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Chapter 7. Classics Read Side by Side: The Substantial and the Empty, the Orthodox and the Unorthodox, and the Fog of War

Note

The comparison is an analogy throughout. This chapter reads the ancient military treatises beside the models of the first six chapters in order to see what each does and does not say. The treatises are about war; this book is about a game with fixed rules. There are comparable features of structure and none of content. The chapter does not use the classics to support any strategic conclusion, nor does it treat the vocabulary of game theory as a translation of them.

The substantial and the empty: avoid the solid, strike the void

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Sunzi, “Weak Points and Strong”: “The form of an army is like water: water in its course avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands; an army in its course avoids the solid and strikes at the void. Water shapes its flow according to the ground; an army secures victory according to the enemy. Therefore an army has no constant disposition, as water has no constant form.” (Sun Tzu 1994; Yang Bing’an 1999)

The connection to Chapter 6 is tighter than it looks. “Secures victory according to the enemy” and “no constant disposition” say that the correct course of action depends on the opponent, and is not a fixed thing. That is exactly the conclusion of the first part of Chapter 6: multiplayer games have no value guarantee, so the useful question is a best response to the opponents actually present rather than a strategy that is correct against every opponent.

But one distinction must be made. “Avoid the solid and strike at the void” corresponds in game theory to a best response, not to an equilibrium. A best response is directed at some particular opponent; an equilibrium is a profile of strategies that are mutually best responses. Sunzi is speaking of the former — his readers have a particular enemy. And Chapter 6 shows that in a four-player game it is the former that is the operable problem. So this passage falls on the same side as this book, and on a different side from the goal of “find an unexploitable way to play”.

Note

This is not a claim that the ancients had game theory. To say that “Weak Points and Strong” is about best responses is not to say that Sunzi had the concept of a best response; it is to say that when the text is reread inside this book’s framework, it lands in that position. The classics chapters of Volumes 53 and 54 use the same reading.

The orthodox and the unorthodox: the proportions of a mix

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Sunzi, “Energy”: “In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed to secure victory. Therefore he who is skilled at the indirect is inexhaustible as heaven and earth, unending as the rivers.” (Sun Tzu 1994; Yang Bing’an 1999)

This passage corresponds to the result of program p12 in Chapter 6, and it corresponds rather precisely.

First, “the direct for joining battle, the indirect to secure victory” is a statement about proportions: both are needed, and they have different work to do. The result of p12 is exactly that — both deterministic policies are worse than the mix. Always unorthodox is worth −2.00-2.00, never unorthodox −0.50-0.50, and the equilibrium mix +0.0833+0.0833. The mix beats either pure choice.

Second, the loss curve has a kink at the equilibrium and rises linearly on either side, so “always surprise” and “never surprise” are equally wrong. And the correct proportion is determined uniquely by the payoff matrix (0.1667 in this example), not by taste.

Third, “inexhaustible as heaven and earth, unending as the rivers” says that unpredictability itself is a resource. That agrees with the core of a mixed strategy: the value of mixing lies not in any one choice but in the opponent’s inability to predict the next.

But section C of Chapter 6 supplies an important qualification, and it narrows the maxim. The value of mixing requires that the opponent observe enough instances to estimate the proportion. Program p11 in Chapter 8 shows that estimating a small difference takes thousands of observations. So against an opponent who has seen a few hundred, a deterministic policy is in fact unexploitable — there are not enough data to read it.

The value of “the indirect secures victory” grows with the opponent’s volume of observation. When that volume is small, the proportion of orthodox to unorthodox hardly matters.

This is a judgement the formalisation yields and reading the classics alone does not. It also marks the maxim’s domain: an opponent in war has intelligence services and prolonged contact, and a casual opponent at a table has neither.

The fog of war: the Western counterpart

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A recurring theme in Clausewitz’s On War is the uncertainty of the information on which action rests: a great part of the intelligence obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character. He uses “fog” and “friction” for the gap between a plan and its execution (Clausewitz 1976).

The difference between Clausewitz and Sunzi here is worth recording, because it maps onto this book’s two classes of quantity (Chapter 1).

Sunzi’s emphasis is on exploiting the opponent’s solid and void — that is inference about the opponent, this book’s second class of quantity, of low reliability. Clausewitz’s emphasis is that one’s own information is unreliable and that plans deform — that is uncertainty about one’s own state, and in this book it corresponds to the reverse of the first class: even though quantities depending only on one’s own tiles can be computed exactly, everything beyond one’s own tiles is in the fog.

The calibration warning of Chapter 4 is the quantified version of this point. The race model’s absolute probabilities are too high, because it starts every hand at 1-shanten and lets the player draw freely for 18 turns. Put the most certain part of a model (one’s own shanten and acceptance) together with its least certain part (the opponents’ hazard rate) and the result is dominated by the latter. Clausewitz’s version is that precision in a plan does not guarantee precision in its execution.

Structural comparison and limits

Text What it says Where it lands in this book’s framework
“Weak Points and Strong”: victory according to the enemy; no constant disposition The right course depends on the opponent and is not fixed Best response rather than equilibrium (Chapter 6, part one)
“Energy”: the direct joins battle, the indirect secures victory The proportions of a mix Mixed equilibrium of a 2×22\times2 zero-sum game; the proportion is set by the payoff matrix (program p12)
“Energy”: inexhaustible as heaven and earth Unpredictability is a resource The value of mixing, conditional on the opponent’s volume of observation (program p11)
Clausewitz’s fog and friction One’s own information is unreliable and plans deform The first class of quantity is exact and the second dominates the conclusion (Chapters 1 and 4)

Four limits. First, the treatises are about war, in which there are no fixed rules, no determinate payoffs and no repeated play; every theorem in this book depends on all three, so the comparison extends only to structure. Second, “the indirect secures victory” has a precise proportion in this book, but that proportion is given by this book’s toy matrix and not by the Sunzi; change the matrix and the proportion changes. Third, the aim of a military treatise is to win, whereas the aim of Chapter 8 is to test whether a policy is better — two different activities, and this book’s position is the latter. Fourth, this chapter has not treated any passage as strategic advice, and does not recommend that the reader act on any of it.

Summary

“Victory according to the enemy” and “no constant disposition” land on best response rather than equilibrium in this book’s framework, which is the same side as Chapter 6’s conclusion that multiplayer games have no value guarantee, so the useful question is a best response to the opponents present. “The direct joins battle, the indirect secures victory” corresponds to mixed strategies, and program p12 supplies the precise content: both deterministic policies are worse than the mix, the loss curve has a kink at the equilibrium, and the correct proportion (0.1667 here) is determined uniquely by the payoff matrix. But the value of mixing is conditional on the opponent’s volume of observation, and reading a proportion takes thousands of observations, so when that volume is small the orthodox-to-unorthodox proportion hardly matters — a qualification the formalisation yields and reading the classics alone does not. Clausewitz’s fog divides the labour differently from Sunzi’s solid and void: it concerns the unreliability of one’s own information, which in this book is “everything beyond one’s own tiles is in the fog”, and Chapter 4’s calibration warning is its quantified version. The comparison extends only to structure, because the treatises have no fixed rules, determinate payoffs or repeated play, and every theorem here depends on all three.

References

Clausewitz, Carl von. 1976. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sun Tzu. 1994. Sun Tzu: The Art of War. Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Yang Bing’an. 1999. Shiyijia Zhu Sunzi Jiaoli [the Eleven Commentators on the Sunzi, Collated]. In Chinese. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company.

Fan, Y. (2026). Imperfect-Information Stochastic Games, Bayesian Hand-Reading and Counterfactual Regret Minimisation in Four-Player Tile Dynamics: From Markov Transitions of the Tile Pool and the Optimal Stopping of Defensive Folding to Kelly Allocation in a Multiplayer Game, with a Textual Examination of the Orthodox and the Unorthodox in the Classical Military Writers [四人不完全信息随机博弈、贝叶斯读牌与反事实遗憾最小化] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24020464 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).