5D Library › Affiliate Network Power Laws, Influencer Portfolio Optimization and Incentive Stability Bounds · 中文

Chapter 2. First-Sale Activation Bonuses and Sales Contests

Whom does a first-sale bonus buy?

To get new affiliates to their first sale quickly, many programmes pay a “first-sale activation bonus”. The trouble is that the bonus is also paid to people who would have sold anyway; and the people it “tips over the line” are precisely the weaker sellers who will contribute less later. p03 computes both effects for a cohort of five thousand new affiliates.

Calculation

# Chapter 2. p03: A first-sale activation bonus. A cohort of 5,000 new
# affiliates; each has a latent drive z ~ N(0, 1). Without a bonus the
# chance of a first sale within 30 days is logistic(-1.5 + z); a bonus of
# B ringgit adds 0.01 B to the logit. The bonus is paid to everyone who
# makes a first sale, including those who would have sold anyway
# (deadweight). An activated affiliate brings the brand a further
# 12-month margin of 120 exp(0.8 z - 0.32) ringgit, so the people a bonus
# tips over are the weaker sellers. Common random numbers, seed 87.
import random
from math import exp

def logistic(x):
    return 1.0 / (1.0 + exp(-x))

def cohort(rng, n=5000):
    return [(rng.gauss(0, 1), rng.random()) for _ in range(n)]

def run(people, bonus):
    act = base = 0
    value = base_value = 0.0
    for z, u in people:
        v = 120.0 * exp(0.8 * z - 0.32)
        if u < logistic(-1.5 + z):
            base += 1
            base_value += v
        if u < logistic(-1.5 + z + 0.01 * bonus):
            act += 1
            value += v
    return act, base, value, base_value

if __name__ == "__main__":
    people = cohort(random.Random(87))
    print("   bonus  activated  extra  deadweight  cost per   net gain")
    print("    (RM)                     share       extra (RM)  (RM)")
    for bonus in (0, 20, 50, 100, 200):
        act, base, value, bv = run(people, bonus)
        extra = act - base
        cost = bonus * act
        dead = base / act if bonus else 0.0
        per = cost / extra if extra else 0.0
        gain = value - bv - cost
        print("   {:5d}  {:9,d}  {:5,d}  {:10.3f}  {:9,.0f}  {:9,.0f}".format(
            bonus, act, extra, dead, per, gain))
#    bonus  activated  extra  deadweight  cost per   net gain
#     (RM)                     share       extra (RM)  (RM)
#        0      1,098      0       0.000          0          0
#       20      1,266    168       0.867        151       -281
#       50      1,522    424       0.721        179    -10,256
#      100      1,994    896       0.551        223    -65,017
#      200      3,020  1,922       0.364        314   -354,275

Without a bonus, 1,098 people make a first sale within thirty days. A bonus of 20 ringgit activates 168 more, but 0.867 of those paid would have sold anyway, and each extra activation costs 151 ringgit; counting the margin these people bring later, the net is still slightly negative. At 200 ringgit the bonus activates 1,922 more, the cost per extra activation rises to 314 ringgit, and the net loss is 354,275 ringgit. The higher the bonus, the weaker the people it tips over, while those who would have sold anyway are paid all the same.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): a small first-sale bonus (about 20 ringgit) roughly breaks even, and raising the amount only adds to the loss. What would show it wrong: in an experiment that assigns bonus amounts at random, the twelve-month margin (after bonus costs) of the higher-bonus group is significantly higher than that of the low-bonus or no-bonus group.

A sales contest or pay by volume?

Another common incentive is the sales contest: a prize pool shared out by rank or by share of sales. Lazear and Rosen showed that with equally able, risk-neutral workers, a rank-order tournament can be as efficient as piece rates (Lazear and Rosen 1981). But affiliates differ enormously in ability. p04 gives fifty affiliates heavy-tailed abilities and, with the same budget of ten thousand ringgit, compares a contest that shares the pool by share of output (a Tullock contest (Tullock 1980)) with pay by volume.

Calculation

# Chapter 2. p04: A sales contest or a pay rate? 50 affiliates with
# ability a = 0.2 + Lomax(1.5) (seed 87); effort e costs e^2 / 2 and
# yields output a e. The same budget W = 10,000 is spent two ways.
# Contest: one prize pool, each affiliate's share of it equal to her share
# of all output (a Tullock contest); the equilibrium is found by
# iterating each affiliate's best response, e = W a (Y - y) / Y^2.
# Rate: r per unit of output above a floor T, with r set so that the
# payout is exactly W; an affiliate works (e = r a) only if it pays.
import random

N, W = 50, 10000.0

def abilities():
    rng = random.Random(87)
    return sorted(0.2 + (1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5) - 1
                  for _ in range(N))

def contest(a):
    e = [1.0] * N
    for _ in range(3000):
        y = [ai * ei for ai, ei in zip(a, e)]
        tot = sum(y)
        new = [W * ai * (tot - yi) / tot ** 2 for ai, yi in zip(a, y)]
        e = [0.5 * x + 0.5 * n for x, n in zip(e, new)]
    return e

def rate(a, floor):
    def pay(r):
        return sum(r * (ai * r * ai - floor) for ai in a
                   if (r * ai) ** 2 / 2 > r * floor)
    lo, hi = 0.0, 1000.0
    for _ in range(200):
        mid = (lo + hi) / 2
        lo, hi = (mid, hi) if pay(mid) < W else (lo, mid)
    r = lo
    return [r * ai if (r * ai) ** 2 / 2 > r * floor else 0.0 for ai in a]

def report(name, a, e):
    y = [ai * ei for ai, ei in zip(a, e)]
    low = sum(y[:N // 2]) / sum(y)
    working = sum(1 for ei in e if ei > 1.0)
    print("   {:<18} {:9,.0f}  {:10.3f}  {:7d}".format(
        name, sum(y), low, working))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    a = abilities()
    print("   scheme             output   lower half  working")
    print("                                share     (e > 1)")
    report("contest", a, contest(a))
    report("rate, no floor", a, rate(a, 0.0))
    report("rate, floor 20", a, rate(a, 20.0))
    print("   ability: median {:.2f}, top {:.2f}".format(
        (a[24] + a[25]) / 2, a[-1]))
#    scheme             output   lower half  working
#                                 share     (e > 1)
#    contest                2,570       0.009       47
#    rate, no floor         3,023       0.006       44
#    rate, floor 20         3,020       0.000        8
#    ability: median 0.87, top 22.45

The contest’s total output is 2,570 and pay by volume gives 3,023: for the same money, the rate buys about 18% more output. The contest’s advantage is that more people “get moving” (47 against 44), but the less able half contributes under one per cent of total output in both schemes. Setting a floor of 20 and paying only above it leaves output almost unchanged (3,020), but only 8 people are still working: under heavy-tailed ability, the money flows almost entirely to the top few and the rest are given up on.

Summary

Most of a first-sale bonus goes to people who would have sold anyway, and those it tips over contribute less later; under the illustrative settings a small bonus roughly breaks even and a large one clearly loses money. In a network with heavy-tailed ability, pay by volume is more efficient than a contest for a prize pool; a floor-based bonus does not reduce output but makes most people stop, a cost worth measuring in an experiment.

References

Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (5): 841 to 864.
Tullock, Gordon. 1980. “Efficient Rent Seeking.” In Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, edited by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock. Texas A&M University Press.

Fan, Y. (2026). Affiliate Network Power Laws, Influencer Portfolio Optimization and Incentive Stability Bounds: Heavy-Tailed Productivity, Markowitz Traffic Allocation and Single-Tier Commission Equilibria [分销网络幂律激活、网红矩阵组合优化与激励稳定边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090229 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).