5D Library › Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization · 中文

Chapter 3. Commissions, Share-to-Unlock and the Incentives of Fake Accounts

Which path will a user take?

Chapter 1 took the share rate and the pay rate as given. In fact they are users’ choices: each person compares the cost of “asking friends” with the cost of “paying”, takes the cheaper path, or leaves. Mechanism design calls this incentive compatibility: the rules must make each person, acting in their own interest, do exactly what the designer intends (Myerson 1981). Book 50 treated the framework in detail; this chapter only applies it to the two channels.

Calculation

The cost of each path. A user values the full reading at vv (Pareto, minimum 3, tail index 1.5) and bears a personal cost ee per invitation sent (uniform between 0 and 2: the social cost of asking a friend). The share channel needs 2 joiners at acceptance 0.15, about 13.3 invitations, at a cost of 13.3e13.3\,e; the pay channel costs 9.9 minus the expected commission rebate. A user takes the cheaper path when vv exceeds its cost, and otherwise leaves.

The fifth program compares four commission rates α\alpha across 100,000 simulated users.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. Share to unlock, or pay and earn a commission?
# 100,000 simulated users. Each values the full reading at v, Pareto with
# minimum 3 and tail index 1.5, and has a personal cost e per invitation
# sent, uniform on [0, 2] (the social cost of asking a friend).
#   share path: needs m = 2 joiners at acceptance 0.15, so about
#               2 / 0.15 = 13.3 invitations: cost 13.3 e
#   pay path:   price 9.9; a payer sends n2 = 20 alpha commission links,
#               each joins with prob 0.10 and pays with prob 0.05 - the
#               commission alpha x 9.9 per paying referral is a rebate.
# Each user takes the cheaper path if v exceeds its cost, else leaves.
# The seller keeps 9.9 per payer minus commissions paid out. K counts
# joiners per user (sharers bring min(Bin(20, 0.15), 2) on average).
# For a single seed the expected lifetime number of users is 1 / (1 - K)
# when K < 1, so revenue per seed = net revenue per user / (1 - K).
import math
import random

PRICE, Q, M = 9.9, 0.15, 2
JOIN_SHARE = sum(min(k, M) * math.comb(20, k) * Q ** k * (1 - Q) ** (20 - k)
                 for k in range(21))

def simulate(alpha, users):
    n2 = 20 * alpha
    paying_refs = n2 * 0.10 * 0.05
    pay_cost = PRICE - alpha * PRICE * paying_refs
    share = pay = 0
    for v, e in users:
        sc = e * M / Q
        best = min(sc, pay_cost)
        if v < best:
            continue
        if sc <= pay_cost:
            share += 1
        else:
            pay += 1
    n = len(users)
    ps, pp = share / n, pay / n
    k = ps * JOIN_SHARE + pp * n2 * 0.10
    from_links = pp * n2 * 0.10 / k if k else 0.0
    net = pp * PRICE * (1 - alpha * from_links)
    return ps, pp, k, net

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(63005)
    users = [(3.0 * (1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5), rng.uniform(0, 2))
             for _ in range(100000)]
    print("   alpha   share   pay     K       net per user   per seed")
    for alpha in (0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75):
        ps, pp, k, net = simulate(alpha, users)
        seed = "{:7.3f}".format(net / (1 - k)) if k < 1 else "  grows"
        print("   {:4.2f}    {:5.3f}   {:5.3f}   {:5.3f}   {:7.3f}"
              "        {}".format(alpha, ps, pp, k, net, seed))
    print("\nReading: the commission barely changes who pays - the expected")
    print("rebate is tiny - but it makes payers send links, so K rises. Each")
    print("step up in alpha raises K and the revenue per seed while lowering")
    print("the take per payer. Of the users who stay, about two in three")
    print("share rather than pay: asking friends costs them less than 9.9.")
#    alpha   share   pay     K       net per user   per seed
#    0.00    0.212   0.105   0.379     1.038          1.671
#    0.25    0.212   0.106   0.431     1.021          1.796
#    0.50    0.211   0.111   0.487     0.970          1.890
#    0.75    0.209   0.118   0.550     0.887          1.969
#
# Reading: the commission barely changes who pays - the expected
# rebate is tiny - but it makes payers send links, so K rises. Each
# step up in alpha raises K and the revenue per seed while lowering
# the take per payer. Of the users who stay, about two in three
# share rather than pay: asking friends costs them less than 9.9.

The commission hardly changes who pays: the rebate a payer can expect is small, and the pay share rises only from 0.105 to 0.118. What it changes is how many referral links payers send, so K rises from 0.379 to 0.550. The result is a clear trade-off: the higher α\alpha, the lower the net revenue per user (from 1.038 down to 0.887), but because K is higher, the total net revenue each seed brings is higher (from 1.671 up to 1.969). In this model a 50 % commission is not an optimum but one point on this monotone curve; the real constraint comes from the fake accounts below. Of the users who stay, about two in three share rather than pay: for them, asking friends costs less than 9.9.

Evidence

Evidence on referral rewards. Experiments found that referral rewards raise the likelihood of referring, and raise it more for weaker ties (Ryu and Feick 2007); data from a bank showed that customers acquired by referral contributed more profit and stayed longer than customers acquired through other channels (Schmitt et al. 2011). These results show that referrals are worth paying for, not that a 50 % commission is itself optimal.

When a fake account is cheaper than a friend

Any mechanism that rewards head counts invites fakes. The sixth program lets users open fake accounts at a cost ff each and compares two shortcuts: unlocking with 2 fake accounts instead of friends, and buying through a fake account’s referral link to pay oneself the 50 % commission.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. When a fake account is cheaper than a friend.
# Same 100,000 users and funnel as p05, commission alpha = 0.5. Now a user
# can also open fake accounts at a cost f each (a spare phone number, the
# time it takes). Two shortcuts:
#   fake unlock    a would-be sharer opens m = 2 fake accounts instead of
#                  inviting friends, if 2 f < 13.3 e (their invitation cost)
#   self-referral  a payer buys through a fake account's commission link
#                  and pockets 0.5 x 9.9 = 4.95, if f < 4.95
# Fake joiners are counted as new users by the platform but bring no one.
# For f from 0.5 to 10 the program reports the share of sharers who fake,
# the share of payers who self-refer, the K the platform measures against
# the real K, and the seller's net take per payer.
import math
import random

PRICE, Q, M, ALPHA = 9.9, 0.15, 2, 0.5
JOIN = sum(min(k, M) * math.comb(20, k) * Q ** k * (1 - Q) ** (20 - k)
           for k in range(21))
N2 = 20 * ALPHA

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(63005)
    users = [(3.0 * (1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5), rng.uniform(0, 2))
             for _ in range(100000)]
    rebate = ALPHA * PRICE
    pay_cost = PRICE - ALPHA * PRICE * N2 * 0.10 * 0.05
    print("   f      fake unlock   self-referral   K measured   K real"
          "   take per payer")
    for f in (0.5, 2.0, 5.0, 10.0):
        sharers = fakers = payers = 0
        for v, e in users:
            sc = min(e * M / Q, M * f)
            pc = pay_cost - (rebate - f if f < rebate else 0.0)
            if v < min(sc, pc):
                continue
            if sc <= pc:
                sharers += 1
                fakers += M * f < e * M / Q
            else:
                payers += 1
        n = len(users)
        real_share = (sharers - fakers) / n
        k_real = real_share * JOIN + payers / n * N2 * 0.10
        k_meas = k_real + fakers / n * M
        self_ref = 1.0 if f < rebate else 0.0
        take = PRICE * (1 - ALPHA * self_ref)
        print("   {:4.1f}      {:5.3f}          {:5.3f}         {:5.3f}"
              "      {:5.3f}      {:5.2f}".format(
                  f, fakers / max(sharers, 1), self_ref, k_meas, k_real,
                  take))
    print("\nReading: when fake accounts are cheap the funnel's own metrics")
    print("lie - the measured K exceeds 1 while the real K is far lower -")
    print("and every payer self-refers, so a 50 % commission becomes a 50 %")
    print("discount. Above f = 4.95 both shortcuts stop in this example:")
    print("two fake accounts then cost more than simply paying.")
#    f      fake unlock   self-referral   K measured   K real   take per payer
#     0.5      0.963          1.000         1.992      0.065       4.95
#     2.0      0.796          1.000         1.357      0.253       4.95
#     5.0      0.000          0.000         0.487      0.487       9.90
#    10.0      0.000          0.000         0.487      0.487       9.90
#
# Reading: when fake accounts are cheap the funnel's own metrics
# lie - the measured K exceeds 1 while the real K is far lower -
# and every payer self-refers, so a 50 % commission becomes a 50 %
# discount. Above f = 4.95 both shortcuts stop in this example:
# two fake accounts then cost more than simply paying.

When fake accounts are cheap (f=0.5f = 0.5), 0.963 of sharers unlock with fakes, and the platform measures K at 1.992 — apparently strong supercritical growth — while the real K is only 0.065. At the same time every payer refers themselves, and the platform receives only 4.95 per payer: the 50 % commission has become a 50 % discount. Only when a fake account costs more than 4.95 do both shortcuts stop.

Note

Compliance and platform rules (to be checked locally; not legal advice). Designs of the “share before you can see the result” kind are explicitly listed as forbidden “induced sharing” on some platforms: WeChat’s rules for external links reportedly list both induced-sharing content and H5 “test” content among the restricted kinds of external link (ifanr, n.d.). Multi-level commissions that pay on a downline’s downline may in China fall within the “team commission” forms prohibited by the Regulations on Prohibiting Pyramid Selling (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2005); the book’s models consider only single-level commission. In mainland China, Article 9 of the Advertising Law forbids advertisements containing superstitious content (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 2015). The current text and scope of each rule must be checked by the author for the place where the business operates.

Summary

Users choose between asking friends and paying according to their own costs. Raising the commission rate hardly changes who pays but makes payers send more referral links, raising K and the total revenue per seed while lowering the net revenue per user. Mechanisms that reward head counts are exploited by fake accounts: when fakes are cheap, the measured K can be far above 1 while the real K is far below it, and the commission becomes a self-discount. On compliance, share-to-unlock, multi-level commissions and advertising for fortune-telling are all governed by specific rules.

References

ifanr. n.d. Report on Enforcement of WeChat’s External Links Content Management Specification (Induced Sharing and H5 Test Content). In Chinese; News Report. https://www.ifanr.com/685476.
Myerson, Roger B. 1981. “Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1): 58–73.
Ryu, Gangseog, and Lawrence Feick. 2007. “A Penny for Your Thoughts: Referral Reward Programs and Referral Likelihood.” Journal of Marketing 71 (1): 84–94.
Schmitt, Philipp, Bernd Skiera, and Christophe Van den Bulte. 2011. “Referral Programs and Customer Value.” Journal of Marketing 75 (1): 46–59.
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. 2015. Advertising Law of the People’s Republic of China (Revised 2015), Article 9. In Chinese. https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/zh/text/370802.
State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 2005. Regulations on Prohibiting Pyramid Selling (Order No. 444). In Chinese.

Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization: Galton-Watson Referral Thresholds, Share-to-Unlock Incentives and Second-Degree Price Discrimination [超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).