5D Library › Affiliate Network Power Laws, Influencer Portfolio Optimization and Incentive Stability Bounds · 中文

Chapter 7. Tao Zhu Gong’s Giving Away, the Labour Shares of the Shanxi Merchants and the Rewards of the Wei Liaozi

Why read these sources here

The earlier chapters dealt with three things: how wealth concentrates in a few hands; how people without capital can share in profit; and whom rewards should go to. Old Chinese sources record all three. This chapter checks the texts and asks which correspondences can be computed. Two points come out of the check: Tao Zhu Gong “three times made a thousand in gold” and “twice gave it away”, that is, he made his fortune three times and gave it away twice, not “gathered three times and scattered three times” as is often said; and the Wei Liaozi says that “rewards are prized when they reach the small” and “rewards reaching the cowherd boy and the stable hand”, while the popular line “reward one man and ten thousand rejoice” is not found in that chapter.

Tao Zhu Gong: three fortunes, twice given away

Source text

Sima Qian, Shiji, “Biographies of the Money-Makers”

十九年之中三致千金,再分散與貧交疏昆弟。

(司马迁 1959)

“Within nineteen years he three times made a thousand in gold, and twice gave it away among his poor friends and distant brothers.” After leaving the state of Yue, Fan Li traded at Tao, three times gathered a thousand in gold within nineteen years, and twice gave his wealth to poor friends and distant kin. The passage is often cited as an example of “wealth scattered, people gathered”. From the viewpoint of Chapter 1, it describes someone at the top of a heavy tail choosing to share part of his output with others in the network. The 50% commission of single-tier affiliation has the same structure: the brand gives half of the retail price to whoever brings the customer. But there is a difference: Tao Zhu Gong’s giving was a gift, while commission is pay for a sale, and the latter is exactly the basis of compliance described in Chapter 5.

The labour shares of the Shanxi merchants: sharing profit without capital

The shares of Shanxi trading houses and remittance banks in the Ming and Qing periods were of two kinds, capital shares (yin gu) and labour shares (shen gu): the owners who put in money held capital shares, while managers and staff who put in no money held labour shares on their own persons, and at the settling of accounts both kinds shared the profit by share (卫聚贤 2008). This amounts to today’s profit sharing: managers without capital share profit according to performance. How high should the share be? Part (a) of p13 computes it with the standard result for linear contracts (Holmström and Milgrom 1987): the noisier the profit, the more risk the manager bears, and the lower the best share.

Calculation

# Chapter 7. p13: Two old incentive rules as arithmetic.
# (a) Labour shares (shen gu) of the Shanxi firms: a manager without
# capital takes a share s of profit. Output 100 e + noise (sd sigma),
# effort cost c e^2 / 2 with c = 10, risk aversion r = 0.02. Effort is
# e = 100 s / c; the owners' best share is s* = 1 / (1 + r c sigma^2 /
# 100^2) (linear contract with normal noise).
# (b) Wei Liaozi: "rewards are prized when they reach the small". Two
# beliefs, prior 1/2 each: H, rewards follow merit at any rank (chance of
# a reward 0.3 for a low or a high rank), and K, rewards follow rank
# (0.02 for a low rank, 0.6 for a high one). One public reward is seen.
def best_share(sigma, r=0.02, c=10.0):
    return 1.0 / (1.0 + r * c * sigma ** 2 / 100.0 ** 2)

def posterior(p_h, p_k, prior=0.5):
    return p_h * prior / (p_h * prior + p_k * (1 - prior))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   (a) profit noise sd   best labour share   manager effort")
    for sigma in (100, 200, 300, 400):
        s = best_share(sigma)
        print("   {:19,d}   {:17.3f}   {:14.2f}".format(
            sigma, s, 100 * s / 10))
    print("   (b) reward seen     belief in merit rule   likelihood ratio")
    for who, ph, pk in (("stable hand", 0.3, 0.02), ("general", 0.3, 0.6)):
        print("   {:<17}   {:20.3f}   {:16.2f}".format(
            who, posterior(ph, pk), ph / pk))
#    (a) profit noise sd   best labour share   manager effort
#                    100               0.833             8.33
#                    200               0.556             5.56
#                    300               0.357             3.57
#                    400               0.238             2.38
#    (b) reward seen     belief in merit rule   likelihood ratio
#    stable hand                        0.938              15.00
#    general                            0.333               0.50

With a profit noise standard deviation of 100, the best labour share is about 0.833; at 400 it is only 0.238, and the manager’s effort falls with it from 8.33 to 2.38. The harder it is to attribute results to one person’s effort, the less suitable it is to put all pay into a share. For an affiliate, commission on a single sale has little noise (a sale is a sale), so 50% can be given; for a licensed principal’s annual profit share the noise is large, so the share should be lower and paired with a fixed wholesale margin.

The Wei Liaozi: rewards are prized when they reach the small

Source text

Wei Liaozi, “Wu yi” (Discussion of military matters)

殺一人而三軍震者,殺之。

殺一人而萬人喜者,殺之。

殺之貴大,賞之貴小,當殺而雖貴重必殺之,是刑上究也。

賞及牛童馬圉者,是賞下流也。

(上海师范学院古籍整理研究室 1978)

“If killing one man makes the three armies tremble, kill him. If killing one man makes ten thousand rejoice, kill him. Punishment is prized when it reaches the great, reward when it reaches the small; when a man should be killed, kill him even if he is high and weighty: this is punishment reaching the top. When rewards reach the cowherd boy and the stable hand, this is reward flowing down.” Wei Liaozi holds that punishment is prized when it reaches those of high rank and reward when it reaches those of low rank, so that even the cowherd boy and the stable hand can be rewarded. Part (b) of p13 writes this as a Bayesian problem: people do not know whether rewards are given “by merit” or “by rank”, and they update their belief after seeing one public reward. Seeing a stable hand rewarded raises belief in “reward by merit” from one half to 0.938, a likelihood ratio of 15.00; seeing a general rewarded lowers it to 0.333, a likelihood ratio of 0.50. Rewarding someone of low rank conveys far more about the rule. In an affiliate programme, publicly recognising a newcomer who has just made a first sale does more to convince everyone else that “pay follows performance” than recognising the champion once more.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): in an affiliate programme, publicly recognising newcomers with small results raises the later activity of the other affiliates more than recognising only the top sellers. What would show it wrong: in an experiment that assigns the form of recognition at random, the two groups’ activity rates over the following three months show no significant difference, or the group that recognises only the top is higher.

Summary

Tao Zhu Gong’s “three fortunes, twice given away” is a person at the top of a heavy tail sharing his output by choice; the labour shares of the Shanxi merchants were an institution for sharing profit without capital, and the best share falls as the noise in results grows; the Wei Liaozi’s “rewards are prized when they reach the small” can be written as a Bayesian update: rewarding the lowly conveys the most about the rule.

References

Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1987. “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives.” Econometrica 55 (2): 303 to 328.
上海师范学院古籍整理研究室, ed. 1978. 尉缭子注释. 上海古籍出版社.
卫聚贤. 2008. 山西票号史. 山西财经大学晋商研究经典文库. 经济管理出版社.
司马迁. 1959. 史记. 中华书局.

Fan, Y. (2026). Affiliate Network Power Laws, Influencer Portfolio Optimization and Incentive Stability Bounds: Heavy-Tailed Productivity, Markowitz Traffic Allocation and Single-Tier Commission Equilibria [分销网络幂律激活、网红矩阵组合优化与激励稳定边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090229 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).