5D Library › Affiliate Network Power Laws, Influencer Portfolio Optimization and Incentive Stability Bounds · 中文
Chapter 5. The Geometry of Multi-Level Commissions and the Saturation of Pyramids
How many people must be below?
A multi-level marketing plan spreads commission over several levels of uplines. p09 sets a seven-level plan totalling 50% (20%, 10%, 8%, 5%, 4%, 2% and 1%), with each member moving 300 ringgit a month, of which 200 is the purchase needed to stay qualified.
Calculation
# Chapter 5. p09: The geometry of multi-level pay. A plan pays 50% of
# volume in all, spread over seven levels: 20, 10, 8, 5, 4, 2 and 1
# percent. Each member moves RM 300 a month, RM 200 of it the purchase
# needed to stay qualified. If every member brings in b recruits, a
# member with l full levels below has b + b^2 + ... + b^l people under
# her. How many does she need for RM 3,000 a month of override, and in
# a finished network (a full b-ary tree, depth 12) what share of members
# earn more in override than their own required purchase?
RATES = (0.20, 0.10, 0.08, 0.05, 0.04, 0.02, 0.01)
VOLUME, BUY = 300.0, 200.0
def override(b, levels):
return sum(r * VOLUME * b ** (i + 1)
for i, r in enumerate(RATES[:levels]))
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" b levels for RM 3,000 people below override (RM)")
for b in (2, 3, 5):
for lv in range(1, 8):
if override(b, lv) >= 3000 or lv == 7:
people = sum(b ** k for k in range(1, lv + 1))
note = "" if override(b, lv) >= 3000 else " not reached"
print(" {} {:19d} {:12,d} {:13,.0f}{}".format(
b, lv, people, override(b, lv), note))
break
print(" full tree of depth 12")
print(" b members share above purchase share with no"
" recruit")
for b in (2, 3, 5):
depth = 12
members = sum(b ** d for d in range(depth + 1))
above = 0
for d in range(depth + 1):
if override(b, min(7, depth - d)) > BUY:
above += b ** d
leaves = b ** depth
print(" {} {:13,d} {:21.3f} {:20.3f}".format(
b, members, above / members, leaves / members))
# b levels for RM 3,000 people below override (RM)
# 2 7 254 1,824 not reached
# 3 5 363 5,229
# 5 3 155 4,050
# full tree of depth 12
# b members share above purchase share with no recruit
# 2 8,191 0.250 0.500
# 3 797,161 0.111 0.667
# 5 305,175,781 0.200 0.800If each person recruits only two, even with all seven levels full and 254 people below, override income is only 1,824 ringgit a month, short of 3,000; if each recruits three, it takes five levels and 363 people; if each recruits five, three levels and 155 people. Now look at a “finished” network (a full tree twelve levels deep): with five recruits each, total membership is 305,175,781, far beyond the reachable population of any country; and even in such a full tree only 0.200 of members earn more in overrides than their own required purchase, while 0.800 have nobody below them at all. The geometry settles it: most people must sit on the bottom level.
Saturation in a finite market
p10 puts the same plan into a market where only fifty thousand people can be recruited, runs it for thirty-six months with recruitment slowing as the market fills, and adds up each member’s net gain or loss while in the network (the required purchase counted at half price as worth it to the member).
Calculation
# Chapter 5. p10: A multi-level network in a finite market. 50,000
# people can be reached. The network starts with 10 members; each month
# every member recruits one more person with probability
# 0.3 (1 - members / 50,000). Members use the plan of p09: RM 300 of
# volume a month, of which RM 200 is a required purchase; the purchase
# is counted at half its price as worth it to the member, RM 30 is
# margin on outside retail, and overrides go up seven levels. After 36
# months, each member's net gain over her own time in the network is
# summed. For comparison, a single-tier affiliate pays nothing to join
# and keeps 50% of her outside retail. Seed 87.
import random
RATES = (0.20, 0.10, 0.08, 0.05, 0.04, 0.02, 0.01)
M, MONTHS = 50000, 36
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(87)
up = [None] * 10
net = [0.0] * 10
for month in range(MONTHS):
n = len(up)
for i in range(n):
net[i] += 30.0 - 100.0
j, lvl = up[i], 0
while j is not None and lvl < 7:
net[j] += RATES[lvl] * 300.0
j, lvl = up[j], lvl + 1
p = 0.3 * (1 - n / M)
for i in range(n):
if rng.random() < p:
up.append(i)
net.append(0.0)
if month in (11, 23, 35):
losers = sum(1 for x in net if x < 0) / len(net)
print(" month {:2d}: members {:6,d}, share with a net loss"
" {:.3f}".format(month + 1, len(net), losers))
s = sorted(net, reverse=True)
top = sum(s[:len(s) // 100])
gains = sum(x for x in s if x > 0)
print(" top 1% of members take {:.3f} of all net gains".format(
top / gains))
print(" median member net (RM): {:,.0f}".format(s[len(s) // 2]))
print(" single tier (no fee, RM 50 a month on retail): share with"
" a loss 0.000")
# month 12: members 349, share with a net loss 0.607
# month 24: members 7,314, share with a net loss 0.631
# month 36: members 43,165, share with a net loss 0.724
# top 1% of members take 0.524 of all net gains
# median member net (RM): -160
# single tier (no fee, RM 50 a month on retail): share with a loss 0.000At month twelve there are only 349 members, at month twenty-four 7,314, and at month thirty-six 43,165, close to the market’s limit; the share of members with a net loss rises from 0.607 to 0.724. The top 1% of members take 0.524 of all net gains. By contrast, a single-tier affiliate pays no fee, need not stock inventory and earns commission only on her own retail sales to outsiders, so nobody loses money; her income is just as heavy-tailed, but the tail comes from selling, not from recruiting.
The legal line
Malaysia’s Direct Sales and Anti-Pyramid Scheme Act 1993 (Act 500), in Part VA (sections 27A and 27B), prohibits pyramid schemes; among the features listed in its Schedule is that participants’ bonuses or benefits come “solely or primarily” from recruiting or introducing others rather than from sales (Malaysia 1993). The US Federal Trade Commission’s 2018 guidance on multi-level marketing likewise says the key question is whether pay is based on retail sales to real customers rather than on participants’ own purchases or on recruitment (Federal Trade Commission 2018).
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): a single-tier 50% direct commission plus a wholesale margin for licensed principals can give the top affiliates income comparable to a multi-level plan without relying on recruitment income. What would show it wrong: in a programme actually run this way, a substantial part of licensed principals’ income (for example more than three tenths) still comes from payments tied to recruitment, or top affiliates earn significantly less than the top level of comparable multi-level plans.
This book is not legal advice; any commission plan must be reviewed by a locally qualified lawyer before it is put into effect.
Summary
The mathematical structure of multi-level commission puts most members on the bottom level; once the market saturates most of them lose money, and gains concentrate in the few who joined first. Single-tier income is just as heavy-tailed, but it comes from selling rather than recruiting, and that is exactly where the legal line lies.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Affiliate Network Power Laws, Influencer Portfolio Optimization and Incentive Stability Bounds: Heavy-Tailed Productivity, Markowitz Traffic Allocation and Single-Tier Commission Equilibria [分销网络幂律激活、网红矩阵组合优化与激励稳定边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090229 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).