5D Library › Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization · 中文
Chapter 5. Pareto Willingness to Pay, One Price and the Revenue Ceiling
The heavy tail of willingness to pay
Among people willing to pay for a reading, most will pay little and a few will pay a great deal. The Pareto distribution is the standard model of such a heavy tail: the share whose willingness to pay exceeds is , and the smaller the tail index , the heavier the tail. The marginal cost of a digital good is close to zero, so the seller’s problem is purely how to collect as much as possible from this distribution.
Economics divides price discrimination into three degrees (Pigou 1920; Varian 1989): first degree charges each person the most they will pay (perfect discrimination); second degree offers a menu and lets people select themselves (quantities, versions, tiers); third degree prices separately for observable groups. First-degree discrimination sets the ceiling on revenue: the sum of all willingness to pay.
Calculation
One price and the ceiling. At a price revenue is . For it falls with , so the best single price is itself, with revenue ; the ceiling is the mean willingness to pay . Their ratio is : without limit as tends to 1, and for the mean willingness to pay is infinite.
The ninth program computes the best single price, its revenue and the ceiling at several tail indices, and tests a classical theorem.
Calculation
# Chapter 5. Pareto willingness to pay, one price, and the ceiling.
# Among visitors who would pay anything, willingness to pay v is Pareto:
# P(v > x) = (3 / x)^a for x >= 3 (minimum 3, tail index a). Marginal cost
# of a digital reading is taken as 0.
# Part 1. Revenue per buyer-candidate from the best single price, against
# the full surplus E[v] that perfect (first-degree) discrimination would
# take. For a > 1 every price above 3 loses more buyers than it gains in
# price, so the best single price is 3; E[v] = 3a / (a - 1). For a <= 1
# E[v] is infinite; here values are capped at 1,000 to show the size.
# Part 2. Riley and Zeckhauser: for ONE good no menu - not even a menu of
# lotteries "get the reading with probability x for price t" - beats the
# best posted price. A grid search over two-option menus (x, t; 1, p)
# with a = 1.5 checks this, with revenue computed in closed form.
def tail(x, a, cap=None):
if x <= 3:
return 1.0
if cap is not None and x >= cap:
return 0.0
return (3 / x) ** a
def mean_v(a, cap=None):
if cap is None:
return 3 * a / (a - 1)
n, lo = 200000, 3.0
h = (cap - lo) / n
return lo + sum(tail(lo + (i + 0.5) * h, a, cap) * h for i in range(n))
def best_price(a, cap=None):
top = cap if cap else 1000.0
grid = [3 * (top / 3) ** (i / 4000) for i in range(4000)]
return max((p * tail(p, a, cap), p) for p in grid)
def menu_revenue(x, t, p, a):
v_low = t / x # indifferent between lottery and nothing
v_high = (p - t) / (1 - x) # indifferent between lottery and good
if v_low >= v_high: # lottery never chosen: posted price p
return p * tail(p, a)
return t * (tail(v_low, a) - tail(v_high, a)) + p * tail(v_high, a)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" tail a best price revenue full surplus ceiling ratio")
for a, cap in ((3.0, None), (2.0, None), (1.5, None), (1.1, None),
(0.8, 1000.0)):
rev, p = best_price(a, cap)
ev = mean_v(a, cap)
print(" {:4.1f}{} {:7.2f} {:6.3f} {:8.3f} {:6.2f}"
.format(a, "*" if cap else " ", p, rev, ev, ev / rev))
print(" (* values capped at 1,000)")
best = (0.0, None)
for i in range(1, 40):
x = i / 40
for j in range(1, 60):
t = 0.25 * j * x
for k in range(1, 60):
p = 3 + 0.25 * k
r = menu_revenue(x, t, p, 1.5)
if r > best[0]:
best = (r, (x, t, p))
print("\n a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns {:.3f} against {:.3f}"
" for one price".format(best[0], best_price(1.5)[0]))
print("\nReading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full")
print("extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound")
print("as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few")
print("buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the")
print("gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one")
print("price.")
# tail a best price revenue full surplus ceiling ratio
# 3.0 3.00 3.000 4.500 1.50
# 2.0 3.00 3.000 6.000 2.00
# 1.5 3.00 3.000 9.000 3.00
# 1.1 3.00 3.000 33.000 11.00
# 0.8* 998.55 9.585 35.937 3.75
# (* values capped at 1,000)
#
# a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns 2.961 against 3.000 for one price
#
# Reading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full
# extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound
# as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few
# buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the
# gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one
# price.The heavier the tail, the wider the gap between one price and the ceiling: at the ceiling is 1.50 times the revenue of one price, at it is 3.00 times, at it is 11.00 times. At (willingness to pay capped at 1,000) the best single price jumps to 998.55 — selling only to the very few at the top.
The last line tests the theorem of Riley and Zeckhauser: for one good, the seller’s optimal mechanism is a posted price, and no menu — not even a lottery menu of the form “receive the reading with probability for a payment ” — does better (Riley and Zeckhauser 1983; Myerson 1981). The best two-option menu in the grid search earns 2.961, below the 3.000 of one price. Splitting one good into tiers cannot, by itself, take more money.
Then why does a multi-tier paywall take more?
Because it does not sell one good. The tenth program imagines four paid products after the free hook — a check of past highs and lows, a ten-year overview, a two-person match and a single question — each valued at a common Pareto scale times a product weight times a personal random factor with log-standard-deviation .
Calculation
# Chapter 5. When do several tiers beat one price? When they are
# different goods.
# Four paid products after the free teaser, with weights w:
# past-events check 1, ten-year overview 3, two-person match 2,
# one question answered 0.8.
# Buyer i values product k at v_ik = theta_i w_k eps_ik: theta is a common
# Pareto scale (minimum 1, tail 1.5, capped at 200), eps an idiosyncratic
# log-normal factor with log-sd sigma (sigma = 0: everyone ranks the four
# products the same way, in fixed proportions). 20,000 buyers, cost 0.
# Strategies, each with prices chosen by grid search on the sample:
# one product sell only the overview, one price
# four prices each product at its own price
# mixed bundle the four single prices held at their separate optimum,
# plus a bundle price f * (sum of the four); only the
# bundle discount factor f is searched
# The ceiling is the total value (perfect discrimination).
import math
import random
W = (1.0, 3.0, 2.0, 0.8)
def sample(sigma, rng, n=20000):
out = []
for _ in range(n):
th = min((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5), 200.0)
out.append([th * w * math.exp(rng.gauss(0, sigma)) for w in W])
return out
def best_single(vals):
vs = sorted(vals, reverse=True)
best = (0.0, 0.0)
for i, v in enumerate(vs):
best = max(best, (v * (i + 1), v))
return best
def mixed(buyers, prices):
# single prices stay at their separate optimum; search f only
tot = [sum(b) for b in buyers]
best = (0.0, None)
for f in [0.5 + 0.02 * i for i in range(26)]:
pb = f * sum(prices)
rev = 0.0
for b, t in zip(buyers, tot):
sep = sum(max(v - p, 0.0) for v, p in zip(b, prices))
if t - pb >= sep and t - pb >= 0:
rev += pb
else:
rev += sum(p for v, p in zip(b, prices) if v >= p)
best = max(best, (rev, pb))
return best
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(63010)
print(" sigma one product four prices mixed bundle ceiling"
" (per buyer)")
for sigma in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0):
buyers = sample(sigma, rng)
n = len(buyers)
one = best_single([b[1] for b in buyers])[0] / n
four, prices = 0.0, []
for k in range(4):
r, p = best_single([b[k] for b in buyers])
four += r / n
prices.append(p)
mix = mixed(buyers, prices)[0] / n
ceil = sum(sum(b) for b in buyers) / n
print(" {:3.1f} {:6.3f} {:6.3f} {:6.3f}"
" {:6.3f}".format(sigma, one, four, mix, ceil))
print(" ({:.3f}) ({:.3f}) ({:.3f})"
" share of ceiling".format(one / ceil, four / ceil,
mix / ceil))
print("\nReading: more tiers earn more because they are more goods, not")
print("because they screen one good. When the four values move together")
print("(sigma = 0) a bundle adds nothing to four separate prices; the")
print("more buyers differ in which product they want, the more a bundle")
print("adds. Even then, well over half of the value stays with buyers.")
# sigma one product four prices mixed bundle ceiling (per buyer)
# 0.0 3.000 6.800 6.800 20.040
# (0.150) (0.339) (0.339) share of ceiling
# 0.5 2.649 5.995 6.321 21.458
# (0.123) (0.279) (0.295) share of ceiling
# 1.0 3.163 7.177 7.808 32.611
# (0.097) (0.220) (0.239) share of ceiling
#
# Reading: more tiers earn more because they are more goods, not
# because they screen one good. When the four values move together
# (sigma = 0) a bundle adds nothing to four separate prices; the
# more buyers differ in which product they want, the more a bundle
# adds. Even then, well over half of the value stays with buyers.Selling only the ten-year overview takes 0.150 of the value ceiling. Pricing the four products separately raises this to 0.339 of the ceiling — the extra money comes from selling three more goods, not from screening the same good. The mixed bundle keeps each single price at its separate optimum and searches only the bundle discount factor (the bundle price is times the sum of the four single prices). When everyone’s values for the four products are exactly proportional (), adding a price for all four together adds nothing (6.800 against 6.800); the more people’s preferences across products differ, the more a bundle helps (from 7.177 to 7.808 at ). Even so, more than three quarters of the value stays with the buyers.
Note
The legal line between second- and first-degree discrimination (to be checked locally). Letting users choose a tier from the same public menu is second-degree discrimination; quoting different prices for the same good to different people on the basis of their personal data comes close to first degree. Article 24 of China’s Personal Information Protection Law requires automated decisions that use personal information to be fair and impartial, and forbids unreasonable differential treatment of individuals in transaction terms such as price (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 2021). The book’s models discuss only public menus.
Summary
Under Pareto willingness to pay, the gap between one price and perfect discrimination widens as the tail grows heavier — three times at a tail index of 1.5, without limit as it tends to 1. But for one good no menu beats one price: the best two-option menu earns 2.961 against 3.000. A multi-tier paywall takes more because each tier is a different good; a bundle adds revenue only when people’s preferences across products differ, and most of the value stays with the buyers.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization: Galton-Watson Referral Thresholds, Share-to-Unlock Incentives and Second-Degree Price Discrimination [超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).