5D Library › 选择架构、累积前景理论与销售界面价格锚定的计算行为学 · English

第五章 诱饵与折中:离散选择模型的正则性及其违反

三档定价与一个「不划算」的选项

许多订阅与出版产品采用三档定价:便宜的基础档、中间的标准档、昂贵的高级档。一种流传很广的设计建议是,在标准档旁边放一个比它贵、却不比它好的选项,让标准档「显得划算」,从而卖得更多。这就是营销与决策研究中的诱饵效应,学术上称为非对称占优效应或吸引效应:新增的选项被目标选项在所有属性上占优,却不被其他选项占优。另一个相关现象是折中效应:当一个选项处于另外两个选项「之间」时,它的份额比它在两两比较中的份额更高。

作者的框架要求构建多项 Logit(MNL)并证明它无法产生诱饵效应,再用特沃斯基—西蒙森的情境依赖模型与多属性决策场理论(MDFT)说明诱饵效应与折中效应在三档定价中的生效边界,示例价格为 9.99、49.90、149.00 美元。本章照写这一结构,但把第一个结论推广到所有随机效用模型,并补充诱饵效应在实证上的边界。

注

关于示例价格。 9.99、49.90、149.00 美元与 5D Library 自己的电子书、平装书与精装合订本定价相同(见利益披露)。本章的程序只把这三个价格换算成一个虚构的「价格吸引力」刻度,与一个虚构的「质量」刻度组合,用来说明模型的性质;书中任何结果都不说明这一定价结构对 5D Library 或任何其他产品是否有效,也不构成对它的验证。第八章的实验不使用这组价格与作者的产品。

多项 Logit 与无关选项独立性

证据

在随机效用模型中,选项 ii 的效用为 Ui=Vi+εiU_i = V_i + \varepsilon_i,人选效用最高的选项。若各 εi\varepsilon_i 独立同分布于第一类极值分布,被选概率为多项 Logit 形式 P(i∣S)=eVi/∑j∈SeVjP(i \mid S) = e^{V_i}/\sum_{j \in S} e^{V_j} (McFadden 1974)。这一形式与卢斯 1959 年的选择公理等价:任意两个选项被选概率之比与集合中还有哪些其他选项无关,即无关选项独立性(IIA)(Luce 1959; Train 2009)。

IIA 直接排除了诱饵效应。加入诱饵 dd 后,标准档 ss 的份额变为 eVs/(∑jeVj+eVd)e^{V_s}/(\sum_{j} e^{V_j} + e^{V_d}),分母变大,份额只能下降;而且所有原有选项按同一比例下降,相互的比值不变。下面程序的第一部分验证这一点。

更强的结论:正则性

IIA 是多项 Logit 的特殊性质,放宽误差的分布可以打破它:概率单位模型(probit)、嵌套 Logit、混合 Logit 都允许相似的选项相互「分流」得更多。那么换一个更灵活的随机效用模型,能否产生诱饵效应?答案是不能。

证据

布洛克与马尔沙克 1960 年证明,任何随机效用模型(无论误差如何分布、如何相关)都满足正则性:若 S⊂TS \subset T,则对 SS 中的任一选项 ii,P(i∣S)≥P(i∣T)P(i \mid S) \ge P(i \mid T) (Block and Marschak 1960)。理由只有一行:「ii 在 TT 中效用最高」这一事件包含于「ii 在 SS 中效用最高」这一事件,所以前者的概率不会更大。休伯、佩恩与普托 1982 年的诱饵实验正是以「违反正则性」为题:加入被占优的选项后,目标选项的份额上升了 (Huber et al. 1982)。

所以作者框架中的「纯 MNL 无法产生诱饵效应」是对的,但范围太窄:任何随机效用模型都不能让目标档的份额因为加入诱饵而上升。下面的程序用多项 Logit、误差相关的概率单位模型(模拟)与嵌套 Logit(闭式)说明这一点。三个选项的系统效用为基础档 0、标准档 0.2、高级档 −0.1,诱饵比标准档低 0.8。

推导

# Multinomial logit (McFadden 1974) and regularity in random utility models.
# MNL: P(i | S) = exp(V_i) / sum_{j in S} exp(V_j). IIA: P(i)/P(j) does not depend on S.
# Regularity (Block & Marschak 1960): in ANY random utility model, P(i | S) >= P(i | T)
# whenever S is a subset of T, because {U_i = max over T} is contained in
# {U_i = max over S}. Below: (1) MNL with and without a dominated decoy; (2) a probit
# whose decoy error is strongly correlated with the target's, by simulation, and a
# nested logit in closed form: both let the decoy take share from the target (the
# similarity effect), but neither can RAISE the target's share -- an attraction effect
# is outside every random utility model.
import math, random

def mnl(V):
    m = max(V.values()); e = {k: math.exp(x - m) for k, x in V.items()}
    s = sum(e.values()); return {k: x / s for k, x in e.items()}

V = {"basic": 0.0, "standard": 0.2, "premium": -0.1}
dec = dict(V, decoy=V["standard"] - 0.8)              # dominated by standard
p0, p1 = mnl(V), mnl(dec)
print("MNL shares          basic  standard  premium  decoy")
for lab, p in (("three tiers", p0), ("plus decoy", p1)):
    print(f"   {lab:15s} " + "  ".join(f"{p.get(k, 0):7.3f}" for k in
                                       ("basic", "standard", "premium", "decoy")))
print(f"   standard/basic ratio: {p0['standard'] / p0['basic']:.4f} ->"
      f" {p1['standard'] / p1['basic']:.4f} (IIA); standard share falls by"
      f" {100 * (p0['standard'] - p1['standard']):.1f} points")

def probit(rho, n=60000, with_decoy=True):
    rng = random.Random(1960); wins = {k: 0 for k in dec}     # common random numbers
    for _ in range(n):
        zs, z0 = rng.gauss(0, 1), rng.gauss(0, 1)
        u = {"basic": V["basic"] + rng.gauss(0, 1),
             "standard": V["standard"] + zs,
             "premium": V["premium"] + rng.gauss(0, 1)}
        if with_decoy:
            u["decoy"] = dec["decoy"] + rho * zs + math.sqrt(1 - rho * rho) * z0
        wins[max(u, key=u.get)] += 1
    return {k: c / n for k, c in wins.items()}

print("probit, decoy error correlated rho with the standard tier (same 60,000 draws)")
base = probit(0.0, with_decoy=False)
print(f"   no decoy: standard {base['standard']:.3f}")
for rho in (0.0, 0.5, 0.9, 0.99):
    p = probit(rho)
    print(f"   rho {rho:4.2f}: standard {p['standard']:.3f} (change"
          f" {100 * (p['standard'] - base['standard']):+5.1f} points),"
          f" decoy {p['decoy']:.3f}")

def nested(mu):             # standard and decoy share a nest, dissimilarity mu in (0, 1]
    iv = mu * math.log(math.exp(V["standard"] / mu) + math.exp(dec["decoy"] / mu))
    top = mnl({"basic": V["basic"], "premium": V["premium"], "nest": iv})
    inner = mnl({"standard": V["standard"] / mu, "decoy": dec["decoy"] / mu})
    return top["nest"] * inner["standard"]

print("nested logit, standard share with the decoy (no decoy: "
      f"{p0['standard']:.4f})")
MUS = (1.0, 0.7, 0.4, 0.1, 0.02)
print("   " + "; ".join(f"mu {mu}: {nested(mu):.4f}" for mu in MUS))
# MNL shares          basic  standard  premium  decoy
#    three tiers       0.320    0.391    0.289    0.000
#    plus decoy        0.272    0.332    0.246    0.149
#    standard/basic ratio: 1.2214 -> 1.2214 (IIA); standard share falls by 5.8 points
# probit, decoy error correlated rho with the standard tier (same 60,000 draws)
#    no decoy: standard 0.406
#    rho 0.00: standard 0.362 (change  -4.4 points), decoy 0.116
#    rho 0.50: standard 0.362 (change  -4.3 points), decoy 0.077
#    rho 0.90: standard 0.396 (change  -1.0 points), decoy 0.011
#    rho 0.99: standard 0.406 (change  +0.0 points), decoy 0.000
# nested logit, standard share with the decoy (no decoy: 0.3907)
#    mu 1.0: 0.3323; mu 0.7: 0.3318; mu 0.4: 0.3548; mu 0.1: 0.3906; mu 0.02: 0.3907

多项 Logit 下,标准档份额从 0.391 降到 0.332,减少 5.8 个百分点;标准档与基础档的份额之比保持 1.2214 不变(IIA)。概率单位模型中,诱饵误差与标准档误差的相关越高,诱饵越是只从标准档「分流」:相关为 0 时标准档减少 4.4 个百分点,0.9 时只减少 1.0 个百分点,0.99 时诱饵几乎从不被选,标准档份额回到 0.406。嵌套 Logit 中,当相异参数 μ→0\mu \to 0(二者几乎完全相似)时,标准档份额趋近没有诱饵时的 0.3907,但从不超过它;这一趋近并不单调(μ=0.7\mu = 0.7 时的 0.3318 比 μ=1\mu = 1 时的 0.3323 略低)。这三个模型能做到的最好结果是「诱饵不带走份额」(相似性效应的极限),做不到「诱饵带来份额」。

这一结论有直接的实践含义:如果一项实验报告目标档的份额因为加入诱饵而上升,那么任何随机效用模型——包括营销分析中最常用的离散选择模型——都无法解释它;用这些模型拟合的「需求」会系统性地低估诱饵的作用,反过来,基于这些模型的定价优化也不会建议放诱饵。要描述吸引效应,需要让选项的评价依赖于集合中的其他选项。

特沃斯基—西蒙森的情境依赖模型

证据

特沃斯基与西蒙森 1993 年提出「情境依赖偏好」模型:选项的价值由两部分组成,一部分是反映背景情境的属性加权,另一部分是与当前集合中其他选项的两两比较 (Tversky and Simonson 1993)。两两比较用「相对优势」表示:xx 对 yy 的优势 A(x,y)A(x, y) 是 xx 在各属性上胜过 yy 的差距之和,劣势 D(x,y)D(x, y) 是 xx 落后于 yy 的差距经过一个递增凸函数 δ\delta 变换后之和(δ(t)≥t\delta(t) \ge t,反映对劣势的损失厌恶式加权),相对优势 R(x,y)=A/(A+D)R(x, y) = A/(A + D)。选项在集合 SS 中的价值是 V(x∣S)=∑ivi(x)+θ∑y∈SR(x,y)V(x \mid S) = \sum_i v_i(x) + \theta \sum_{y \in S} R(x, y)。这一模型可以同时解释吸引效应与折中效应;后者此前由西蒙森 1989 年与西蒙森和特沃斯基 1992 年记录为「极端厌恶」(Simonson 1989; Simonson and Tversky 1992)。

下面的程序把三个示例价格换算到 0 到 1 之间的「价格吸引力」刻度(9.99 为 1.0,149.00 为 0.2,按对数价格线性插值),配上虚构的质量刻度,使三档恰好在一条直线上(价格吸引力 + 质量 = 1.2),没有一档在两个属性的简单加总上占优。诱饵比标准档在两个属性上各低 0.05 与 0.10。为了得到份额,程序在模型价值上加了一个逻辑斯谛误差(τ=0.1\tau = 0.1);这是我们的选择,原模型本身只比较价值。θ=0\theta = 0 时模型退化为多项 Logit。

推导

# Tversky & Simonson (1993) context-dependent model on a FICTITIOUS three-tier page.
# Attribute values v1 = affordability, v2 = quality. Relative advantage of x over y:
#   A(x, y) = sum_i max(v_i(x) - v_i(y), 0)
#   D(x, y) = sum_i delta(max(v_i(y) - v_i(x), 0))
#   R(x, y) = A / (A + D);   V(x | S) = v1(x) + v2(x) + theta * sum_{y in S} R(x, y)
# delta(t) = t + kappa t^2 is increasing and convex with delta(t) >= t (loss aversion).
# To get shares we add a logit error, P(x | S) ~ exp(V(x | S) / tau) (our choice; the
# model itself compares values). theta = 0 reduces it to a multinomial logit.
import math

def afford(price):                 # log-price scale between 9.99 (1.0) and 149.00 (0.2)
    return 1 - 0.8 * math.log(price / 9.99) / math.log(149.0 / 9.99)

S_ = afford(49.90)                 # the three tiers lie on one line: v1 + v2 = 1.2
TIERS = {"basic": (afford(9.99), 0.20), "standard": (S_, 1.2 - S_),
         "premium": (afford(149.0), 1.00)}
DECOY = {"decoy": (S_ - 0.05, 1.1 - S_)}        # worse than standard on both attributes

def rel(x, y, kappa):
    a = sum(max(p - q, 0) for p, q in zip(x, y))
    d = sum(t + kappa * t * t for t in (max(q - p, 0) for p, q in zip(x, y)))
    return 0.5 if a + d == 0 else a / (a + d)

def shares(opts, theta, kappa=1.0, tau=0.1):
    V = {k: sum(x) + theta * sum(rel(x, y, kappa) for j, y in opts.items() if j != k)
         for k, x in opts.items()}
    m = max(V.values()); e = {k: math.exp((v - m) / tau) for k, v in V.items()}
    s = sum(e.values()); return {k: x / s for k, x in e.items()}

print("attribute values (affordability, quality):")
ALL = {**TIERS, **DECOY}
print("   " + "; ".join(f"{k} {x[0]:.3f}, {x[1]:.2f}" for k, x in ALL.items()))
print("attraction: standard's share, three tiers -> three tiers plus decoy")
print("compromise: standard/basic odds, {basic, standard} -> {basic, standard, premium}")
print("   theta  kappa   3 tiers  +decoy  change   odds 2 tiers  odds 3 tiers")
for theta in (0.0, 0.01, 0.03, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
    for kappa in ((0.0, 2.0) if theta else (0.0,)):
        s3 = shares(TIERS, theta, kappa)
        s4 = shares({**TIERS, **DECOY}, theta, kappa)
        two = {k: TIERS[k] for k in ("basic", "standard")}
        s2 = shares(two, theta, kappa)
        print(f"   {theta:5.2f}  {kappa:5.1f}  {s3['standard']:8.3f}"
              f"  {s4['standard']:6.3f}"
              f"  {100 * (s4['standard'] - s3['standard']):+6.1f}"
              f"  {s2['standard'] / s2['basic']:12.3f}"
              f"  {s3['standard'] / s3['basic']:12.3f}")
s4 = shares({**TIERS, **DECOY}, 0.3, 2.0)
print(f"theta 0.3, kappa 2: decoy share {s4['decoy']:.3f}; shares"
      f" basic {s4['basic']:.3f}, premium {s4['premium']:.3f}")
# attribute values (affordability, quality):
#    basic 1.000, 0.20; standard 0.524, 0.68; premium 0.200, 1.00; decoy 0.474, 0.58
# attraction: standard's share, three tiers -> three tiers plus decoy
# compromise: standard/basic odds, {basic, standard} -> {basic, standard, premium}
#    theta  kappa   3 tiers  +decoy  change   odds 2 tiers  odds 3 tiers
#     0.00    0.0     0.333   0.310    -2.3         1.000         1.000
#     0.01    0.0     0.333   0.321    -1.3         1.000         1.000
#     0.01    2.0     0.335   0.325    -1.0         1.000         1.010
#     0.03    0.0     0.333   0.342    +0.8         1.000         1.000
#     0.03    2.0     0.339   0.354    +1.6         1.000         1.030
#     0.10    0.0     0.333   0.416    +8.3         1.000         1.000
#     0.10    2.0     0.351   0.464   +11.2         1.000         1.105
#     0.30    0.0     0.333   0.625   +29.1         1.000         1.000
#     0.30    2.0     0.389   0.751   +36.2         1.000         1.349
#     0.60    0.0     0.333   0.850   +51.6         1.000         1.000
#     0.60    2.0     0.446   0.949   +50.3         1.000         1.821
# theta 0.3, kappa 2: decoy share 0.005; shares basic 0.105, premium 0.140

θ=0\theta = 0 时,加入诱饵使标准档份额下降 2.3 个百分点,与正则性一致。θ\theta 很小时仍然下降(θ=0.01\theta = 0.01 时 −1.3 或 −1.0 个百分点):诱饵分走份额的稀释作用(多项 Logit 部分)大于相对优势带来的增益;θ=0.03\theta = 0.03 时转为上升(+0.8 或 +1.6),所以在本例(τ=0.1\tau = 0.1)中吸引效应的阈值在 0.01 与 0.03 之间,具体位置还取决于 τ\tau 与诱饵自身的份额。θ\theta 再大,吸引效应迅速增强:θ=0.1\theta = 0.1 时标准档份额上升 8.3 个百分点(κ=0\kappa = 0)或 11.2 个百分点(κ=2\kappa = 2),θ=0.3\theta = 0.3 时上升 29.1 或 36.2 个百分点,而诱饵本身几乎没人选(0.005)。折中效应则只在劣势函数为凸(κ=2\kappa = 2)时出现:标准档对基础档的赔率在加入高级档后从 1.000 升到 1.105(θ=0.1\theta = 0.1)、1.349(θ=0.3\theta = 0.3)与 1.821(θ=0.6\theta = 0.6);κ=0\kappa = 0 时,三档在直线上对称,相对优势相互抵消,赔率保持 1.000。所以在这个模型里,吸引效应需要「两两比较进入评价」且权重足够大,折中效应还需要「劣势比优势更重」。

多属性决策场理论

证据

罗、布西迈耶与汤森 2001 年的多属性决策场理论(MDFT)把选择看作偏好随时间累积的过程:每一刻注意力随机落在一个属性上,各选项在该属性上的值与其他选项的平均值相比,得到一个瞬时的「效价」;偏好状态按 P(t+1)=SP(t)+V(t+1)P(t+1) = S\,P(t) + V(t+1) 演化,反馈矩阵 SS 的对角元是记忆,非对角元是选项之间的侧抑制,抑制强度随两个选项在属性空间中的距离增大而减弱。文章指出,把侧抑制设为零时吸引效应消失:被占优的诱饵积累负的偏好,通过与目标之间较强的负向连接,「负负得正」地推高目标;折中效应同样依赖侧抑制,它使中间选项与两个极端选项负相关,从而在比较中获得优势 (Roe et al. 2001)。

下面的程序使用与上一节相同的四个选项,侧抑制取 −ϕ2exp⁡(−dij2/ℓ)-\phi_2 \exp(-d_{ij}^2/\ell)(dijd_{ij} 为两选项的欧氏距离;指数形式是常见选择之一,原文只要求抑制随距离递减),每个选择者累积 100 步,选偏好最高者。

推导

# Multialternative decision field theory (Roe, Busemeyer & Townsend 2001) on the same
# FICTITIOUS tiers. Preferences evolve as P(t+1) = S P(t) + C M W(t+1) + e(t+1):
# M = options x attributes, W(t) attends to ONE attribute per step (probability 1/2 each),
# C subtracts the mean of the other options, e ~ N(0, sig^2). Feedback S has self-memory
# 1 - phi1 on the diagonal and lateral inhibition -phi2 * exp(-d_ij^2 / ell) off it,
# d = distance between options in attribute space (the distance form is one common
# choice; the 2001 paper only requires inhibition to fall with distance). Choice is the
# largest P after T steps. phi2 = 0 switches lateral inhibition off.
import math, random

def afford(price):
    return 1 - 0.8 * math.log(price / 9.99) / math.log(149.0 / 9.99)

S_ = afford(49.90)             # the tiers lie on one line: afford + quality = 1.2
OPT = {"basic": (afford(9.99), 0.20), "standard": (S_, 1.2 - S_),
       "premium": (afford(149.0), 1.00), "decoy": (S_ - 0.05, 1.1 - S_)}

def mdft(names, phi2, n=1500, T=100, phi1=0.01, ell=0.2, sig=0.1, seed=2001):
    rng = random.Random(seed); m = len(names); X = [OPT[k] for k in names]
    S = [[(1 - phi1) if i == j else
          -phi2 * math.exp(-sum((a - b) ** 2 for a, b in zip(X[i], X[j])) / ell)
          for j in range(m)] for i in range(m)]
    wins = [0] * m
    for _ in range(n):
        P = [0.0] * m
        for _ in range(T):
            a = 0 if rng.random() < 0.5 else 1
            val = [x[a] for x in X]; tot = sum(val)
            V = [val[i] - (tot - val[i]) / (m - 1) + rng.gauss(0, sig) for i in range(m)]
            P = [sum(S[i][j] * P[j] for j in range(m)) + V[i] for i in range(m)]
        wins[max(range(m), key=P.__getitem__)] += 1
    return {k: c / n for k, c in zip(names, wins)}

three, four = ["basic", "standard", "premium"], ["basic", "standard", "premium", "decoy"]
print("MDFT shares (1,500 simulated choosers per set, common seed, T = 100 steps)")
print("narrow inhibition: phi1 = 0.01, ell = 0.2")
print("   phi2    set              basic  standard  premium  decoy")
res = {}
for phi2 in (0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03):
    for lab, names in (("2 tiers", ["basic", "standard"]), ("3 tiers", three),
                       ("3 tiers + decoy", four)):
        p = mdft(names, phi2); res[phi2, lab] = p
        print(f"   {phi2:4.2f}    {lab:15s}  " + "  ".join(
            f"{p[k]:7.3f}" if k in p else "      -" for k in four))
for phi2 in (0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03):
    a = res[phi2, "3 tiers + decoy"]["standard"] - res[phi2, "3 tiers"]["standard"]
    o2 = res[phi2, "2 tiers"]["standard"] / res[phi2, "2 tiers"]["basic"]
    o3 = res[phi2, "3 tiers"]["standard"] / res[phi2, "3 tiers"]["basic"]
    print(f"   phi2 {phi2:4.2f}: attraction {100 * a:+5.1f} points;"
          f" standard/basic odds {o2:.2f} -> {o3:.2f} with premium")
print("broad inhibition and faster decay: phi1 = 0.06, ell = 1.0")
for phi2 in (0.05, 0.10):
    r = {lab: mdft(names, phi2, phi1=0.06, ell=1.0) for lab, names in
         (("2", ["basic", "standard"]), ("3", three), ("4", four))}
    print(f"   phi2 {phi2:4.2f}: standard {r['2']['standard']:.3f} (2 tiers),"
          f" {r['3']['standard']:.3f} (3), {r['4']['standard']:.3f} (+decoy);"
          f" odds {r['2']['standard'] / r['2']['basic']:.2f} ->"
          f" {r['3']['standard'] / r['3']['basic']:.2f}")
# MDFT shares (1,500 simulated choosers per set, common seed, T = 100 steps)
# narrow inhibition: phi1 = 0.01, ell = 0.2
#    phi2    set              basic  standard  premium  decoy
#    0.00    2 tiers            0.511    0.489        -        -
#    0.00    3 tiers            0.476    0.063    0.461        -
#    0.00    3 tiers + decoy    0.503    0.070    0.427    0.000
#    0.01    2 tiers            0.507    0.493        -        -
#    0.01    3 tiers            0.473    0.071    0.456        -
#    0.01    3 tiers + decoy    0.357    0.355    0.288    0.000
#    0.02    2 tiers            0.508    0.492        -        -
#    0.02    3 tiers            0.465    0.083    0.453        -
#    0.02    3 tiers + decoy    0.145    0.772    0.083    0.000
#    0.03    2 tiers            0.513    0.487        -        -
#    0.03    3 tiers            0.453    0.103    0.445        -
#    0.03    3 tiers + decoy    0.012    0.981    0.007    0.000
#    phi2 0.00: attraction  +0.7 points; standard/basic odds 0.96 -> 0.13 with premium
#    phi2 0.01: attraction +28.3 points; standard/basic odds 0.97 -> 0.15 with premium
#    phi2 0.02: attraction +68.9 points; standard/basic odds 0.97 -> 0.18 with premium
#    phi2 0.03: attraction +87.9 points; standard/basic odds 0.95 -> 0.23 with premium
# broad inhibition and faster decay: phi1 = 0.06, ell = 1.0
#    phi2 0.05: standard 0.509 (2 tiers), 0.107 (3), 0.327 (+decoy); odds 1.04 -> 0.23
#    phi2 0.10: standard 0.483 (2 tiers), 0.436 (3), 0.993 (+decoy); odds 0.94 -> 1.83

窄抑制(ℓ=0.2\ell = 0.2)下,没有侧抑制时(ϕ2=0\phi_2 = 0)加入诱饵只改变 0.7 个百分点,这来自模拟误差,以及对比矩阵从减去另外 2 个选项的均值变为减去 3 个选项的均值所带来的效价尺度变化;ϕ2=0.01\phi_2 = 0.01 时标准档份额上升 28.3 个百分点,ϕ2=0.03\phi_2 = 0.03 时上升 87.9 个百分点。但同一组参数下没有折中效应:加入高级档后,标准档对基础档的赔率从约 0.96 降到 0.13 至 0.23。原因是注意力每次只落在一个属性上,中间选项在任何一个属性上都不是最好的,在随机游走中处于劣势;只有当侧抑制足够宽、足够强,并且偏好衰减得更快时(ℓ=1\ell = 1、ϕ1=0.06\phi_1 = 0.06、ϕ2=0.10\phi_2 = 0.10),赔率才从 0.94 升到 1.83,出现折中效应——而这时加入诱饵后标准档的份额已从 0.436 升到 0.993(吸引效应约 +55.7 个百分点),几乎所有人都选标准档。图 4 把两个模型的吸引效应随参数的变化画了出来。

两个模型的共同结论是:吸引效应在机制上很容易产生,只要选项的评价足够强地依赖于与其他选项的比较;折中效应则需要更特殊的条件。但「机制上容易产生」不等于「在真实页面上一定出现」,这要看证据。

左:特沃斯基—西蒙森模型中,加入诱饵后(实线、虚线)与加入高级档后(点线)标准档份额的变化,横轴为相对优势权重 \theta。右:MDFT 中吸引效应随侧抑制 \phi_2 的变化(窄抑制,每点 600 个模拟选择者)。示意。

分析页面测试时该用什么模型

上面的结果对分析页面测试数据有一个直接的推论。如果一项随机测试比较了有无诱饵的两个页面,最简单、也最不依赖模型的分析是直接比较两组中选择目标档的比例(第八章即如此);这不需要假设任何选择模型。若要用一个模型把测试结果推广到其他价格组合,多项 Logit、嵌套 Logit 等随机效用模型在结构上就不能再现吸引效应,拟合结果会把诱饵的作用解释为零或负;需要的是特沃斯基—西蒙森模型、MDFT 或其他允许情境依赖的模型。里斯坎普、布西迈耶与梅勒斯 2006 年的综述把违反正则性、违反各种随机传递性等「理性选择原则」的证据放在一起,比较了能解释它们的各类模型,并讨论了这些模型之间怎样用数据加以区分 (Rieskamp et al. 2006)。对本书而言,要点是:模型的选择不是技术细节,它事先决定了分析能不能「看见」诱饵效应。

诱饵效应的生效边界

证据

弗雷德里克、李与巴斯金 2014 年报告了 38 项研究:在用数字表示属性的抽象选择中(例如以数字给出概率的赌局、以数字评分表示质量的电视),吸引效应可以重现(目标份额从 14% 升到 28%、从 21% 升到 37%、从 33% 升到 57%);但在 27 项至少有一个属性以知觉或体验方式呈现的研究中(公寓图片、果汁、薄荷糖、瓶装水等),没有一项出现显著的吸引效应,其中瓶装水出现了显著的反向「排斥效应」(目标份额从 70% 降到 52%)(Frederick et al. 2014)。杨与林恩 2014 年报告了类似的失败 (Yang and Lynn 2014)。原作者休伯、佩恩与普托在回应中承认效应有边界,并列出它较强的条件:先前偏好较弱、占优关系一眼可见(如数字属性)、诱饵很少被选、两个核心选项份额接近、人们的价值观相近;在属性丰富或依赖感官、先前偏好较强、诱饵本身对部分人有吸引力时,效应较弱或消失 (Huber et al. 2014)。希思与查特吉 1995 年的梅塔分析发现,诱饵对低质量竞争者份额的削减大于对高质量竞争者,而且只有在高质量品牌是目标时才违反正则性 (Heath and Chatterjee 1995)。特鲁布拉德等人 2013 年在知觉判断(比较矩形面积)中观察到了三种情境效应 (Trueblood et al. 2013),但弗雷德里克等人未能重复其中的吸引效应;斯佩克特、巴蒂亚与格卢特 2021 年的综述讨论了情境效应在不同任务与呈现方式下难以稳定出现的问题 (Spektor et al. 2021)。现场证据方面,吴与科斯居纳 2020 年分析一家大型网上珠宝商的钻石销售数据,估计只有 11% 至 25% 的顾客察觉到占优关系,察觉者中占优钻石的销售风险率提高 1.8 至 3.2 倍,诱饵效应使零售商的毛利提高 14.3% (Wu and Cosguner 2020)。

综合起来,诱饵效应在三档定价中的生效边界可以列为四条,它们都来自上面的证据,而不是来自模型:

  1. 占优关系必须被看见。 数字化、并排、单位相同的属性有利于效应出现;图片、口味、体验型属性或需要计算才能比较的属性不利于效应出现。现场数据中察觉率只有 11% 至 25%。
  2. 诱饵本身几乎不应被选。 若有相当比例的人选择诱饵,说明它对部分人并不被占优,或占优关系没有被看见;第八章的实验把「诱饵被选比例超过 10%」设为不可解释的门槛。
  3. 核心选项不能相差太大。 若人们本来就强烈偏好某一档,诱饵很难改变选择。
  4. 方向可能反转。 在知觉型属性下已观察到排斥效应;页面设计者无法事先假定方向。

假说 · 尚未验证 · 诱饵效应随占优关系的可见程度而变

作者的假说(尚未确立): 在三档订阅价格页面上,诱饵效应的大小随占优关系的可见程度单调增加:当诱饵与目标档的差别以并排的数字列出时效应最大,以文字描述时较小,以图标或图片表示时接近零。什么样的结果能证明它是错的: 在一项预先登记、按「有无诱饵 × 三种呈现方式」随机分配的实验中,诱饵效应在三种呈现方式下没有单调趋势(趋势检验的置信区间包含零)。

本章小结

多项 Logit 满足无关选项独立性,加入诱饵只会按比例降低所有原有选项的份额。更一般地,任何随机效用模型都满足正则性,所以诱饵效应违反的是所有随机效用模型;误差相关最多使诱饵不带走份额,不能使目标档上升。特沃斯基—西蒙森模型中吸引效应在相对优势权重超过一个阈值(示例中 0.01 至 0.03 之间)后出现,折中效应还需要凸的劣势函数;MDFT 中两者都依赖侧抑制,折中效应需要更宽更强的抑制。实证上,吸引效应在数字属性的抽象选择中可以重现,在知觉与体验型属性中常常消失甚至反转,现场察觉率只有 11% 至 25%。示例价格与 5D Library 自家定价相同,本章结果不构成对该定价的验证。

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Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces: From Loss-Aversion Value Functions and Asymmetric Dominance to Hyperbolic Discounting, Read Beside the Qingzhong Chapters of the Guanzi [选择架构、累积前景理论与销售界面价格锚定的计算行为学] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).