5D Library › 分销网络幂律激活、网红矩阵组合优化与激励稳定边界 · English
第六章 分销队列的衰减与持牌主理人的批发差价
队列会怎样流失
激活只是开始。p11 追踪一千名刚激活的分销员二十四个月:销售较弱的人更早停下来。
推导
# Chapter 6. p11: How an affiliate cohort decays. 1,000 newly active
# affiliates sell 10 x Lomax(1.5) units a month each (p02). Weak sellers
# quit sooner: the monthly chance of stopping is 0.05 + 0.25 / (1 + s/10)
# for an affiliate selling s a month. Tracked: the share still active,
# revenue relative to month 1 (net revenue retention), and the share of
# that month's revenue from the cohort's top 1% of sellers. 200 cohorts,
# seed 87.
import random
def cohort(rng, n=1000):
return [10.0 * ((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5) - 1) for _ in range(n)]
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(87)
marks = (1, 3, 6, 12, 24)
acc = {m: [0.0, 0.0, 0.0] for m in marks}
for _ in range(200):
s = cohort(rng)
top = set(sorted(range(1000), key=lambda i: -s[i])[:10])
alive = [True] * 1000
first = sum(s)
for month in range(1, 25):
if month in acc:
rev = sum(x for x, a in zip(s, alive) if a)
tr = sum(s[i] for i in top if alive[i])
acc[month][0] += sum(alive) / 1000
acc[month][1] += rev / first
acc[month][2] += tr / rev
for i in range(1000):
if alive[i] and rng.random() < 0.05 + 0.25 / (1 + s[i] / 10):
alive[i] = False
print(" month still active revenue vs month 1 top 1% share")
for m in marks:
a, r, t = (x / 200 for x in acc[m])
print(" {:5d} {:12.3f} {:18.3f} {:12.3f}".format(m, a, r, t))
# month still active revenue vs month 1 top 1% share
# 1 1.000 1.000 0.274
# 3 0.645 0.807 0.301
# 6 0.350 0.600 0.338
# 12 0.122 0.354 0.401
# 24 0.025 0.140 0.457六个月后只剩 0.350 的人还在卖,但收入还有第一个月的 0.600;十二个月后人数剩 0.122,收入剩 0.354;二十四个月后只剩 0.025 的人,收入仍有 0.140。原因是留下来的多半是强者:最初前 1% 的销售者,在第一个月贡献 0.274 的收入,到第二十四个月贡献 0.457。这意味着一个分销计划的长期收入主要取决于能否留住顶尖的少数人,而不是激活人数。
每一百令吉怎么分
p12 比较一笔 100 令吉零售在三种渠道下的分配:品牌直接投放广告、单层分销员拿 50% 佣金、持牌主理人以 45 令吉批发进货再自行零售。
推导
# Chapter 6. p12: Where each ringgit of a RM 100 sale goes, and a test
# for the legal line. Cost of goods RM 20. Direct: the brand pays
# RM 30 of ads per sale and RM 10 to ship. Single-tier affiliate: the
# brand pays 50% commission and RM 10 to ship. Licensee: buys at RM 45
# wholesale (the brand ships in bulk, RM 5 a unit) and spends RM 15 a
# unit selling to her own customers. Then a variant that crosses the
# line: each licensee also signs up two sub-licensees a month at a
# RM 5,000 fee (RM 2,000 to her) and takes 5% of their wholesale buying
# (200 units a month each). The test: what share of her income comes
# from recruiting rather than from sales to end customers?
P, COGS = 100.0, 20.0
if __name__ == "__main__":
rows = (("brand direct", P - COGS - 30 - 10, 0.0),
("single-tier affiliate", P * 0.5 - COGS - 10, P * 0.5),
("licensee wholesale", 45.0 - COGS - 5, P - 45 - 15))
print(" channel brand keeps partner keeps (RM)")
for name, brand, partner in rows:
print(" {:<22} {:11.0f} {:18.0f}".format(name, brand, partner))
sales = 300 * (P - 45 - 15)
print(" licensee selling 300 units a month earns RM {:,.0f} from"
" sales".format(sales))
print(" variant with paid sign-ups")
print(" month sub-licensees from recruiting share of income")
subs = 0
for month in range(1, 13):
subs += 2
rec = 2 * 2000.0 + 0.05 * 45 * 200 * subs
if month in (1, 3, 6, 12):
print(" {:5d} {:13d} {:15,.0f} {:15.3f}".format(
month, subs, rec, rec / (rec + sales)))
# channel brand keeps partner keeps (RM)
# brand direct 40 0
# single-tier affiliate 20 50
# licensee wholesale 20 40
# licensee selling 300 units a month earns RM 12,000 from sales
# variant with paid sign-ups
# month sub-licensees from recruiting share of income
# 1 2 4,900 0.290
# 3 6 6,700 0.358
# 6 12 9,400 0.439
# 12 24 14,800 0.552品牌直营每笔留下 40 令吉,但要自己承担获客;单层分销员与持牌主理人两种渠道下品牌都留下 20 令吉,合作方分别拿 50 与 40 令吉。持牌主理人每月卖 300 件,从销售得到 12,000 令吉。这三种安排都合规,因为每个人的收入都来自卖给最终顾客的商品。
问题出在变体:如果持牌主理人每月再招两位「次级主理人」,每位缴 5,000 令吉加盟费、其中 2,000 归她,并抽取次级主理人进货额的 5%,那么第一个月她的收入中来自招募的比例是 0.290,第六个月 0.439,第十二个月 0.552,过半之后已经是「主要来自招募」。这条线不是一次越过的,而是随着网络长大慢慢越过的;因此需要按月计算这个比例。
注
合规监测指标: 每月为每位持牌主理人计算「来自招募的收入比例」,包括加盟费分成、对下级进货的抽成与任何与招募挂钩的奖金;只要这一比例大于零,就说明方案的设计里存在与招募挂钩的报酬,应当移除,而不是等它接近一半。
小结
分销队列的人数衰减得很快,收入衰减得较慢,因为留下的是强者。单层佣金与持牌主理人的批发差价都把收入绑在零售上;一旦加入加盟费分成或对下级进货的抽成,来自招募的收入比例会随网络增长而上升,最终越过法律界线。
Fan, Y. (2026). Affiliate Network Power Laws, Influencer Portfolio Optimization and Incentive Stability Bounds: Heavy-Tailed Productivity, Markowitz Traffic Allocation and Single-Tier Commission Equilibria [分销网络幂律激活、网红矩阵组合优化与激励稳定边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090229 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).