5D Library › Relationship Rupture Survival Analysis, No-Contact Memory Decay and Reconciliation Game Windows · 中文
Chapter 4. Signals That Can Be Believed
A signalling game
Often what stands between two former partners is a doubt: has anything changed? The person who wants to reunite may say so, but words cost nothing, and a person who has not changed can say the same words. Signalling theory asks when an action can separate types who would like to look alike (Spence 1973). The answer is that the action must cost the type who is pretending more than the type who is not.
p07 takes as the signal months of steady, pressure-free conduct that the other person can see for themselves: keeping a job, keeping a promise, answering calmly. For a person who has really changed a month of this costs 1 unit; for one who has not, it costs more, because it has to be kept up against habit.
Calculation
# Chapter 4. p07: When can a display of change be believed? Two sender
# types: "changed" (H) and "unchanged" (L). The signal is m months of
# steady, pressure-free conduct that the other person can observe
# (work, health, calm replies). A month of it costs H 1 unit and L 3
# units (it is harder to keep up if nothing has changed). Being given
# another chance is worth V = 12 to either type. A separating
# equilibrium needs H willing (m <= V / 1) and L unwilling (m >= V / 3).
# A post that costs nothing to either type separates no one.
V = 12.0
def band(c_h, c_l):
return V / c_l, V / c_h
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" cost a month (H, L) months that separate least-cost m")
for c_h, c_l in ((1, 3), (1, 2), (1, 1.2), (0, 0)):
if c_l == c_h:
print(" {:>19} {:>20} {:>12}".format(
"({}, {})".format(c_h, c_l), "none (pooling)", "-"))
continue
lo, hi = band(c_h, c_l)
print(" {:>19} {:9.1f} to {:6.1f} {:12.1f}".format(
"({}, {})".format(c_h, c_l), lo, hi, lo))
print(" H's net gain at least-cost m (1, 3): {:.1f}".format(V - 4.0))
print(" L's gain from mimicking at m = 4: {:.1f}".format(V - 3 * 4.0))
# cost a month (H, L) months that separate least-cost m
# (1, 3) 4.0 to 12.0 4.0
# (1, 2) 6.0 to 12.0 6.0
# (1, 1.2) 10.0 to 12.0 10.0
# (0, 0) none (pooling) -
# H's net gain at least-cost m (1, 3): 8.0
# L's gain from mimicking at m = 4: 0.0With costs 1 and 3 and a second chance worth 12 to either, any length between 4.0 and 12.0 months separates the two types; the least costly is 4.0 months, leaving the changed sender a net gain of 8.0 while the unchanged one gains 0.0 from imitating it. When the costs are close (1 and 1.2), it takes 10.0 months. When the signal costs nothing to anyone, as with a cheerful post, no length separates anyone: both types send it, and it carries no information.
What the other person can infer
The same point can be put as Bayes’ rule. p08 starts from a belief of 0.3 that the sender has really changed and updates it on what is observed.
Calculation
# Chapter 4. p08: What the other person can infer. Prior that the
# sender has really changed: 0.3. Each observation has a probability
# under H and under L; the posterior is updated by Bayes' rule.
# cheap display (a happy post): H 0.90, L 0.80
# four months of steady conduct: H 0.80, L 0.15
# a direct demand for commitment: H 0.20, L 0.60
# a reply that respects a "no": H 0.90, L 0.40
SIG = {"cheap display": (0.90, 0.80), "four steady months": (0.80, 0.15),
"direct demand": (0.20, 0.60), "respects a no": (0.90, 0.40)}
def post(prior, seq):
p = prior
for s in seq:
h, l = SIG[s]
p = p * h / (p * h + (1 - p) * l)
return p
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" evidence seen posterior")
for seq in ((), ("cheap display",), ("cheap display",) * 3,
("four steady months",), ("direct demand",),
("four steady months", "direct demand"),
("four steady months", "respects a no")):
lab = " + ".join(seq) if seq else "nothing (prior)"
if len(seq) == 3:
lab = "cheap display, three times"
print(" {:<42} {:9.3f}".format(lab, post(0.3, seq)))
# evidence seen posterior
# nothing (prior) 0.300
# cheap display 0.325
# cheap display, three times 0.379
# four steady months 0.696
# direct demand 0.125
# four steady months + direct demand 0.432
# four steady months + respects a no 0.837A cheap display moves the belief from 0.300 to 0.325, and three of them to 0.379: almost nothing, because an unchanged sender posts them nearly as often. Four months of steady conduct move it to 0.696. A direct demand for commitment does the opposite: by itself it lowers the belief to 0.125, and after four good months it still pulls the belief back to 0.432. A reply that accepts a “no” calmly is the strongest evidence in the table, taking the belief to 0.837 after four steady months. The most persuasive thing a person can show is the thing that is hard to fake and that asks for nothing.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): after a rupture, the former partner’s belief that the other has changed rises with the duration of observable, unpressured conduct and falls after explicit demands for commitment. What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered vignette experiment with randomised descriptions of post-rupture conduct, the duration of steady conduct has no effect on judged change, or demands for commitment raise it.
Summary
A display of a better life is believable only when it would be costly for someone who has not changed to keep it up. Words, posts and demands are cheap and carry little or negative information; months of steady conduct and respect for the other person’s answer carry the most.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Relationship Rupture Survival Analysis, No-Contact Memory Decay and Reconciliation Game Windows: Negative-Affect Dissipation Rates, Dual-Process Nostalgia Peaks and Signaling Equilibria [关系断裂生存分析、断联期记忆衰减与复联博弈窗口] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090241 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).