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Chapter 4. Information Gaps, Purchase Hazards and the Feeling of “So Accurate”

Curiosity is a gap

Loewenstein defined curiosity as a response to an “information gap”: when people notice a gap between what they know and what they want to know, they feel an urge to fill it (Loewenstein 1994). The theory has two testable consequences. First, people who know nothing are not curious — no question has formed — and neither are people who know almost everything — the gap has closed. Curiosity is strongest in the middle, and its strength depends on the size and salience of the gap (Golman and Loewenstein 2018). Second, curiosity fades: if the gap is not filled, attention moves on.

Evidence

Inverted-U curiosity. Kang and colleagues had participants answer trivia questions and report their confidence and curiosity: curiosity was highest at intermediate confidence and lower at very low or very high confidence; curiosity also predicted how much participants would spend to obtain the answer (Kang et al. 2009).

The seventh program writes both points as a purchase hazard: the free hook reveals a share rr of the full result, curiosity is C(r)=4r(1−r)C(r) = 4r(1-r), and the purchase hazard decays over time with a half-life of about 0.35 days. In the program, 1−exp⁡(−h0Cτe−T/τ)1-\exp\!\big(-h_0 C \tau\, e^{-T/\tau}\big) is the infinite-horizon cumulative purchase conversion after the paywall pops up at delay TT.

Calculation

# Chapter 4. An information gap as a purchase hazard.
# A free teaser reveals a share r of what the full reading will say. In
# the information-gap account curiosity is low when almost nothing is
# known (no question has formed) and low when almost everything is known
# (the gap has closed); here C(r) = 4 r (1 - r), largest at r = 0.5 - an
# assumed shape, in line with the inverted U measured by Kang et al.
# Curiosity fades after the teaser: the purchase hazard at time t (days)
# is h(t) = h0 C(r) exp(-t / tau), h0 = 1.2 per day, tau = 0.5 day.
# If the paywall pops up at delay T, the infinite-horizon cumulative
# purchase conversion is
#   1 - exp(-h0 C tau exp(-T / tau)).
import math

H0, TAU = 1.2, 0.5

def p_buy(r, delay):
    c = 4 * r * (1 - r)
    return 1 - math.exp(-H0 * c * TAU * math.exp(-delay / TAU))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   revealed r   curiosity   buy: offer at once"
          "   after 6 h   after 1 day")
    for r in (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9):
        print("      {:3.1f}         {:4.2f}          {:5.3f}"
              "            {:5.3f}       {:5.3f}".format(
                  r, 4 * r * (1 - r), p_buy(r, 0), p_buy(r, 0.25),
                  p_buy(r, 1.0)))
    half = TAU * math.log(2)
    print("\n   curiosity half-life: {:.2f} days".format(half))
    print("\nReading: a teaser that reveals too little or too much leaves")
    print("a small gap; the middle maximises the chance to buy. Because")
    print("curiosity decays, an offer made a day later converts at about a")
    print("sixth of an offer made at once. Both shapes are assumptions to be")
    print("measured, not facts about any audience.")
#    revealed r   curiosity   buy: offer at once   after 6 h   after 1 day
#       0.1         0.36          0.194            0.123       0.029
#       0.3         0.84          0.396            0.263       0.066
#       0.5         1.00          0.451            0.305       0.078
#       0.7         0.84          0.396            0.263       0.066
#       0.9         0.36          0.194            0.123       0.029
#
#    curiosity half-life: 0.35 days
#
# Reading: a teaser that reveals too little or too much leaves
# a small gap; the middle maximises the chance to buy. Because
# curiosity decays, an offer made a day later converts at about a
# sixth of an offer made at once. Both shapes are assumptions to be
# measured, not facts about any audience.

Revealing half (r=0.5r = 0.5) and offering payment at once gives a final purchase probability of 0.451; revealing too little (0.1) or too much (0.9) gives only 0.194. The timing of the offer matters as much: after six hours it is 0.305, after a day only 0.078, about a sixth of an immediate offer. Both shapes — the inverted U and the exponential decay — are assumptions that must be measured in a particular audience.

Purchase probability as a function of the share r revealed by the free hook and the delay before the payment offer.

Where “so accurate” comes from

The second part of the slogan is “state the pain point bluntly + an identity label”: users who feel the reading has hit the mark will share it. The trouble is that feeling hit and being hit are different things. In 1949 Forer gave students a “personality test” and then handed each the same generic description; the students generally rated its accuracy close to the top of the scale (Forer 1949), and many studies have since repeated this “Barnum effect” (Dickson and Kelly 1985). Signal detection theory puts the problem more precisely: whether a judgement carries information depends on whether it separates “true” from “false”, not on the share of it people consider correct (Green and Swets 1966).

The eighth program simulates 40 statements, each true of a random person with a base rate between 0.2 and 0.9. A generic reading gives everyone the 6 statements with the highest base rates; an informed reading knows each person’s truth with accuracy 0.8 and picks 6 statements for that person. Then comes a Carlson-style swap test: one’s own reading is set beside two readings made for others, and the question is whether one’s own scores highest (Carlson 1985).

Calculation

# Chapter 4. "It describes me exactly": perceived accuracy without signal.
# 40 statements; statement j is true of a random person with base rate
# b_j, drawn uniform on [0.2, 0.9]. 5,000 people; truth is independent
# across statements and people. A reading consists of 6 statements.
#   generic    the same 6 statements for everyone: those with the highest
#              base rates (a "Barnum" reading; no information about anyone)
#   informed   a reader who knows each truth value with accuracy 0.8 and
#              picks 6 statements it believes true of THIS person
# Perceived accuracy = share of the 6 statements true of the person.
# Swap test (as in Carlson's double-blind test): shown their own reading
# and two readings made for others, how often does a person's own reading
# score highest (ties split)? Chance is 1/3.
# Sharing is modelled as P(share) = 1 / (1 + exp(3 - 4 acc - 0.8 tag)),
# tag = 1 if the reading carries an identity label ("you are the kind of
# person who..."); the coefficients are assumptions.
import math
import random

def make(rng):
    base = [rng.uniform(0.2, 0.9) for _ in range(40)]
    people = [[rng.random() < b for b in base] for _ in range(5000)]
    return base, people

def generic(base):
    top = sorted(range(40), key=lambda j: -base[j])[:6]
    return lambda person, rng: top

def informed(base):
    def pick(person, rng):
        belief = [t if rng.random() < 0.8 else (not t) for t in person]
        cand = [j for j in range(40) if belief[j]]
        rng.shuffle(cand)
        cand.sort(key=lambda j: -base[j])
        return (cand + list(range(40)))[:6]
    return pick

def acc(person, stmts):
    return sum(person[j] for j in stmts) / len(stmts)

def share(a, tag):
    return 1 / (1 + math.exp(3 - 4 * a - 0.8 * tag))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(63008)
    base, people = make(rng)
    print("   reader     accuracy own   own wins swap test   share no tag"
          "   share tag")
    for name, maker in (("generic", generic), ("informed", informed)):
        pick = maker(base)
        readings = [pick(p, rng) for p in people]
        own = [acc(p, r) for p, r in zip(people, readings)]
        wins = 0.0
        for i, p in enumerate(people):
            others = [readings[(i + 1) % 5000], readings[(i + 2) % 5000]]
            scores = [own[i]] + [acc(p, o) for o in others]
            best = max(scores)
            if scores[0] == best:
                wins += 1 / scores.count(best)
        m = sum(own) / len(own)
        print("   {:8s}      {:5.3f}             {:5.3f}"
              "            {:5.3f}        {:5.3f}".format(
                  name, m, wins / len(people),
                  sum(share(a, 0) for a in own) / len(own),
                  sum(share(a, 1) for a in own) / len(own)))
    print("\nReading: the generic reading feels almost as accurate as the")
    print("informed one - both pick statements with high base rates - yet")
    print("it fails the swap test exactly at chance (1/3). Adding an")
    print("identity label raises sharing more than real information does.")
    print("Share rates measure how a reading feels, not whether it is right.")
#    reader     accuracy own   own wins swap test   share no tag   share tag
#    generic       0.838             0.333            0.583        0.745
#    informed      0.939             0.653            0.676        0.819
#
# Reading: the generic reading feels almost as accurate as the
# informed one - both pick statements with high base rates - yet
# it fails the swap test exactly at chance (1/3). Adding an
# identity label raises sharing more than real information does.
# Share rates measure how a reading feels, not whether it is right.

The generic reading is judged 0.838 accurate, not far from the informed reading (0.939) — both pick statements with high base rates. But the generic reading wins the swap test at exactly the chance rate of 0.333: it is equally “accurate” for everyone and so cannot tell anyone apart. The informed reading wins 0.653.

More striking is sharing. In the assumed sharing model, adding an identity label to the generic reading raises sharing from 0.583 to 0.745, above the unlabelled informed reading (0.676). Share rates measure how a reading feels, not whether it is right; optimising readings by share rate pushes a system towards Barnum-style generic statements.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s hypothesis (not established): on a real reading website, reading templates ranked by share rate score no better than chance in a swap test. What would show it to be wrong: in a pre-registered blind swap test, the most-shared templates let users pick out their own reading significantly more often than one time in three.

Summary

Information-gap theory writes curiosity as a quantity that rises then falls and decays with time: purchase is likeliest when the free hook reveals half, and delaying the offer by a day cuts the probability to about a sixth. The feeling of accuracy needs no information: a generic reading is judged nearly as accurate as an informed one yet scores only chance in a swap test, and an identity label raises sharing by more than real information does. Share rates measure feeling, not accuracy.

References

Carlson, Shawn. 1985. “A Double-Blind Test of Astrology.” Nature 318: 419–25.
Dickson, D. H., and I. W. Kelly. 1985. “The ’Barnum Effect’ in Personality Assessment: A Review of the Literature.” Psychological Reports 57 (2): 367–82.
Forer, Bertram R. 1949. “The Fallacy of Personal Validation: A Classroom Demonstration of Gullibility.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 44 (1): 118–23.
Golman, Russell, and George Loewenstein. 2018. “Information Gaps: A Theory of Preferences Regarding the Presence and Absence of Information.” Decision 5 (3): 143–64.
Green, David M., and John A. Swets. 1966. Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics. Wiley.
Kang, Min Jeong, Ming Hsu, Ian M. Krajbich, et al. 2009. “The Wick in the Candle of Learning: Epistemic Curiosity Activates Reward Circuitry and Enhances Memory.” Psychological Science 20 (8): 963–73.
Loewenstein, George. 1994. “The Psychology of Curiosity: A Review and Reinterpretation.” Psychological Bulletin 116 (1): 75–98.

Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization: Galton-Watson Referral Thresholds, Share-to-Unlock Incentives and Second-Degree Price Discrimination [超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).