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Chapter 2 Struck-Through and Reference Prices: Transaction Utility, Credibility and Price-Indication Rules
What a struck-through number can do
Product pages often show a higher price struck through, the lower current price beside it and a line such as “save 32 %”. The author’s framework asks to refute the claim that “simply striking through a former price raises willingness to pay without limit”. This chapter first introduces the theory that explains why the practice might work (transaction utility and reference prices), then looks at how large the reference-price effect is in published evidence and where it stops, then uses an author’s model to show why the gain in willingness to pay has a ceiling, and finally discusses the US and EU rules on “former prices” and what those rules allow and forbid in arithmetic terms.
Transaction utility and reference prices
Evidence
Thaler’s 1985 “mental accounting” framework splits the total utility of a purchase into two parts: acquisition utility, the value of the good to the buyer minus its price; and transaction utility, the “reference price” (what the buyer considers fair or expected) minus the actual price, measuring whether the deal is a good one (Thaler 1985). Reference prices can come from memory of past prices (internal reference prices) or from prices displayed by the seller (external reference prices, such as struck-through or “recommended retail” prices). Mazumdar, Raj and Sinha’s 2005 review organises the literature on how reference prices form, how they are measured and what they do (Mazumdar et al. 2005).
In this framework a struck-through price works by raising the buyer’s reference price and hence transaction utility. If the buyer purchases whenever acquisition plus transaction utility is non-negative, with value , reference price and weight on transaction utility, the most she will pay is
With , WTP is just : only the good counts. With , each dollar added to raises WTP by dollars. The key question is therefore how far a displayed struck-through price can raise . If rose without limit with , so would WTP — exactly the claim the framework wants refuted.
Evidence: the effect exists, but credibility is discounted
Evidence
Urbany, Bearden and Weilbaker (1988) compared “plausible” and “exaggerated” advertised reference prices: exaggerated reference prices were less believable, but, as later literature reports, still raised perceived value relative to showing no reference price (Urbany et al. 1988). Compeau and Grewal’s 1998 integrative review brought together research on comparative price advertising (advertising that displays a reference price) and its public-policy implications (Compeau and Grewal 1998). Krishna and co-authors’ 2002 meta-analysis of 20 marketing studies found that both the percentage and the dollar size of a deal raise perceived savings, the percentage more so; displaying the regular price as an external reference raises perceived value for large plausible deals and for implausible deals, but not for small plausible deals (Krishna et al. 2002).
This evidence says two things, partly differently from what the framework expects. First, reference-price effects do exist, and exaggerated reference prices, though less believable, did not reverse into negative effects in the studies checked. So “implausibly high reference prices backfire” is a possibility, not an established result; the “suspicion” model later in this chapter states it as a hypothesis. Second, “credibility is discounted” is itself enough to refute “without limit”: as long as buyers give ever smaller weight to ever more exaggerated reference prices, the gain in WTP is bounded. A model makes this explicit.
Where internal reference prices come from
A struck-through price is an external reference; the buyer’s internal reference price comes mainly from the prices she has seen. Mazumdar and co-authors’ review sorts the sources of reference prices into several kinds, and one common class of models writes the internal reference price as a weighted average of past observed prices, adjusting a step towards each new price seen (Mazumdar et al. 2005). In such adaptive models frequent promotions have an easily overlooked consequence: every purchase at a low price pulls the buyer’s internal reference down, so that later purchases at the regular price carry negative transaction utility and the regular price looks “expensive”. In other words, today’s struck-through price raises today’s transaction utility, but using it often may lower tomorrow’s reference price; the author’s model in this chapter describes a single purchase and leaves this dynamic out.
There is an interesting correspondence with the 30-day rule of Article 6a: by defining the “prior price” as the recent lowest price, the rule in effect asks the seller to use a conservative reference point that moves in the same direction as the buyer’s adaptive reference price, rather than a high price the buyer has never seen. Whether the rule was motivated by this, the book does not infer; it notes only that the two point the same way arithmetically.
Anchoring evidence needs qualifying too
Struck-through prices are sometimes described as “anchoring”: an arbitrary number affecting later judgement. In Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec’s 2003 experiments participants first thought of the last two digits of their social security number and then bid for goods; those with higher numbers bid more, which the authors called “coherent arbitrariness” (Ariely et al. 2003). Maniadis, Tufano and List (2014) repeated similar experiments with larger samples, found much weaker anchoring than the original study and used this to discuss the replicability of single studies (Maniadis et al. 2014). Book 27 treated anchors and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) in bargaining; here we add only one point: a struck-through price differs from an arbitrary anchor in that it claims to be a real former price, so part of its effect comes from the buyer’s trust in that claim, and exploitation of that trust is precisely what the law regulates. Prices ending in 9 (such as 9.99) are another kind of price presentation: Anderson and Simester found in mail-order catalogue field experiments that prices ending in 9 raised demand (Anderson and Simester 2003), but this is a different mechanism from reference prices and is not pursued here.
Price-indication rules: what is a “former price”?
Evidence
Section 233.1 of the US Federal Trade Commission’s Guides Against Deceptive Pricing (16 CFR Part 233) states that a former-price comparison is legitimate if the former price is the actual, bona fide price at which the article was offered to the public on a regular basis for a reasonably substantial period of time; if an artificial, inflated price was established in order to offer a large reduction later, the “former price” is fictitious and the advertised bargain is false (U.S. Federal Trade Commission 1964). Article 6a of EU Directive 98/6/EC (inserted by Directive 2019/2161) requires any announcement of a price reduction to indicate the prior price, meaning the lowest price applied by the trader during a period of not less than 30 days before the reduction (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 1998, 2019); member states may provide differently for perishable goods, goods on the market for less than 30 days and progressively increasing reductions. On 26 September 2024, in Case C-330/23 (Verbraucherzentrale Baden-Württemberg v Aldi Süd), the Court of Justice of the EU confirmed that a reduction announced as a percentage or by other wording that stresses an advantageous price must be calculated from this 30-day lowest price, not from the price on the day before the offer (Court of Justice of the European Union 2024).
The second part of the program uses a fictitious 90-day price history to show the arithmetic of the two kinds of rule. An item sells at 39 for 45 days, is raised to 59 for 14 days, returns to 39 for 6 days and from day 65 is “on sale” at 29. Taking the price on the day before the sale as the former price, the claimed reduction is 26 %; taking the highest price of the last 30 days, it could be 51 %; under Article 6a the prior price is the lowest of the last 30 days, 39, so only 26 % can be claimed. Even if 59 had been kept right up to the day before the sale, the 30-day window would still contain 39, and the claim would still be 26 % (Figure 2, right). But if 59 had been charged for all 65 days, the 30-day low would be 59 and the 51 % claim would be allowed under this rule. So the 30-day-low rule blocks “raise briefly, then cut”; on its own it cannot exclude “list for a long time at a price nobody pays”, which needs a substantive test like the US Guides’ “bona fide … on a regular basis”.
Note
Other jurisdictions. The author’s framework mentions Malaysian rules. This round of checking found no rule text that could be verified directly, so the book does not cite one. Rules differ from place to place and are revised; this chapter uses two verified sets of rules, the US and the EU, only to illustrate the arithmetic, and it is not an interpretation of the law anywhere.
Hypothesis · not established · Exaggerated struck-through prices damage trust
The author’s hypothesis (not established): when a struck-through price exceeds the buyer’s internal reference price by more than some multiple (about 2.3 times in the author’s model, 92.0/40; 1.5 times is where the gain peaks), a page displaying it has a lower purchase rate than a page without one (the suspicion form). What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered experiment randomising “no struck-through price”, “struck-through price at 1.2 times the reference” and “at 2.5 times” (each struck-through price must be a real former price, so that the experiment itself is not a false indication), the purchase rate in the 2.5-times arm is not lower than with no struck-through price, or the confidence interval for the difference includes zero.
Chapter summary
Thaler’s transaction utility explains a struck-through price as raising the reference price. The evidence checked shows that reference-price effects exist and that exaggerated reference prices lose credibility, without reversing in those studies; Krishna and co-authors’ meta-analysis shows the regular price helping large plausible deals and implausible ones, but not small plausible ones. The author’s model shows that as long as credibility saturates with exaggeration, the gain in WTP is bounded (3.00, or 7.5 %, in the example); with suspicion added, very high struck-through prices lower WTP, but that is a hypothesis. The US Guides require the former price to be bona fide and regularly offered; EU Article 6a requires the prior price to be the lowest price in at least the 30 days before a reduction, which blocks “raise briefly, then cut” but cannot by itself exclude a long-standing inflated list price. “Striking through a former price raises willingness to pay without limit” therefore fails in theory, in evidence and in law.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces: From Loss-Aversion Value Functions and Asymmetric Dominance to Hyperbolic Discounting, Read Beside the Qingzhong Chapters of the Guanzi [选择架构、累积前景理论与销售界面价格锚定的计算行为学] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).