5D Library › 零人工多站点容错架构、支付防欺诈状态机与被动现金流排队论 · English
第一章 转账回单:去重、图像哈希与先放行后抽查
问题:一张截图能用几次
许多小型数字业务不接入支付网关,而是让读者转账后上传银行或钱包的截图,由系统或人工核对后放行。最常见的作弊是重复使用:把同一张截图(或略作修改的截图)用于第二笔订单,或者用别人的截图。最省事的防法是记录每张回单流水号的末几位,遇到重复就拒绝。本章先计算这个办法为什么不行,再讨论图像哈希,最后计算「先放行、后抽查」的经济条件。
尾号碰撞:生日问题
若流水号的末 位均匀分布, 笔诚实订单中至少有两笔尾号相同的概率是经典的生日问题 (Feller 1968)。更直接的代价是误判:累计接受 笔订单之后,一张诚实的新回单的尾号已被用过的概率是 。
推导
# Chapter 1. [p01] Last-k-digit receipt checks and hash look-alikes.
# (1) A manual-payment site accepts a bank-transfer screenshot and
# stores only the last k digits of its reference number to stop reuse.
# If tails are uniform, among n honest orders the chance of at least
# one shared tail is 1 - prod_{i<n} (1 - i / 10^k) (birthday problem).
# After M accepted orders, a new honest receipt is wrongly flagged as
# "reused" with chance 1 - (1 - 10^-k)^M.
# (2) A 64-bit perceptual hash flags two images as the same receipt if
# they differ in at most d bits. For unrelated images, bits differ
# with chance 0.5; for two honest receipts made by the same banking
# app (same layout, different numbers) they differ with chance 0.15;
# a re-saved copy of one receipt differs with chance 0.03 per bit.
import math
def birthday(n, k):
p = 1.0
for i in range(n):
p *= 1 - i / 10 ** k
return 1 - p
def first_n(k, target=0.5):
n, p = 1, 1.0
while 1 - p < target:
p *= 1 - n / 10 ** k
n += 1
return n
def tail(d, q, bits=64):
return sum(math.comb(bits, i) * q ** i * (1 - q) ** (bits - i)
for i in range(d + 1))
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" (1) P(some shared tail) among n orders")
print(" k n=50 n=100 n=500 n=5000 n for 0.5")
for k in (4, 6, 8):
row = [birthday(n, k) for n in (50, 100, 500, 5000)]
print(" {} {:11.4f} {:8.4f} {:8.4f} {:8.4f} {:10d}".format(
k, *row, first_n(k)))
print(" honest receipt flagged after M = 5,000 orders:")
for k in (4, 6, 8):
print(" k={}: {:.4f}".format(k, 1 - (1 - 10 ** -k) ** 5000))
print(" (2) P(Hamming distance <= d) for a 64-bit perceptual hash")
print(" d unrelated same app re-saved copy")
for d in (4, 6, 10):
print(" {:2d} {:11.2e} {:10.4f} {:15.4f}".format(
d, tail(d, 0.5), tail(d, 0.15), tail(d, 0.03)))
print("\nReading: four-digit tails collide by the time a shop has")
print("taken 119 orders, and after 5,000 orders four honest")
print("receipts in ten would be refused. A perceptual hash finds")
print("re-saved copies but also matches honest receipts from the")
print("same app; neither replaces the full reference number.")
# (1) P(some shared tail) among n orders
# k n=50 n=100 n=500 n=5000 n for 0.5
# 4 0.1155 0.3914 1.0000 1.0000 119
# 6 0.0012 0.0049 0.1173 1.0000 1178
# 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.1175 11775
# honest receipt flagged after M = 5,000 orders:
# k=4: 0.3935
# k=6: 0.0050
# k=8: 0.0000
# (2) P(Hamming distance <= d) for a 64-bit perceptual hash
# d unrelated same app re-saved copy
# 4 3.68e-14 0.0280 0.9569
# 6 4.51e-12 0.1365 0.9970
# 10 9.98e-09 0.6374 1.0000
#
# Reading: four-digit tails collide by the time a shop has
# taken 119 orders, and after 5,000 orders four honest
# receipts in ten would be refused. A perceptual hash finds
# re-saved copies but also matches honest receipts from the
# same app; neither replaces the full reference number.只核对末 4 位时,50 笔订单中就有 0.1155 的概率出现碰撞,100 笔时 0.3914,到 119 笔时超过一半。更糟的是误判:累计 5,000 笔订单之后,诚实的新回单有 0.3935 的概率被当成「重复」拒绝。末 6 位在 1178 笔时过半,末 8 位在 11775 笔时过半。尾号再长,也只是把问题推后;而且尾号本身很容易被改图伪造。正确的做法是核对完整流水号,并与金额、时间与收款账户一起比对。
图像哈希能做什么
另一类办法是对截图本身计算哈希。密码学哈希(如 SHA-256)对任何一个字节的改变都会给出完全不同的值 (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2015),因此只能发现逐字节相同的文件;截图被重新保存或裁剪一下就认不出来了。感知哈希把图像压成一个 64 位的指纹,相似的图像指纹也相近,用汉明距离阈值 判断「是同一张」。
程序考虑三种情形:两张毫不相关的图像(每一位不同的概率 0.5)、同一个银行 App 生成的两张诚实回单(版式相同、数字不同,每一位不同的概率设为 0.15)、同一张回单重新保存后的副本(每一位不同的概率 0.03)。阈值 时,重新保存的副本有 0.9569 的机会被认出,毫不相关的图像几乎不会误配;但同一 App 的两张诚实回单有 0.0280 的机会被误判为同一张。阈值放宽到 10,副本全部认出,可同一 App 的诚实回单误配升到 0.6374。
也就是说,感知哈希能发现「同一张图再用一次」,却分不清「同一个 App 的两张不同回单」,因为后者的大部分像素本来就相同。它只能作为辅助信号,不能替代完整流水号。
先放行、后抽查
即使核对做得好,人工核对银行流水仍然需要时间。「零人工」的设计因此倾向于先放行:上传回单后立即开放内容,事后按比例 抽查,查出伪造即撤销。这是否足以让伪造无利可图?经济学中对犯罪的分析给出的框架是比较预期收益与「被抓概率 × 惩罚」(Becker 1968)。
设商品价值 ,伪造的工夫折合 2;被抓之前已经消耗的比例为 (即时交付的测算 ,按周解锁的课程 很小);被抓时还会失去抵押 (店内积分、待结佣金、被级联撤销的下线账户)。白嫖者的期望收益为 ,当 超过 时为负。
推导
# Chapter 1. [p02] Optimistic release, sampled audits and revocation.
# Access is released as soon as a receipt is uploaded; a share a of
# orders is audited against the bank statement within a few days. A
# freeloader who uploads a fake receipt gains the product's value v,
# of which a share f is consumed before any audit can revoke access
# (f = 1 for an instant reading, small for a course that drips weekly).
# If caught he also loses a stake L (store credit, pending commissions,
# referred accounts revoked in cascade) and spent effort c. His
# expected gain is
# EV(a) = v (1 - a (1 - f)) - a L - c,
# negative iff a > a* = (v - c) / (v (1 - f) + L). An audit costs 1.5;
# the cost of deterrence per order is 1.5 a*.
V, C, AUDIT = 99.0, 2.0, 1.5
def a_star(f, L):
den = V * (1 - f) + L
return float("inf") if den == 0 else (V - C) / den
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" audit share a* that makes faking unprofitable (v = 99):")
print(" f (consumed early) L=0 L=50 L=200 L=500")
for f in (1.0, 0.5, 0.2, 0.05):
cells = []
for L in (0, 50, 200, 500):
a = a_star(f, L)
cells.append(" never" if a > 1 else "{:8.3f}".format(a))
print(" {:18.2f} ".format(f) + " ".join(cells))
print(" audit cost per order at a*, f = 0.05:")
for L in (0, 50, 200):
a = a_star(0.05, L)
print(" L={:3d}: a* = {:.3f}, cost {:.2f}".format(
L, a, AUDIT * a))
print("\nReading: with nothing at stake (L = 0) no audit rate deters")
print("a freeloader, even when value is released slowly: auditing")
print("every order still leaves him what he consumed early. A stake")
print("lost on detection - credit, commissions, referred accounts")
print("revoked in cascade - is what makes sampled audits work, and")
print("slow release lowers the audit share it needs.")
# audit share a* that makes faking unprofitable (v = 99):
# f (consumed early) L=0 L=50 L=200 L=500
# 1.00 never never 0.485 0.194
# 0.50 never 0.975 0.389 0.177
# 0.20 never 0.751 0.347 0.167
# 0.05 never 0.673 0.330 0.163
# audit cost per order at a*, f = 0.05:
# L= 0: a* = 1.031, cost 1.55
# L= 50: a* = 0.673, cost 1.01
# L=200: a* = 0.330, cost 0.49
#
# Reading: with nothing at stake (L = 0) no audit rate deters
# a freeloader, even when value is released slowly: auditing
# every order still leaves him what he consumed early. A stake
# lost on detection - credit, commissions, referred accounts
# revoked in cascade - is what makes sampled audits work, and
# slow release lowers the audit share it needs.结论很明确:被抓时一无所失()的白嫖者,任何抽查比例都吓不住他,即使内容按周慢慢解锁也一样:全部抽查,他仍然留下了被抓之前已经用掉的部分( 时所需的比例是 1.031,超过 1)。真正起作用的是抵押: 时,即时交付的商品只需抽查 0.485 的订单,慢慢解锁()时只需 0.330,每单的抽查成本 0.49。
这说明「先放行、后抽查」的设计必须同时设计被抓时的损失:把积分、佣金与下线关系挂在同一身份上,查出伪造时一并撤销(级联撤销);而新注册、一无所有的账户,要么先核验再放行,要么只放行低价值的部分。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 在作者的业务中,绝大多数伪造回单来自新注册、没有积分与下线的账户;对这些账户先核验后放行,对有抵押的老账户先放行后抽查,可以在不明显降低转化的前提下让伪造无利可图。什么会证明这一判断错:若真实的抽查记录显示伪造主要来自有积分或下线的老账户,或者对新账户延迟放行使其转化率大幅下降,那么这一分流规则不成立。
小结
末 4 位尾号在 119 笔订单时就有一半的碰撞机会,累计 5,000 笔后会误拒 0.3935 的诚实回单;必须核对完整流水号。感知哈希能认出重新保存的副本,却会把同一 App 的诚实回单当成同一张。先放行、后抽查只有在被抓者会失去抵押时才有威慑力;抵押为 200 时,抽查 0.485 的订单即可。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Zero-Touch Multi-Site Fault Tolerance, Payment Anti-Fraud State Machines and Passive Cashflow Queuing: Receipt-Hash Deduplication, Self-Referral Blocking, Host-Header Routing and Availability Bounds [零人工多站点容错架构、支付防欺诈状态机与被动现金流排队论] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090201 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).