Repairs
- Chapter 5 · The Liquidity Shock: Gambler's Ruin, Refund Runs and Frozen Channels
- Chapter 6 · The Joint Attack, Coverage and Global Sensitivity: Rewriting "Exhaustive" as Three Numbers That Can Be Checked
- Chapter 7 · Eastern and Western Classics: the Temple Calculation of the Sunzi and Clausewitz's Friction
- Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: the Sandbox Planning Ledger, Backfill Calibration and a Pre-Registered Test