5D Library › Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds · 中文
Chapter 3. Capital Lock-Up: Why Near-Certain Contracts Sit at 0.92 to 0.96
Money for nothing?
Six months before resolution, a contract that will almost certainly pay out is quoted at 0.95. If its true probability is 0.99, buying it has an expected return of 4 %; this looks like free money that arbitrageurs should bid up to 0.99 at once. Yet such contracts often sit between 0.92 and 0.96 for months and converge to 1 only in the last weeks. This chapter shows that this is not a market failure but a direct consequence of the cost of capital.
The key point: a contract pays no interest before it resolves. Buying it at locks away until resolution day. That money has other uses — the risk-free rate, or whatever return the trader could earn elsewhere. Shleifer and Vishny called such constraints “the limits of arbitrage”: arbitrage needs capital, and capital has a cost (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
The no-arbitrage band
Calculation
Lock-up discounting. A contract resolves in years and pays 1 with probability . The trader’s money earns a year elsewhere, so a position must return in total to be worth holding. Buying YES at returns on average; buying NO at returns . Neither side wants to trade in the range Inside that band the price is set by whoever does want to trade: hedgers, supporters, longshot buyers.
Calculation
# Chapter 3. p06: Capital lock-up opens a no-arbitrage band around p.
# A contract pays 1 at resolution, tau years away, with probability p.
# Money in it earns nothing until then; the trader's alternative earns
# rho a year, so a position must return g = (1 + rho) ** tau to be worth
# holding. Buying YES at price x pays p / x on average; buying NO at
# 1 - x pays (1 - p) / (1 - x). Neither side wants to trade while
# p / g <= x <= 1 - (1 - p) / g.
# Inside the band the price is set by whoever does want to trade: hedgers,
# fans, longshot buyers. rho = 0.045 is a risk-free rate; rho = 0.145
# adds a 10 % a year return the trader could earn elsewhere.
TAUS = ((1 / 52, "1 week"), (1 / 12, "1 month"), (0.25, "3 months"),
(0.5, "6 months"), (1.0, "1 year"), (2.0, "2 years"))
def band(p, tau, rho):
g = (1 + rho) ** tau
return p / g, 1 - (1 - p) / g
if __name__ == "__main__":
for p in (0.99, 0.05):
print("true p = {:.2f}".format(p))
print(" horizon rho = 0.045 rho = 0.145")
for tau, name in TAUS:
a = band(p, tau, 0.045)
c = band(p, tau, 0.145)
print(" {:<9} [{:.4f}, {:.4f}] [{:.4f}, {:.4f}]"
.format(name, a[0], a[1], c[0], c[1]))
print()
p, tau = 0.99, 0.5
for x in (0.92, 0.95, 0.96):
r = (p / x) ** (1 / tau) - 1
print("buy YES at {:.2f}, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected {:+.1%}"
" a year".format(x, r))
print("\nReading: a near-certain contract a year out can trade anywhere")
print("from 0.86 to 0.99 without offering anyone a return above 14.5 %;")
print("a 5 % longshot can trade up to 0.17. The band, not the")
print("probability, is what arbitrage enforces, and it closes only as")
print("resolution nears.")
# true p = 0.99
# horizon rho = 0.045 rho = 0.145
# 1 week [0.9892, 0.9900] [0.9874, 0.9900]
# 1 month [0.9864, 0.9900] [0.9789, 0.9901]
# 3 months [0.9792, 0.9901] [0.9570, 0.9903]
# 6 months [0.9684, 0.9902] [0.9252, 0.9907]
# 1 year [0.9474, 0.9904] [0.8646, 0.9913]
# 2 years [0.9066, 0.9908] [0.7551, 0.9924]
#
# true p = 0.05
# horizon rho = 0.045 rho = 0.145
# 1 week [0.0500, 0.0508] [0.0499, 0.0525]
# 1 month [0.0498, 0.0535] [0.0494, 0.0607]
# 3 months [0.0495, 0.0604] [0.0483, 0.0816]
# 6 months [0.0489, 0.0707] [0.0467, 0.1122]
# 1 year [0.0478, 0.0909] [0.0437, 0.1703]
# 2 years [0.0458, 0.1301] [0.0381, 0.2754]
#
# buy YES at 0.92, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected +15.8% a year
# buy YES at 0.95, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected +8.6% a year
# buy YES at 0.96, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected +6.3% a year
#
# Reading: a near-certain contract a year out can trade anywhere
# from 0.86 to 0.99 without offering anyone a return above 14.5 %;
# a 5 % longshot can trade up to 0.17. The band, not the
# probability, is what arbitrage enforces, and it closes only as
# resolution nears.The first table is for a contract with true probability 0.99. At the risk-free rate alone (), a one-year contract can be priced anywhere from 0.9474 to 0.9904 without offering anyone more than 4.5 % a year. If the trader can earn another 10 % elsewhere (), the lower edge falls to 0.8646; to 0.9252 at six months and 0.9570 at three. The range 0.92 to 0.96 sits right at the lower edge for three- to six-month contracts.
The second table applies the same arithmetic to a longshot whose true probability is only 0.05. At one year and the upper edge is 0.1703: a 5 % longshot can trade at 0.17 without being arbitraged, because correcting it means buying NO — locking up for a year to earn a few per cent.
The last three lines turn “free money” into annual returns. For a six-month contract with true probability 0.99, buying at 0.95 earns +8.6 % a year, at 0.96 +6.3 %; only at 0.92 does it reach +15.8 %. For a trader who can earn 14.5 % elsewhere, 0.95 is not cheap.
Note
What is left out. The band counts only the time cost of money. Platform risk (exchange failure, resolution disputes, oracle errors), fees and withdrawal costs widen it; platforms that let positions serve as collateral or pay interest on them narrow it. differs from trader to trader, and so does the band: a trader who can only earn the risk-free rate is willing to buy a one-year contract at 0.9474, while one who can earn 14.5 % is not.
Why the favourite-longshot bias survives
Chapter 1 showed that dispersed beliefs are enough to create the favourite-longshot bias. If capital were free, arbitrageurs who knew the true probabilities would remove the bias entirely. The seventh program puts the two together: the crowd’s mean belief sets the price, but when it leaves the no-arbitrage band, informed capital pushes it back to the band’s edge.
Calculation
# Chapter 3. p07: Why long-dated prices lean toward 0.5.
# Each contract has a true p (uniform on log-odds in [-4, 4]). The crowd
# price is the mean of 200 noisy beliefs (log-odds noise sd 1.0, the L
# rule of p03). Informed arbitrage capital knows p and requires
# rho = 0.145 a year, so it pushes the crowd price only back to the edge
# of the no-arbitrage band of p06; inside the band the crowd price stands.
# With rho = 0 the band is a point and prices equal p. Calibration error
# (mean price minus mean true p) is reported by price band and horizon.
import math
import random
K, T, SD, RHO = 6000, 200, 1.0, 0.145
EDGES = (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 0.9, 1.0)
def sig(x):
return 1 / (1 + math.exp(-x))
def priced(rng, tau, rho):
rows = []
for _ in range(K):
x = rng.uniform(-4, 4)
p = sig(x)
crowd = sum(sig(x + rng.gauss(0, SD)) for _ in range(T)) / T
g = (1 + rho) ** tau
lo, hi = p / g, 1 - (1 - p) / g
rows.append((min(max(crowd, lo), hi), p))
return rows
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(59007)
heads = "".join(" [{:.1f},{:.1f})".format(a, b)
for a, b in zip(EDGES, EDGES[1:]))
print("mean price - mean true p, by price band")
print(" horizon rho " + heads)
for tau, name in ((1 / 12, "1 month"), (0.5, "6 months"),
(1.0, "1 year"), (2.0, "2 years")):
for rho in (0.0, RHO):
rows = priced(rng, tau, rho)
cells = []
for a, b in zip(EDGES, EDGES[1:]):
g = [r for r in rows if a <= r[0] < b]
d = round(sum(r[0] - r[1] for r in g) / len(g), 4) + 0.0
cells.append(" {:+9.4f}".format(d))
print(" {:<8} {:5.3f}".format(name, rho) + "".join(cells))
print("\nReading: with costless capital the crowd's bias is arbitraged")
print("away; with a 14.5 % hurdle it survives - longshots too dear,")
print("favourites too cheap - growing with the horizon until the band")
print("is wide enough to hold the whole crowd bias (by six months here).")
print("The same price means a different probability a month out.")
# mean price - mean true p, by price band
# horizon rho [0.0,0.1) [0.1,0.3) [0.3,0.7) [0.7,0.9) [0.9,1.0)
# 1 month 0.000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000
# 1 month 0.145 +0.0105 +0.0092 -0.0001 -0.0092 -0.0106
# 6 months 0.000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000
# 6 months 0.145 +0.0183 +0.0358 +0.0002 -0.0355 -0.0181
# 1 year 0.000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000
# 1 year 0.145 +0.0179 +0.0354 -0.0005 -0.0355 -0.0178
# 2 years 0.000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000
# 2 years 0.145 +0.0183 +0.0351 +0.0004 -0.0357 -0.0181
#
# Reading: with costless capital the crowd's bias is arbitraged
# away; with a 14.5 % hurdle it survives - longshots too dear,
# favourites too cheap - growing with the horizon until the band
# is wide enough to hold the whole crowd bias (by six months here).
# The same price means a different probability a month out.With free capital () the band shrinks to a point, every bias is removed and every cell is 0. With capital that requires 14.5 %, the bias survives: at one month, longshots are overpriced by +0.0105 and favourites underpriced by −0.0106; at six months, contracts priced between 0.1 and 0.3 are overpriced by +0.0358 and those between 0.7 and 0.9 underpriced by −0.0355. The bias grows with the horizon until the band is wide enough to hold the whole of the crowd’s bias (here by six months), after which one-year and two-year contracts look like six-month ones.
This is the pattern Page and Clemen found in real prediction markets: the further from resolution, the more prices lean toward 0.5, and the nearer, the better calibrated (Page and Clemen 2013). This chapter’s model supplies a mechanism: overpriced longshots and underpriced favourites both sit inside the no-arbitrage band, and the band widens with the horizon.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s hypothesis (not yet tested): on the same platform, contracts whose locked funds earn interest or can be used as collateral price their long-dated favourites closer to the realised resolution rate than comparable contracts that earn nothing; a week before resolution the two kinds are equally calibrated. What would show it wrong: the two kinds show the same long-dated mispricing, or the interest-earning kind shows more. Chapter 8 gives a pre-registered test of the lock-up discount itself.
Summary
A contract that pays no interest before resolution locks the buyer’s money away until resolution day. At a cost of capital , a contract with true probability has a no-arbitrage band with , and no price inside the band pays an arbitrageur enough. The band widens with the horizon and the cost of capital: for a contract with true probability 0.99, a one-year horizon and a 14.5 % cost of capital put its lower edge at 0.8646. Overpriced longshots and underpriced favourites both survive inside it, so the longer the horizon, the more prices lean toward 0.5 — the same price stands for different probabilities a month out and a year out.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds: Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules, Favorite-Longshot Calibration Bias, Lock-Up Opportunity Cost and Frank-Wolfe Combinatorial Pricing [预测市场微观结构、布雷格曼信息投影与跨盘口无套利边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090166 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).