5D Library › Cart-Abandonment Recovery Kinetics, Sunk-Data Retention Ratchets and High-Ticket B2B Qualification Mechanisms · 中文

Chapter 5. A Two-Licence Menu and Screening by Application Form

First, a correction of source

Discussions of “screening” for high-ticket products often cite the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz. That model is about competitive insurance markets: several insurers offer menus of policies, buyers of different risk choose for themselves, and an equilibrium may not exist at all (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). One seller designing two products for two kinds of client is closer to the monopoly menu problem of Mussa and Rosen: the premium product goes to high-value clients, and the quality of the basic product is held down so that high-value clients do not want to pass as low-value ones (Mussa and Rosen 1978).

The menu separates the clients

Calculation

# Chapter 5. p09: A two-licence menu as a screening device. Two kinds
# of business client: low fit (value RM 14,000 for the basic licence,
# RM 24,000 for licence plus with advisory) and high fit (RM 20,000 and
# RM 52,000). Serving costs RM 2,000 and RM 9,000. Prices RM 9,800 and
# RM 29,800. Check who picks what, the highest plus price that keeps
# high-fit clients choosing it, and profit per client against the share
# of high-fit clients for three menus. Illustrative values.
VAL = {"low": (14000, 24000), "high": (20000, 52000)}
COST = (2000, 9000)

def choice(kind, pb, pp):
    vb, vp = VAL[kind]
    opts = [(0, "none"), (vb - pb, "basic"), (vp - pp, "plus")]
    return max(opts, key=lambda o: (o[0], o[1] != "none"))[1]

def profit(share, pb, pp):
    out = 0.0
    for kind, w in (("high", share), ("low", 1 - share)):
        c = choice(kind, pb, pp)
        if c == "basic":
            out += w * (pb - COST[0])
        elif c == "plus":
            out += w * (pp - COST[1])
    return out

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for kind in ("low", "high"):
        vb, vp = VAL[kind]
        print("   {:4s}: surplus basic RM {:,}, plus RM {:,} -> {}".format(
            kind, vb - 9800, vp - 29800, choice(kind, 9800, 29800)))
    cap = VAL["high"][1] - (VAL["high"][0] - 9800)
    print("   high-fit clients keep choosing plus up to RM {:,}".format(cap))
    print("   room above the RM 29,800 price: RM {:,}".format(cap - 29800))
    print("   share high  menu RM  plus only RM  basic only RM")
    for share in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5):
        print("   {:10.1f}  {:7,.0f}  {:12,.0f}  {:13,.0f}".format(
            share, profit(share, 9800, 29800),
            profit(share, 10 ** 9, 29800), profit(share, 9800, 10 ** 9)))
#    low : surplus basic RM 4,200, plus RM -5,800 -> basic
#    high: surplus basic RM 10,200, plus RM 22,200 -> plus
#    high-fit clients keep choosing plus up to RM 41,800
#    room above the RM 29,800 price: RM 12,000
#    share high  menu RM  plus only RM  basic only RM
#           0.1    9,100         2,080          7,800
#           0.2   10,400         4,160          7,800
#           0.3   11,700         6,240          7,800
#           0.5   14,300        10,400          7,800

In the illustrative model, a low-fit client values the basic licence at RM 14,000 and licence plus (with advisory) at RM 24,000; a high-fit client at RM 20,000 and RM 52,000. With prices of RM 9,800 and RM 29,800, low-fit clients choose the basic licence (surplus RM 4,200, against RM -5,800 for plus), and high-fit clients choose plus (surplus RM 22,200, above the RM 10,200 of basic). The menu separates the two kinds. High-fit clients keep choosing plus as long as it costs no more than RM 41,800; the RM 12,000 of room above the current price is the information rent that high-fit clients receive.

With high-fit clients at 0.2 of the total, the menu earns RM 10,400 per client, plus alone RM 4,160 and basic alone RM 7,800; at 0.5 these are RM 14,300, RM 10,400 and RM 7,800. Under the illustrative parameters the menu is better at every share.

Profit per client of three product line-ups against the share of high-fit clients (p09).

When the friction of an application form screens

Calculation

# Chapter 5. p10: Does a longer application form screen for fit? Prior
# share of high-fit applicants 0.20. Each extra question makes a share
# of applicants give up: d_high for high-fit, d_low for low-fit. Friction
# improves the mix only if d_low > d_high (the single-crossing condition
# of screening); with equal drop rates it only loses applicants.
PRIOR = 0.20

def after(k, d_high, d_low, n=1000):
    h = n * PRIOR * (1 - d_high) ** k
    l = n * (1 - PRIOR) * (1 - d_low) ** k
    return h, l

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for d_high, d_low in ((0.04, 0.04), (0.03, 0.08), (0.06, 0.08)):
        print("   drop per question: high {:.2f}, low {:.2f}".format(
            d_high, d_low))
        for k in (0, 5, 10):
            h, l = after(k, d_high, d_low)
            print("     {:2d} questions: {:5.1f} high, {:5.1f} low,"
                  " high share {:.3f}".format(k, h, l, h / (h + l)))
#    drop per question: high 0.04, low 0.04
#       0 questions: 200.0 high, 800.0 low, high share 0.200
#       5 questions: 163.1 high, 652.3 low, high share 0.200
#      10 questions: 133.0 high, 531.9 low, high share 0.200
#    drop per question: high 0.03, low 0.08
#       0 questions: 200.0 high, 800.0 low, high share 0.200
#       5 questions: 171.7 high, 527.3 low, high share 0.246
#      10 questions: 147.5 high, 347.5 low, high share 0.298
#    drop per question: high 0.06, low 0.08
#       0 questions: 200.0 high, 800.0 low, high share 0.200
#       5 questions: 146.8 high, 527.3 low, high share 0.218
#      10 questions: 107.7 high, 347.5 low, high share 0.237

“Keep unsuitable clients out with a long application form” works under one condition only: each extra question makes unsuitable clients more likely to give up. This is the single-crossing condition of screening theory. If both kinds give up at 0.04 per question, after 10 questions high-fit clients fall from 200 to 133.0 and low-fit from 800 to 531.9, and the share stays at 0.200: the friction only drives clients away. If high-fit clients give up at 0.03 per question and low-fit at 0.08, the share rises to 0.298 after 10 questions; if the former is 0.06, it rises only to 0.237, while nearly half of the high-fit clients are lost (107.7 remain).

Note

In practice. Choose application questions that are easy for suitable clients and hard for unsuitable ones: an approved budget, a definite deadline, the decision maker filling in the form personally. A long generic form adds friction without improving the mix.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s hypothesis (not yet tested): in the author’s business licence applications, adding an “approved budget” question raises the share of applicants who end up buying, without lowering the number of sales. What would show it wrong: in a randomised experiment the group with the added question makes significantly fewer sales, or its share of buyers does not rise.

Summary

A two-licence menu lets clients choose for themselves through the price gap; it is screening in the manner of Mussa and Rosen, not the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz. An application form screens only when the single-crossing condition holds.

References

Mussa, Michael, and Sherwin Rosen. 1978. “Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Economic Theory 18 (2): 301–17.
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (4): 629–49.

Fan, Y. (2026). Cart-Abandonment Recovery Kinetics, Sunk-Data Retention Ratchets and High-Ticket B2B Qualification Mechanisms: Multi-Pulse Follow-Up Timing, Switching-Cost Accumulation and Screening Equilibria [弃单挽回动力学、沉没数据续费棘轮与高客单顾问筛选机制] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090209 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).